Adjunct extraction and chain configurations by Hegarty, Michael Vincent
ADJUNCT EXTRACTION AND CHAIN CONFIGURATIONS
by
Michael Vincent Hegarty
B.S. in Mathematics, Arizona State University
(1980)
M.A. in Mathematics, UCLA
(1982)
M.A. in Philosophy, Ohio State University
(1986)
Submitted to the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
in panial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
at the
MASSACHUSETIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOOY
February 1992
© Michael Vincent Hegarty
The author hereby grants to MIT pennission to reproduce and
to distribute copies of this thes.is document in whole Of in part
Signature of Author ---->..,.__-;-----j'--- - -:--:--:-:----:--
Bepartment of Linguistics and Philosophy
S~temb~r 12, 1991
, -
Certified by ~_~ ,
Noam Chomsky
Thesis Sqp-qfvisor
Accepted by------------:-.1"'---~~-------- __~Y (--,.' Wayne O'Neil
Chairman, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
ARCHIVES
MASSACHuSrns INSTITUTE
OF TECI-iNQt.OGY
APR 09 1992
Lu --
ABSTRACT
This study is concerned with the semantic content of
complcmentizers, and with the modes of interpretation of adverbial
wh elernents and with their possibilities for wh movement. It
examines the event structure of cumplement clauses, revealing a
difference of semantic function between the conlplementizers in
tensed factive complement clauses and propositional complement
clauses. This yields a difference in their effects on adverbial w h
extraction. The effect of complementizers on w h extraction roin ts to
the Minimality Condition, taking effect for nongoverning heads such
as complementizers. An attempt is made to define antecedent
government in such a way as to capture the Minimality effects of
complemen tizers.
Chapter I reviews some pertinent aspects of the underlying syntactic
and seman tic frameworks, and con tains a brief au tline of the thes is.
Chapter 2 examines the event structure of complement clauses. It
argues that the event position of factive complements is discharged
by the factive complementizer, yielding an interpretation of factive
complements as involving discourse binding of the event position of
the complement clause. It then examines the even t position of
various infinitival complement clauses and of gerunds, as well as
some other contexts which involve discourse binding of an event
variable, and which exhibit the resulting presupposition that the
event occurred. In all cases, event positions which are not bound are
found to exhibit the possibility of unselective binding by an adverb
of q uan tification.
Chapter 3 examines the pattern of adv,erbial w h extraction from
factive and propositional complement clauses and shows that this
pattern depends on the event structures of the complement clauses
detailed in Chapter 2. Adverbial wh extraction out of infinitivals and
gerunds is then examined, along with extraction from some other
contexts which involve discourse binding of the event variable.
Chapter 4 examines some simplifications in extraction theory that
follow from a typology of chains at LF proposed by Chomsky. On
the basis of these simplifications, a radically reduced system of y-
marking is proposed for ex traction theory. A definition of
antecedent government is then formulated so as to capture the
Minimality effects on antecedent government of intervening
complemen tizers.
Chapter 5 summarize~ the results of the thesis and discusses them in
the light of some recent literature.
Thesis Supervisor: Noam Chomsky
Title: Institute Professor
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Chapter 1
Preliminaries and Theoretical Framework
1.0 In troductioD
Much of this dissertation is concerned with the construal and wh
movement of adverbial constituents. It brings together certain techniques
in current syntactic and semantic theories in such a way that they interact
intricately with one another. The underlying framework is therefore a
composite of syntactic and semantic devices and notions. Nevertheless,
the elements that enter into the framework adopted here can be factored into
the syntactic and the semantic, so that it makes sense to say that this
framework has two components, one of which is commonly regarded as a
,.theory of syntax, and the other as a theory of semantics. And the
conclusions arrived at here can be evaluated in terms of their implications,
if they should be correct, for the underlying syntactic and semantic theories
that went into them. Therefore, we begin with an overview of the syntactic
and semantic notions that will be drawn upon especially heavily in this
study, and those on which this study would have the most impact insofar as
it is correct.
1. 1 The Syntactic Framework
The syntactic framework for this thesis is Government~Binding theory,
as developed and manifested in Chomsky (1981), S lowell (1981), Aoun
and Sportiche (1983), Kayne (1983a), Chomsky (1986a), Chomsky
(1986b), and Chomsky (1989). The thesis will draw mostly on recent
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formulations of the theory of wh mnvement, especially those in Lasnik and
Saito (1984, forthcoming) and Chomsky (1986b). To a large extent, the
thesis is a commentary on thes(~ latter two works, devt:'.loping and
lnodifiying ideas within them, in part within the context of more recent
ideas, drawn especially from Chomsky (1989) and Chomsky (Class
lectures, Fall 1989, Fall 1990). The goal in this section is mainly to
review aspects of the theory for which some modification will be suggested
in the work that follows.
The phrase structure in Chomsky (1986b) will be adopted here, with
binary branching throughout.
(1) XP ~ YP XI
X' ~ X ZP
The position of YP in (1) is called the sper,ifier of XP, denoted spec-XP.
The specifier of XP is not a phrase structure category, but a position for
certain items related to the head X, such as an external argument of X,
certain modifiers, and perhaps determiners.
One of the driving considerations of the theory of wh movement, since
Huang (1982), is to explain the divergence between extraction properties
of arguments and adjuncts. By arguments are meant, primarily and
paradigmatically, a-marked NPs. By adjuncts are meant adverbial elements
such as reason adverbials (in order to and because clauses in English), and
manner adverbials, as well as a variety of selected adverbials. Locative
and temporal modifiers are also adjuncts; however, they do not diverge as
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radically from arguments in their behavior upon wh movement as reason
and manner adverbials do.
One driving concern of extraction theory is the subject/object
asymmetry that arises in wh movement of arguments out of 3. tensed
complement, as in (2).
(2) a. What do you think [that [John bought t ]]
b. * Who do you think [that [t hired John ]]
A second driving concern is an asymmetry of arguments and adjuncts by
which objects can extract out of islands, exhibiting subjacency effects, as
can subjects when the extraction site is far enough removed from the
is land, whereas adjuncts cannot.
(3) a. ? What do you wonder [whether John bought t ]
b. ??Who do you wonder [whether John said
[t visited Mary]]
c. * Why do you wonder [whether John resigned t]
(4) a. ? What do you believe [the claim [that John stole t ]]
b. ??Who do you believe [the rumor [that John claims
[t fired Mary ]]
c. * Why do you believe [the chlim [that John
arranged the coup t ]]
Furthermore, although adjuncts are limited in their extraction possibilities
to the extent indicated in (3)-(4), adjunct extraction does not manifest the
that-trace effect of subject extraction, shown in (2b).
(5) a. Why do you think [that [Mary hired John t ]]
b. How do you think [that [John fixed the car t ]]
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Lasnik and Saito (1984, forthcoming) account for these asymmetries on
the basis of the proper government requirements on the traces of
movement.
(6) a properly governs ~ iff either
a. a. lexically governs ~, or
b. a. antecedent governs }3.
(7) ex. antecedent governs ~ iff
a. a binds ~ (a c-commal'!ds ~, and a and ~ arecoindexed),
and
b. There is no y (y = S' or NP) such that a c-commands y
and y dominates 13, unless ~ is the head of y.
These definitions are employed under a system of assumptions that
distinguish the situation of argument traces from that of adjunct traces. In
particular, adjunct extraction as in (5) can occur across overt
complementizers, unlike subject extraction in (2b). L&S assume that
complementizers can delete at LF, thus allowing the extracted adjunct to
antecedent govern its trace in (5). By the recoverability condition on
deletion, this presupposes that complementizers lack nonrecoverable
semantic content. Furthermore, this approach to comp-trace effects
requires that the that-trace violation in (2b) be recorded somehow, else the
that-trace violation will disappear upon deletion of the intervening
complementizer at LF. L&S introduce y-marking, the assignment of an
abstract feature to traces, in order to accomplish this. In particular, they
formulate the ECP as in (8), with the y-marking mechanisms spelled out in
(9).
(8) ECP: A movement tr~ce must have the feature [+y] at LF.
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(9) y-Marking (Lasnik and Saito)
1. If an argument trace is properly governed at S-structure, then it is
marked [+y]. Otherwise it is marked [-y].
2. y-marking is indelible: once a trace has been assigned either [±y], it
retains that specification for y.
3. The trace of an adjunct is not y-marked as either [±y] at S-structure.
An adjunct trace is marked at LF as [+y] if it is properly governed at LF;
otherw ise it is marked [-y].
Since the adjunct traces in (5) cannot be antecedent governed over the
intervening complementizers at S-structure, the y-marking of adjunct traces
must be deferred until LF, at which point the complementizers have
deleted.
L&S adopt the phrase structure of the Extended Standard Theory,
according to which complement clauses have the following structure.
(10) [S' CaMP [8 ... ]]
L&S assume that COMP takes the index of the element generated in it, or,
if it is empty in the base, the first element to move into it. Antecedent
government by an element a in COMP is possible only when COMP has the
index of a; L&S construe such antecedent government as being, actually,
head government by CaMP. Antecedent government by a in COMP is
blocked when there is a complementizer in COMP since the complementizer
is the head of COMP and therefore blocks the trans ..nission of the index of
a to COMP. If we adopt the Chomsky (1986b) phrase structure in (1),
then we lose the L&S explanation for the failure of antecedent government
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over a complementizer. Within the framework of Chomsky (1986b), the
effects of antecedent government over a complementizer can be captured by
the Minimality Condition, stated, in one form, as follows.
(11) a. a does not (antecedent) govern ~ in (11 b) if "'( is a
projection of 0 excluding £l.
b. . .. a ... [y ... 5 ... J3 .•• ]
Consider the configuration in (11 b) when a is an extracted element in spec-
CP whcse trace ~ lies within IP. In this case, if 2) is a complementizer,
and y=C', it follows by (11a) that a. does not antecedent govern ~. 1 Thus,
Minimality should block antecedent government over complementizers.
In the chapters 2 and 3 below, the dependence of adverbial w h
extraction on the presence of complementizers will be examined. Finally,
in Chapter 4, relying on the idea (Chomsky, Class lectures, Fall 1990) that
chains must be uniform in order to be legitimate LF objects, a much
simplified system of y-marking will be proposed in which the "'( feature is
assigned as a privative feature rather than as a binary feature specification,
where the assignment of '1 is needed only for the original trace of argument
extraction. The characteristics of adverbial wh extraction are determined
by the well formedness of the LF chain of adjunct extraction, and by the
mechanisms of adverbial wh construal explored in Chapters 2 and 3.
In Chapter 4 below, antecedent government will be defined in such a
way as to capture Minimality effects induced by complementizers with
1Chomsky (1986b) assumes that the I system is defective for Minimality, as it is for the
definition of barriers, so 0=1 and y=r in (11 b) does not induce Minimality.
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semantic content. In particular, the Government Domain of a head X will
be defined as its m-command domain together with the specifier and head
of its complement (if any). fhis., in itself, is a sort of local domain
delimited by Minimality. Assuming that INFL is an extended projection of
V, the Government Domains of V and I fuse together to form an Extended
Government Domain. Antecedent government is taken to be free within an
Extended Government Domain. In particular:
( 12)
ex an teceden t governs ~ iff
a. a. binds p (ex c-commands p, and ex and ~ are coindexed), and
b. There is an Extended Government Domain containing both
a. and ~.
Under assumptions about head movement adopted in Chapter 4, this
definition effectively captures Minimality effects of complemen tizers.
1.2 The Semantic Framework
This section will review the semantic framework developed in
Higginbotham (1985, 1989). In section 1.2.3, a small modification will be
suggested in the way in which we understand the mechanisms of this
framework. The object is to arrive at explicit representations of the truth
conditions of a sentence. These 'J. epresentations will usually be given in
formulas of first order logic, called logical forms. These are to be
distinguished from LFs, which are representations at the level of LF in the
grammar.
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1.2.1 Theta role discharge and semantic composition
To begin with, the modes of a-role discharge must be enlarged beyond
the operation of a-marking. A verb has an array of semantic arguments,
filling various thematic roles, whi\.~h must be projected into the syntax.
This thematic structure is recorded in the lexicon as positions within a 0-
grid (5 towell 1981). For example, the 9- grid of the verb see is of the
form <1,2>, where the first entry fIt is the role of the agent of seeing,
and the second entry 12' is the role of the patient, the entity seen. These e-
roles are projected in the syntax as argument positions which, by the
Projection Principle (Chomsky 1981), must be present at all levels of
syntac.+ic derivation in the grammar. An argument is projected (in accord
with XI -theory) from a position in the a-grid of the verb, and assigned the
corresponding thematic role; the assignment of this thematic role is called
a-marking, and the corresponding entry in the a-grid of the verb is thereby
discharged. This meets a necessity of lexical semantics: that the verb be
provided with a sequence of arguments, each bearing an appropriate
thematic role. ThroQgh a-marking, the available a-roles are paired with
arguments one-by-one. Thus a-marking is a mode of semantic composition
for a verb with its arguments. Furthermore, a-marking can be taken as the
basis for a certain part of semantic composition: it is the syntactic condition
under which the argument places of a predicate are saturated.
But a-marking will not suffice as the basis of semantic composition for
some other predicates. A common noun, such as dog, has an open
position, in evidence in (14) below, where the open position is projected
15
up to VP and predicated of an individual by a-marking, yielding the
(simplified) interpretation in (13b).
( 13) a. Fido is a dog
b. dog(Fido)
This motivates a lexical entry for dog along the lines shown in (14), where
the position x is a generalized thematic role.
(14) dog (+N, -V, <x»
With its open position undischarged, the head [N dog<x>] denotes the
function from individuals to truth values that is true for an individual just
in case it is a dog (or extensionally, it denotes the set of aU dogs). But
then in the context in (15), there is no NP argument to be 9-marked and
thereby to discharge this open position.
(15) The dog entered the room
In these contexts, Higginbotham assumes that the determiner discharges the
open position in [N' <x> dog] (where the a-grid is projected up to N' since
its open position wasn't discharged at N). Discharge by the definite
determiner in (15a) has the effect of mapping the set of all dogs to a unique
dog. This mode of a-role discharge is called a-binding, illustrated in
(16a) below, w here the empty angle brackets <> indicate a 9- grid whose 0-
roles have all been discharged. The semantic effect of a-binding in (16a) is
to introduce the iota operator in (16b).
(16) a. [NP the [N'<x> [N<x> dog ]]]
b. tx dog(x)
16
The resulting NP enters into further semantic operations (those that operate
outside the NP, in the context in which it occurs) as a closed expression.
With an indefinite determiner in (15), we will adopt Heim' s (1982)
theory of exis tential clos ure. The indefinite determiner does not bind the
open position in N'; this open position then projects up to the NP node of
an indefinhe. The indefinite NP< 1> raises and adjoin s to IP at LF where it
can be bound by an adverb of quantification or by an unselective existential
quantifier 3 which is adjoined to IP above it.
In order to capture the effects of quantificational variability that
indefinites manifest in the scope of certain unselective binders (Lewis
1975, Heim 1982), the indefinite deternliner must fail to discharge the open
position, leaving it open to be bound by the unselective binder. Consider
the example in (17a) from Lewis (1975), whose interpretation can be
expressed as in (17b).
(17) a. A quadratic equation usually has two solutions
b. Most(x) [x a quadratic equation] (x has two solutions)
As Lewis argues, the adverb in such sentences is an intrinsically
unselective adverb of quantification whose domain of quantification is
determined by what variables are available in the context. In (17a), the
adverb usually quantifies over quadratic equations, as expressed by the
quantifier most(x) in (17b). As such, it relies on the presence of a
variable in the indefinite NP; a definite NP cannot occupy the same
position, with the same quantificational interpretation of the adverb. This
17
s ugges ts that the indefinite NP in (17 a) should have a free variable, as
argued by Heim (1982).
The semantic needs of other predicate~ motivate two additional
operations on a-roles. There is a very straightforward form of adjectival
modification, in which a common noun is further delimited by an adjective.
This is the case in (18a), which has the interpretation in (18b).
(18) a. The red ball
b. tx [red(x) & ball(x)]
The predicate-argument structure in (18b) suggests that the adjective red
has an open position of its own; the interpretation in (18b) can be derived
from thematic structure (in the extended sense employed here) if the open
position of the adjective is identified with the open position of the head N
in a process of a-identification, illustrated in (19) below.
(19) NP<>
A
the Nt <x>
A
A<x> N<x>
I I '-~111red~
The a-positions of the A and N are identified at Nt, and the resulting
position is discharged by the determiner at Nt, yielding the interpretation in
(18b). Thus, the effect of a-identification is to establish that the red ball
is interpreted as something that is both red, and a ball.
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Not all cases of adjectival modification are as straightforward as that
involved in (18a). A case in point is the expression in (20a), which has, as
a salient interpretation, the one paraphrased in (20b).
(20) a. a big mosquito
b. a thing that is a mosquito, and big for a mosquito
In (20b), ins tead of conjoining the property of being big directly with the
property of being a mosquito, the property of being big is first relativized
to the property of being a mosquito, and then conjoined to this latter
property. The adjective big firs t looks at the head N it is modifying, and
is interpreted as bigness with respect to members of the class denoted by
this N, called the comparison class. This aspect of the interpretation of big
in (20) is captured by adding to the a· grid of the adjective a position which
can only be saturated by a property; the discharge of this position is
accomplished by the formal device of antonymous a-marking which
takes the property denoted by the head N and uses it to establish a
comparison class for the property expressed by the adjective. The lexical
entry of the adjective big in (20a) is given in (21a), and the interpretation
induced by autonymous a-marking is given in (21 b). The process of
autonymous a-marking is illustrated in (21c).
(21) a. big (+ V, +N, < 1,2»
b. tx [ mosquito(x) & big(x, {y: mosquito(y)}) ]
19
c. NP
A
det N'
~
A<1,2> N<l>
blg l m~sq?J
There are yet more subtle cases of adjectival modification, many of theIn
discussed in Higginbotham (1985, 1989). These include modification by
adjectives such as alleged, purported, suspected, which derive properties
from the corresponding verbs, and ones like rude which can characterize
an action either in its manner or in reference to the people who engage in it.
The subtleties will not be needed in the following chapters, and so will not
be discussed here.
1.2.2 Event Semantics
The processes considered so far concern the NP arguments in a sentence
and the individuals which they denote. For other processes, it is useful to
postulate an additional argument position corresponding to the event (or
state) described by the sentence. The lexical entry of the verb see is then
of the form (+V, -N, <1,2,E», where E is an event a-position. In a root
clause, such as Mary saw Tom, the event position of the verb is projected
with the a-grid to VP where it is discharged by a-binding by a tensed INFL;
abstracting away from other a-roles in the a-grid, this is represented in
20
(22).2 (The empty brackets '<>' accompanying a node indicate that the
event position has been discharged below that node.)
(22)
In semantic composition, the a-binding by a [+Tns] INFL introduces
existential quantification over the event variable, with the existential
quantifier exported outside the representation of the semantic argument
structure, as in (23).
(23) 3e see(Mary, Tom,e)
In Chapter 2, reason will be given for assuming that the event position of
infinitivals is projected up to the IP node of the infinitival clause; this is
why only [+Tns] INFL effects a-binding of the event position.
Furthermore, tensed complement clauses will be considered (section 2.1),
and reason will be found to assume that their event position is not
discharged by INFL; this is why (22) is proposed here only for root
clauses.
In straightforward cases of adverbial modification, the adverb is
predicated of the event described in the clause. Thus in The rainbow
quickly disappeared, the adverb quickly assigns a property to the event of
the rainbow disappearing, namely of being quick (to transpire). This can
be captured by a-identification if we assume that the adverb has an event 9-
position of its own, so that is is entered in the lexicon as quickly <e>.
29-binding by !NFL is structurally analogous to a-binding by a determiner only if the
determiner is in 00.
21
Leaving the adverb out of consideration, the sentence asserts that an event
characterized as a disappearing occurred, with the rainbow as participant,
as in (24a) below. Assuming that the adverb is adj<:>ined to VP, the event
position of the adverb can a-identify with that of the VP, as in (24b). The
event position resulting from 9-identificati,on (e in (24b» is projected to the
higher segment of the complex VP node formed by adjunction, and a-bound
by INFL[+Tns], yielding the interpretation in (24c).
(24)
a.
b.
c.
3e [disappear(the rainbow,e)]
[IP the rainbow [I [+Tns]] [vP<~> [Adv<e"> quickly] [VP<e'>
1 ,. 1 1
disappeared ]]]
3e [disappear(the rainbow,e) & quick(e)]
This is only the most straightforward case, in fact, a sort of limiting case.
Adverbials don't always modify the event alone, and a sentence like the
rainbow quickly disappeared is a sort of limiting case in which the event
alone is modified. Consider instead a sentence like John quickly set the
table. This would mean not just that the setting of the table transpired
quickly, but also that John was quick (efficient or hurried) in his actions.
Other adverbial modifiers, including argument oriented adverbs such as
intentionally and reluctantly, also require more complex mechanisms
(primarily just combinations of ones considered so far) by which they
characterize the subject. 3 These will not be addressed here. Furthermore,
adverbial modification is often relativized to a comparison class. In a
sentence like that in (25), wearing away of the pyramids may be an event
3Also, manner adverbs often characterize the subject. For example, clumsily has a pure
subject oriented reading, and a manner reading, but even on the manner reading it
characterizes the subject ill part, as well as the event (that is, the action).
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that will span decades, but it is nevertheless quick against the comparison
class of wearings away (of pyramids).
(25) With the increase in tourism over the past few years, the
pyramids are quickly being worn away.
This can be captured by autonymous a-marking, positing an argument place
for the comparison class in the a-grid of the adverb.
1. 2 •3 Dis co U rs e bin din g
The mechanisms reviewed in sections 1.2.1 and 1. 2. 2 were presented as
though they established absolute reference to things and events in a model.
But in fact, to be useful, they had to be understood as implicitly relativized
to a discourse context which is not fixed throughout a conversation. For
example, [NP the dog], intel-preted as tx[dog(x)] on an occasion of use
does not refer to the unique dog in the model, but rather to a unique dog
established for the purposes of the discourse. A similar point can be made
with regard to events/states in the example in (26a), interpreted as in (26b)
(from Higginbotham 1985).
(26) a. Mary persuaded me of [John's lack of talent]
b. [3e: lack(John, talent, e)] Mary persuaded me of e
The state of which Mary persuades me in (26a) might be John's lack of a
particular talent which has been established as relevant for the discourse,
and (26) would then concern only that one state.
Adopting ideas from Karttunen (1976), Kamp (1981), and Heim (1982),
the mechanisms of the previous sections can be interpreted in a way that
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makes this implicit relativization explicit. Suppose that a discourse frame
is maintained in the course of a conversation. For concreteness and some
technical convenience, the conception of a discourse file given by Heirn
(1982) will be adopted here, with some modifications. On this conception,
the discourse frame would be a file of cards. Items within the discourse
frame are file cards marked with a referential index, containing pertinent
information about the indexed item. Items can be entered into the discourse
frame in a variety of ways. They can be established by being explicitly
mentioned, as when a conversation is opened with the remark, A dog bit me
yesterday. Such a remark causes a file card to be introduced with an index
i on it and the information !lis a dog", along with "bit j", where j is the
index of a card corresponding to the speaker. Furthermore, in order to
accommodate the event semantics in section 1.2.2, we'll assume that a card
is introduced with an index k and written on it the information, "is an
event in which i bit j". Another wayan item can be entered into the
discourse frame is for an object to be salient in a conversation. If a dog
walks into a room, his presence evident to all involved in a discourse, and
it is obvious that his presence is evident to all, then a speaker can remark,
The dog is hungry, or He is hungry. In this case, the entry of the dog
into the room establishes a file with an index distinct from that of any other
card in the file, and with suitable information, basically anything that can
be gleaned by a casual obsesvation of the dog.
This is idealizing somewhat. Actually, Heim assumes that there is a file
of cards for each participant in the discourse, which is particular to the
knowledge of that participant and which gets updated accordingly as items
are introduced to that participant. In the example at hand, participants may
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notice the dog in varying degrees of detail, and some may have to add
information to their file for the dog as others call their attention to features
of the dog that they hadn't noticed before. Thus, at a given point in the
discourse, not all participant's files for the dog will be alike. In the
current example, in order for the definite NP the dog or the pronoun he to
be felicitously used, a file card for the dog must be present in the file of
each participant, but a card for the state of the dog being hungry need be
added only when it is mentioned in the discourse. 4
From now on, a-binding will be interpreted as binding within the
discourse frame. In place of the iota operator, which selects from the
domain of individuals in the model, introduce an operator B which selects
cards within the discourse frame. Then a-binding by a determiner, as in
(27a), will be interpreted as discourse binding, or o-binding, as in (27b).
(27) a. [NP the [N'<x> dog]]
1 "
b. 8x[dog(x)]
Furthermore, a-binding by [+Tns] INFL will existentially bind the event
position, not over events and states in the model, but over file cards for
events and states. For a given discourse frame D, let DE be the file card
4The exact contents of a person's file, before the dog is mentioned, can be established by
the course of the subsequent mentionings of the dog. If the dog enters the room visibly
limping, commentary may be opened by someone voicing the speculation, Maybe he put his
foot in the mouse trap. This comment assumes that everybody noticed the dog's limp, and
thereby presupposes that each person has a discourse frame with the infonnation Itis
limping lt or Ithas a hurt foot" on the file card for the dog, and with a file card for the state "i
is limping", where i is the index in the public ftIe for the card for the dog. Alternatively, if
commentary is opened by someone saying, Look, the dog is limping, and if this comment
is felicitously made, then the file card for the dog in the hearer's file is established as initially
lacking information about the li'11p, and this infonnation is entered upon the making of this
comment
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for events and states in D. Then a-binding of the event position in (28a)
establishes the interpretation in (28b).
(28) a. [IP Mary [I [+T~~~~~~~:+> saw Tom ]]
b. 3eeDE [see(Mary, Tom,e)]
In chapter 2, we will encounter cases of a-binding of the event position.
1.3 Outline of the Thes is
In Chapter 2, the event structure of complement clauses is examined. It
is argued that factive tensed complements and propositional tensed
complements differ in their event structure, with the event position of the
factive tensed complement being bound within the discourse frame by the
complementizer of the factive clause, whereas the event position of a
propositional complement is bound in semantic composition with the
higher, propositional, verb. This effectively assigns semantic content to
the factive complementizer.
In Chapter 3, the event structures in Chapter 2 are used to give an
account of the patterns of adverbial wh extraction out of factive and
propositional tensed complements.
In Chapter 4, obligatory and nonobligatory complementizers are
examined in terms of their effects on extraction. Using the idea that only
uniform chains are legitimate LF chains, the need for the device of y-
marking is minimized, assuming the effects of the Minimality Condition for
26
nongoverning heads. Antecedent government is then defined in such a way
as to capture the effects of Minimality for nongoverning heads.
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis with a discussion of its results in light
of some recent literature.
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· . ~'. aspter 2
Events and Presuppositions
2.0 Introduction
This chapter analyzes a variety of presuppositional phenomena as being
formally reducible to the form of the presupposition involved in definite
descriptions, as in (1).
(1) a. The King of France is bald
b. Presupposition: There is a King of France
In particular, the presupposition in (1) will be analyzed as induced by
binding of a variable over individuals within the discourse frame of the
speaker upon emitting the utterance. A variety of other presuppositions
will be analyzed as being introduced by binding of a variable ranging over
events within the discourse frame; this will give them the character of
definite descriptions of events. Within the framework of Higginbotham
(1985, 1989), outlined in Chapter 1, some mechanisms will be sketched for
the structural generation of these presuppositions within a compositional
semantics. In the next chapter, the mechanisms introduced here will be
taken as the basis for a theory of adverbial w h extraction.
2.1 The Event Structure of Tensed Complement Clauses
In this section, it will be argued that factive and nonfactive tensed
complements differ in their internal event structure. This will be used to
account for various syntactic differences between the two types of tensed
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complements, and it will constitute the basis for an account of the
differences in adverbial wh extraction from the two complement types, to
be pursued in the next chapter.
2.1.1 Propositional and factive complements
With regard to a number of properties, to be considered in this and the
next chapter, predicates taking clausal complements cluster into two
classes t propositional predicates and factive predicates, which I will call p-
predicates and f-predicates. When the predicates at i~sue are verbs, we
will refer to p-verbs and f-verbs; when they are clausal complement taking
adjectives, we will refer to p-adjectives and f-adjectives. Correspondingly,
the complements of these predicates are characterizable as propositional or
factive, hereafter, p-complements and f-complements. Examples of p-
predicates and f-predicates are given in (2). 1
(2)
p-verbs: allege, assert, assume, believe, claim, conclude,
conjecture, consider, decide, declare, envisage,
es timate, fancy, feel, figure, imagine, intimate, judge,
propose, report, reckon, say, state, suggest, suppose,
suspect, tell, think
f-verbs: admit, comment, emphasize, forget, inform, know,
mention, notice, point out, realize, recall, recognize,
regret, remember,
p-adjectives: likely, possible
f-adjectives: aware, significant, odd
1See Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971) and Cattell (1978).
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Some predicates may be ambiguous between being propositional and
factive, including the verbs convince, report, tell. 2 The focus will be on
p-verbs and f-verbs in this dissertation.
First note that f-complements generally require the that
complementizer, as in (3ab), although this requirement is not so strong in
some cases, such as (3c).
(3) a. lie John accepts [tfl [Mary left]]
mentioned
pointed out
recalls
b. • John informed Bill [eJ> (Mary left]]
c. ? John adrrlits [eJ> [Mary left]]
forgot
noticed
knows
I'll assume that the complementizer is present in all f-complements, even in
the cases when an overt complementizer is not clearly obligatory. In view
of the lack of uniformity in the data, this point is not a very strong one in
2The following data, from Ritter and Szabolcsi (1991), illustrate the ambiguity of tell
between propositional and factive interpretations. (Ritter and Szabolcsi report only a '*'
in (ib), corresponding to the 'I' given here.)
(i) a. I told Bill he was being stupid (but I knew he wasn't)
b. I told Bill that he was being stupid (OKl# but I knew he wasn't)
In (ia), where the complementizer is missing, the complement ofrell is unambiguously
propositional, as indicated by the possibility of continuing with the parenthesized material
denying the content of the complement clause. In (ib), with the complementizer present,
the complement of tell can be interpreted as either propositional or as factive, where on
the factive interpretation, it is not possible to continue with material that denies the content
of the complement clause. A similar contrast hold for report and convince to the extent
that the complementizer can be absent in their complements.
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isolation, but the presence of the complementizer will be critical to the
analysis developed below, so it will be insisted on nevertheless. 3
The p-verbs and f-verbs in (2) differ in two other respects that will be
discussed here. First, the f-complements can occur with an associated
object expletive, as in (4); p-complements cannot. 4
a. * I suppose / claim it [that John left]
b. * Bill said it [that John left]
(4)
(5)
a.
b.
c.
I regret it [that John left]
John mentioned it [that Bill just left]]
John commented on it {that nobod.y seems to care]
Next, p-verbs can take EeM infinitival complements, with or without
raising, as in (6)-(7); f-verbs cannot.
(6) a. We believe / claim / suppose [John to be talented]
b. * We noticed / emphasized / regret [John to be talented]
(7) a. John is believed / claimed I supposed [t to be talented]
b. * John is noticed I emphasized / regretted [t to be talented]
The following seem to defy the generalization that factive predicates do
not take ECM complements.
(8) We recognize I find / determined John to be insincere
3The complementizer seems to be obligatory in the complements of a few propositional
predicates. This is discussed in section 2.1.3 below.
4In examples like the following, a propositional verb seems to take an object expletive.
(i) I believe it [that John left]
However, this ascription is not actually propositional; it has what Cattell (1978) calls a
response stance interpretation, to be discussed later in this section.
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However, the sentences in (8) are not straighforwardly factive. They have
the quality of an evaluation, asserting that we have arrived at an evaluation
of John as insincere. This point will be taken up later in this section when
the interpretive difference between propositional and factive complements
is discussed.
In order to account for these facts, a structural distinction will be
drawn between the complements of p-verbs and f-verbs. For the moment,
this difference will simply be stipulated as a means of accounting for the
data discussed above. Later in this section, the interpretations of
propositional and factive complements will be di "'ussed more carefully,
and an attempt will be made to motivate the structures adopted here.
Consider a pair of ascriptions, one of them factive and the other
propos itional, as follows.
(9) a. John mentioned that Max visited London
b. John believes that Max visited London
Assume that in embedded clauses, INFL does not discharge the event
position; discharging the event position is a function of INFL only in root
clauses. 5 The event position of a complement clause then propagates
higher up in the clause, beyond the INFL node, to IP. Assume that the
complementizer in a factive that-clause discharges the event position of the
clause at IP, as shown in (10).
STIte actual generalization is that iNFL discharges the event position in clauses with an
interrogative, assenoric, or relative marker or feature. Then INFL fails to discharge the
event position in infinitival and that clause complements.
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(10) forget [cp<> that £!P<e> Max [['<e> I [VP<e> visit London]]]]1 -1'
,Assume that in a propositional complement, the complementizer does not
discharge the event position, which then propagates to C' and then to CP.
Suppose finally that the event position of a propositional complemen t is
discharged in ser.:1antic composition with the verb that selects this
complemen t, as in (11).
(11) believe [CP<e> that [IP<e> Max [I'<e> I [VP<e> visit London]]]]
1 -+
The event position of a factive complement cannot be discharged in
semantic composition with the higher verb, as the event position of a
propositional complement can. This structural difference between factive
and propositional complements is to be assured by selection. A factive
predicate selects a closed complement, CP<>. With the INFL node
incapable of discharging the event position of the complement clause, the
only element within the clause capable of discharging the event position is
the complementizer. A propositional predicate selects a complement with
an open event position, CP<e> or IP<e>. Thus the event position of a
propositional complement clause must remain undischarged up to the CP
node.
The facts mentioned earlier in this section can now be accounted for in
terms of the selectional properties of the verbs at issue. To begin with, f-
complements must have a complementizer since the complementizer of an f~·
complement plays a semantic role in binding the event position of the
complement clause. The complementizer of a p-complement plays no
semantic role, and.is therefore not obligatory.
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Now consider the extraposition data in (4) and (5). The operation of 9 4
binding is restricted to sisterhood (Higginbotham 1985). Therefore, since
the event a-position of the complement clause of a p-verb is discharged in
the process of composing verb and complement, it follows that the
complement of a p-verb must be base generated as sister of the selecting
verb. 6 This prevents the complement CP from having an object expletive in
its place, as in (5a).7 Since the event position of an f-verb complement is
discharged internally to the complement clause, the f-complement is not
required to be base generated as sister of the verb that selects it.
Therefore, f-complements can occur in the context in (4). If the
complementizer of an f-complement failed to discharge the event position
of that complement, or if the complementizer of a p-complement did
discharge the event position of the complement, selectional requirements of
the selecting head would not be met.
Next consider the ECM infinitivals in (6). In such an infinitive, unlike
a tensed f-complement, there is no [Tns] morpheme and no complementizer
to discharge the event position. Therefore the event position of the
infinitive remains undischarged up to the IP boundary of the infinitive,
where it must be discharged in composition of the infinitive with the higher
predicate. Therefore only a predicate that selects a constituent with an
6When the propositional complement occurs in a double object structure, as in John told
Bill thaI Mary left, there are two choices: we can adopt a structure of the double object
VP derived from Larson (1988) in which the complement is a sister of the verb, or we
can loosen the strict sisterhood condition slightly to allow discharge by V anywhere
within VP.
7Complements of [+E] verbs can be displaced transfonnationally, as in the passive
sentence Thai Max visited Spain is believed by everyoni? This is consistent with the
discussion above since movement chains transmit 9-structure.
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open event position can take an ECM infinitival complement. Since p-
verbs select an open IP<e>, but f-verbs don't, it is then expected that p-
verbs can take ECM infinitiv?ls, as in (6a), and that f-verbs cannot, as in
(6b).8
We now consider how the mechanisms proposed above might be
interpreted. To begin with, a factive complement involves a presupposition
to the effect that the event (or state) described in the complement clause
actually occurred (holds). The reports in (12) below, for example, all
presuppose that Bill sliced the grapefruit. 9
( 12) John mentioned that Bill sliced the grapefruit
forgot
regrets
pointed out
Sentences like those in (12) can be paraphrased as follows.
8Note that, in the discussion of this paragraph, the lack of a [Tns] morpheme and
complementizer assure that the infinitival is of the fonn IP<e>, and is therefore
propositional, and not factive. However, it is not true that infinitivals are generally
nonfactive. This will be taken up in section 2.2.
gIn making this claim, it is impottant to screen out some apparent counter examples. A
speaker might use a sentence such as John mentioned that Bill sliced the grapefruit as a
rhetorical device for putting forth the assertion that Bill sliced the grapefruit. In this
event, some of the speaker's audience may not have known beforehand that Bill sliced
the grapefruit It might then seem that the complement clause is not presupposed.
Howevert in such a use, the attitude of the speaker is that the fact that Bill sliced the
grapefruit ought to be common knowledge. In using a factive ascription, the speaker is
according the complement clause the status of a factive complement, thus getting across
the speaker's point --- that the content of the complement clause ought to be accepted by
all present In using (12) in the rhetorical manner just described, the speaker is adopting
a discourse frame which contains a relevant event of Bill slicing a grapefruit. If other
participants in the conversation are not aware that Bill sliced the grapefruit, or don't
believe that he did, then the discourse fmme adopted by the speaker for the purposes of
using (12) is not actually a discourse frame that all participants in the conversation would
accept. Nevertheless, the semantics of an ascription like those in (12) goes through
unaffected, as factive complementation. The issue of what discourse frame can actually
be adopted in a conversation is a separate issue, distinct from semantic issues.
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(13) a. Regarding the event e in which Bill slir,ed a grapefruit, John
men lioned that e occurred.
b. John mentioned that the event in which Bill sliced a
grapefruit occurred.
The event structure of an example like this, rcpe~tP,d from (10) above, is
the following.
( 14)
mention [cp<> that [rP<e> Bill [I'<e> I [VP<e> slice a grapefruit ]]]]
1 +
The interpretation in (13) can be made dependent on the event structure in
(14) if the complementizer that B-binds the event p"'.sition that it
discharges. The interpretation of (14) is then the following.
( 15) John mentioned that Oe[slice(Bill, grapefruit, t;)] occurred
This is precisely (13b). Since the 8-bound event position is referentially
transparent, it can be exported from the context of the complement clause,
yielding the formulation in (13a).
Turning to propositional complementation, consider first a propositional
attitude ascription, as in (16).
(16) John believes [that Max visited London]
In this ascription, there is no presupposition that the event (state) described
in the complement clause occurred (holds). There is therefore no role for
the discourse frame in formulating the interpretation of this sentence.
However, there is need to appeal to another special domain of entities,
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namely, John's mental model of the world. An interpretation of (16) can
be formulated along the following lines. 10
(17) [3eeME: visit(M,L,e)] believe(J,e)
M = John's mental model
ME = the set of events in M
That is, (16) asserts that there is an event e in John's mental model, and
that John stands in a belief relation to that event in his mental model. The
event structure of the complement clause, repeated from (11) above, is
given in (18).
(18) believe [CP<e> that hP<e> Max h'<e> I [VP<e> visit London]]]]
I ~
The interpretation in (17) can be made dependent on the structure in (18) if
the discharge of the event position by a propositional predicate effects
existential quantification over the mental model of the world held by the
subject of the attitude ascription. This will now be addressed.
The interpretation in (17) can be derived from the structure in (18) by
analogy with the analysis of perception sentences given in Higginbotham
(1983), discussed below in section 2.2.2.
sentence in (19) below.
(19) Jobo saw Mary leave the barn
Consider the perception
10See Moltmann (1990) for an elaboration of an approach with a similar underlying idea.
See Johnson-Laird (1983) for a theory of mental models.
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Such sentences have characteristic properties, and Higginbotham argues
that an analysis that captures these properties in a compositional manner is
to be favored. These properties, as exhibited by (19), are as follows:
(20)
I. Veridicality: If (19) is true, then it follows that Mary left the barn.
II. Referential transparency: Substitution: The context of the complement
is referentially transparent; that is, replacement of a singular term by
one with the same reference does not change the truth value of the
sentence.
III. Exportability of quantifiers: The following are true.
a. If John saw somebody leave the barn, then there is somebody
who John saw leave the barn.
b. If John saw nobody leave the barn, then there is nobody who
John saw leave the barn.
These properties are captured if we assume that the event variable of the
naked infinitive complement in (19) is exis tentially quan tified out, with
wide scope over the attribution of the perception, as follows.
(21) [3e: leave(Mary, the barn, e)] see(John, e)
Putting in the matrix event variable, we increase the adicity of the predicate
see by one, allowing for the matrix event variable.
(22) (3e t )[3e: .leave(Mary, the barn,e)] see(John,e,e t )
But the heart of the analysis is in (21). Since the quantification over the
event variable of the ~omplement clause takes wide scope, it follows that
the perceived event must have occurred (I.), and since the content of the
complement clause is specified outside the scope of the perception verb in
(21) and (22), it follows on this analysis that the context of the complement
clause is referentially transparent (11.), and allows quantification out of it
(III. ).
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Assuming that the semantics can make use of domains of mental entities
derived from John's mental model, the propositional attitude a~cription in
(16) can be analyzed in a way directly parallel to Higginbf'tham's analysis
of perception sentences, yielding (17). In particular, suppose that we are
given M=John's mental model, and ME=the set of events in M. Then if
(16) is true, it follows that there is an event eEME in which Max visits
London. Next, suppose that we replace one of the singular terms Max or
London in the complement of (16) with a singular term having the same
referent within M, assuming that this means that John takes the two
singular terms to refer to the same thing. Then the truth of the sentence in
(16) is preserved. Thus, the propositional attitude ascription (16) quite
s traigh tforw ardly has properties of veridicalty and referen tial trans parency,
only relativized to John's mental model M. Finally, we consider whether a
relativized version of exportability of quantifiers holds. The question is
whether (23a) entails (23b), and whether (24a) entails (24b).
(23)
a. John believes that somebody left the house
b. (3XEM)(John believes x left the house)
(24)
a. John believes that nobody left the house
b. -(3xeM)(John believes x left the house)
These entailments must hold no matter what the grounds are for John's
belief. In particular, (23a) must hold when John believes that somebody
left the house but has no idea as to who it might have been that left the
house; this case arises, for example, when (23a) is true merely because
John overheard a person P say "Somebody left the house", and John
believes P. In this case, (23b) does not follow if the existential quantifier
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over M requires that John be acquainted with a person who he believes to
have left the house, or that he have a mental image of this person.
However, it is plausible to suppose that if (23a) is true, then a place is
reserved in Jobn' s mental model for the person who he believes left the
house, even if John has no acquaintance with, or mental image of, such a
person. On this assumption, (23a) entails (23b). Further, (24a) entails
(24b) quite straightforwardly. Thus, a version of the exportability of
quantifiers, relativized to the subject's mental model, does hold for
propositional attitude ascriptions.
This motivates the analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions given in
(17), repeated below.
(17) [3eEME: visit(M,L,e)] believe(J,e)
M =John's mental model
ME = the set of events in M
Adopting this as the analysis of (16), the properties (1. )-(111.), relativized
to M, follow automatically. Furthermore, the truth conditions in (17) can
be derived straightforwardly from the structure in (18), repeated here.
(18) believe [CP<e> that [IP<e> Max [f'<e> I [VP<e> visit London]]]]
1 +
On this structure, the content of the attitude ascription can be treated as an
indefinite description of an event, where the event corresponds to the event
position of the complement clause, and the indefinite description occurs
within the context of the propositional attitude verb believe. Under the
existential interpretation of indefinites, the unbound variable of the
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indefinite description will be quantified out, but we assume that embedding
under believe relativizes this quantification to John's mental model,
establishing the existential quantification over ME in (17). See section
2.2.2 for discussion of the parallel deriving the interpretation of a
perception sentence from the naked infinitive structure of the complement
of the perception verb. Altogether, then, the grounds for adopting the
structure (18) and interpretation (17) for a propositional attitude ascription
such as (16) are ~dentical, modulo relativization to a mental model, to the
grounds for adopting the naked infinitive structure for a perception
complement, and Higginbotham's analysis of the perception sentence.
A critical and fundamental feature of the interpretation in (17) is
obtained by deriving it from the structure in (18). Note that the
characterization of the event in the restrictive clause of the quantifier in
(17) can be referentially opaque in everything except the variable e. The
speaker of the attitude ascription in (16) need not be able to establish
independent reference to items about which the subject, John, has beliefs.
It may even be that the attitude report involves things that don't actually
exist. However, the speaker has referential access to the belief state of
John. In saying that John believes a unicorn is in the next room, the
speaker cannot refer to a unicorn, since there is none, but the speaker can
refer to that part of John's model of the world which (mistakenly) places a
unicorn in the next room. The structure in (18) captures this feature of the
belief ascription by using the event position of the complement clause to
refer to the relevant portion of John's mental model, and by having this
event position discharged in semantic composition with the opacity
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inducing predicate believe itself; the event position is thereby discharged
outside the scope of believe.
Thus we derive the interpretation in (17) from the structure in (18) as
follows. Assume that the event a-position of the complement clause is not
discharged by INFL (since it is not a root clause), nor by the
complementizer that (which would a-bind the event position and make the
complement factive). The event po~ition thus propagates up to the CP node
of the complement clause. This is required as a consequence of the
selectional properties of the propositional verb, which selects a complement
with an open event position, CP<e> in (16). The event position of the
complement clause is then discharged by the higher, propositional, verb.
The binding of the event variable therefore occurs outside the context of
referential opacity of the verb, allowing the speaker to have referential
access to it. This makes the event position of the lower clause available to
the speaker to quantify over it. Binding by the propositional verb
existentially quantifies the event position over the domain ME of events
within John's mental model. Finally, we say that belief and other
propositional attitudes are relations between John and parts of his mental
model delineated by the event positions of the complement clauses of
propositional attitude ascriptions. This allows us to identify the event
variable in (17) as the object of John's belief. Thus the representation in
(17) is derived from the event structure in (18).
The account is essentially the same for speech reports, such as in (25).
(25) John said [that Max visited London]
claimed
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In these as well, t;te context of the higher verb is referentially opaque, but
nevertheless the speaker can refer to an event or state within John's mental
model. This is captured by using the event variable of the complement
clause to refer to the event in John's mental model of the world. The event
variable of the complement clause is then suitably bound by the higher verb
outside the context of referential opacity. This binding is interpreted as
existential quantification over events in MEt and such events are taken to he
the object of the speech ascription. This yields an interpretation exactly
analogous to that for propositional attitude reports in (17).
(26) [3eeME: visit(M,L,e)] claim(J ,e)
On this approach, propositions are dispensed with as intermf'diaries
between John's mental states and the propositional attitude or speech
ascription. In a propositional attitude or speech ascription, interpreted as
in (17) or (26), John is put directly in a relation with the relevant aspect of
his mental model. As a result, paraphrases like the following, while
possible, are not indicative of actual semantic structure.
I
(27) a. John believes the proposition that Max visited London
b. John claimed that the proposition that Max visited London is
I
true I
IFurthermore, the following sentences, which might be taken as evidence
I
for the existence of proposiitions as the objects of belief, can be
I
I
accommodated. I
I
,
i
I
(28) a. What does John Ibelieve?
b. What did John claim?
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(29) a. What John believes is that Max visited London
b. What John asserted was that Max visited London
(30) a. John believes that
b. John said that
In (28), what is to be identified with an event in ME, which believe and
claim relate John to. Lik~wise for the relatives what John beIieves and
what John asserted in (29), and the demonstrative that in (30).
Melvold (1986) a.lso presents an account in which the distinction
between propositional and factive complements depends on the dispensation
of th~ event position of the complement clause. On her account, the
distinction is between this event position being existentially quantified out
in a propositional complement, and bound by an iota operator in a factive
complement. The complementizer of a factive complement performs a
semantic function by inducing the insertion of the iota operator. However,
there are some critical differences between Melvold's account and the one
presented here. On Melvold's account, no distinction is made such as in
the present account between the positions at which the event positions of
propositional and factive complements are discharged. The event position
of the propositional complement is quantified out within the complement
clause on her account, contrary to the account given here. Finally, a
factive complement on Melvold's account, with its event position bound by
an iota operator, refers to the actual event involved. This blocks the
extension of Melvold's account to response stance complements, to be
considered in the next subsection, and it runs into some problems to be
discussed in section 2. 1. 4 below.
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2.1.2 Response stance complements
The proposal being made h~re is that the properties of p-complements
and f-complements discussed here follow from the dispensation of the
event a-position (which is a-bound in f-complements, but not in p-
complements) rather than in an unanalyzed factive or propositional nature
of these complements. This claim is supported by the fact that there are
nonfactive verbs whose complements have the event structure of f-
complements, and which share the distributional properties of f-
complements considered here. Consider verbs like accept, confirm, verify,
deny, and doubt. These were identified by Cattell (1978), who calls them
response stance verbs, and will be designated here as r-verbs.
(31) r-verbs: accept, confirm, verify, deny, doubt
These are not factive, as can be seen clearly be embedding them under
negation.
(32) a. They don't accept that loneliness causes cancer
b. They didn' t confirm that loneliness causes cancer
c. They didn't verify that lonelines s causes cancer
None of these presupposes that loneliness causes cancer; in fact, in
plausible contexts for these sentences, the question of whether loneliness
causes cancer is precisely what is at issue. 11 However, the r-verbs patterns
11However, that the presuppositions of the embedded sentences in (32) are preserved
under negation when the embedded clause is extraposed, with an object expletive.
(i) a. They don't accept it that loneliness causes cancer
b. They didn't confinn it that loneliness causes cancer
c. They didn't verify it that loneliness causes cancer
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with factives in taking a complement with an overt complementizer, as
ShowD below.
(33) They accept *(that) loneliness causes cancer
agree ??(that) II II "
confirmed *(that) " " "
deny ?(that) II " "
doubt ?(that) II II "
verified *(that) " " "
Furthermore, as with factives, the complements of r-verbs can occur with
an associated object expletive, and like factives, r-verbs do not generally
take ECM complements.
(34) They (accept, agree to, confirmed, deny, doubt, verified) it that ..
(35) They *accept the lake to be polluted
*agree
??deny
??doubt
??confirmed
??verified
On these grounds, we assign to r-complements the same event structure that
we assigned to factive complements, as follows.
(36) agree [cp<> that (JP<e> Max loves Cecelia
1 +
Assuming that r-verbs select a CP<> complelnent with a closed event
position, this structure accounts for the data in question. The presence of
the complementizer that in (33) is required since the complementizer
discharges the event position, and therefore performs a semantic function.
Since the event position of the complement clause is discharged internally
to the complement, the complement clause can occur dislocated from the
object position of the r-verb, with an object expletive in its place. And
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since the r-verb selects a CP<> complement with a closed event position,
whereas ECM complements are of the form IP<e>, it follows that r-verbs
don't take ECM complements.
Assuming, as with factive complements, that the complementizer that
a-binds the event position that it discharges, the structure in (36) yields the
interpretation jn (37).
(37) They agree that 8e[love(Max, Cecelia, e)] holds
Since the event position is transparent, the a-bound expression in (37) can
be exported to yield the following.
(38) Regarding 3e[love(Max, Cecelia, e)], they agree that it holds.
In (37) and (38), the state in question is not presupposed to actually hold:
it is entirely possible for people to agree on something that is false.
However, binding within the discourse frame does not require that the
event in question actually occurred, or that the state in question actually
holds. Binding within the discourse frame only requires the event or state
in question to be at issue in the discourse.
In (37) and (38), a-binding of the event/state position does not mean
that Max actually loves Cecelia. It just means that there is an event or state
in the discourse frame in which Max loves Cecelia. Such an event is
present within the discourse frame if it is presupposed that Max loves
Cecelia: this is what happens with factive complements. But such an event
is also present in the discourse frame if the question of Max loving Cecelia
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is at issue in the discourse, and not presupposed. This is the case with
response stance complements. So the structure in (36), with the event
position of a response stance complement a-bound by the complementizer
that, yields interpretations such as those in (37)-(38), which are exactly
correct for response stance complements.
In sUffilnary, an event or state can be within the discourse frame because
it is presupposed; for this reason, o-binding is suitable for the event
position of a factive complement. But also, an event or state can be present
within the discourse frame because it is at jssue in the discourse, whether
or not it actually occurred; for this reason, a-binding is suitable for the
event position of response stance complements.
2.1.3 The complementizer in propositional complements
As illus trated in (3) and (33) above, the complemen tizer in factive and
response stance complements is obligatory. This can be explained on the
grounds that these complementizers are required to a-bind the event
position of the complement clause at LF. We have assigned no LF role to
the that complementizer of propositiQnal complement clauses. And in the
complements of most propositional predicates, the complementizer need not
appear. This can be seen by substituting any of the verb forms in (39b) for
'V' in the schema in (39a); the result is good whether or not the
complementizer that is present.
(39)
a. John V [ (that) [Martians are visiting Earth]]
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b. assumes, believes, claims, concluded, decided, declared, feels,
imagines, maintains, reckons, says, suggested, supposes, suspects,
thinks
However, complementizers are required in the complements of a few
propositional predicates. This is indicated in (40), where any substitution
instance of a verb fornl in (40b) for 'V' in (40a) is bad without the
complementizer that.
(40) a. John V [ *(that) [Bill is a spy]]
b. asserted, conjectured, envisages, intimated, judges, proposed,
speculated, stated
We have not proposed an LF role for the complementizer of a propositional
complement. Since the complementizer in: (39) is optional, we assume that
it plays no semantic role. If this is true, then assuming the principle of
Pull Interpretation from Chomsky (1989), 1 2 it follow s that the
complementizer in (39), if present at S~structure, deletes at LF. Turning to
(40), it is not clear why the complementizer should be obligatory in
complements of these verbs. Pres umably, these verbs, like other
propositional predicates, take a complement clause with an open event
position; the complementizer would therefore not be required for a-binding
of the event position. The complementizer might play some more fine
grained role in the interpretation of these sentences, or it might be required
for some purely grammatical reason which we haven't noticed, having
nothing to do with the interpretation of these sentences. In the next
chapter, support will be given for the assumption that when the
complementizer is obligatory on the surface, it is present at LF. If this is
true, then the complernents in (40) have some subtle semantic difference
12pull Interpretation: An element is present at LF only if it plays a role at LF.
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from those in (39) which requires the presence of the complementizer that
at LF. What this property might be is not clear at this point.
2.1.4 Further properties of factive and response stance
complements
Some residual issues concerning factive and response stance
complements will now be addressed.
From the analysis developed here, it follows that sentential subjects
must be factive, as in (41), or response stance, as in (42).
(41) a. [That John fixed the car] was fortunate
b. [That John committed the crime] affected us all
c. [That John succeeded] bothers/surprised Mary
d. [That John always loses] doesn't stop him from trying
(42) a. [That John wrecked the car] is impossible
b. [That John committed the crime] is impossible
c. [That John fixed the car] is false
In the position of a sentential subject, there is no predicate directly
selecting the CP. Hence, in order for the structure to be good, the event
position of the sentential subject must either be discharged internaPy to the
sentential subject, or discharged externally by some means other than
selection by a higher verb. The only mechanism available for internal
discharge of the event position is a-binding by the complementizer that; the
sentential subject emerges as factive in this case. 13 The case of external
13There is, of course, another option for discharging the event 9-position internally to the
sentential subject clause, namely 9-binding by the INFL of this clause. However, this
operation seems to occur exclusively in root clauses, possibly from a unique association
with the function of the root clause as assertive.
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discharge of the event position can be realized if there is an adverb of
quantification present. Then the event position of the sentential subject can
remain undischarged within the clause and be unseletively bound by the
adverb, as in (43) below. (See Heim 1982 for discussion of unselective
binding by adverbs of quantification of variables in indefinites.)
(43) a. [That John fixed the car] was always fortunate
b. [That John won at tennis] always bothered Mary
c. [That John lost] always led him to insult Mary
(43a) can mean that each occasion of John fixing the car was fortunate,
(43b) that each occasion in which John won at tennis bothered Mary, and
so on. When a sentential subject that -clause raises to subject position, its
factivity depends on the verb that selected it.
(44) a. [That John fixed the election]i is believed ti by all
b. [That John fixed the election] i is claimed ti widely
c. [That John committed the crime]i is regretted Ii by his
friends
d. [That release of the hostages was fixedli was mentioned ti in
the papers
The sentential subjects in (44a,b) are propositional, and those in (44c,d)
are factive. Thus the property of the raised sentential subject is determined
through its trace, or through its chain. In particular, the event position of
the CP<e> propositional sentential subject in (44a, b) must be discharged
through the trace. (We assume then that a-role discharge is transmitted by
an A-chain.)
Return to the sentences (8), repeated below, which seemed to defy the
generalization that factive predicates don't take ECM infinitival
compl:",ments.
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(8) We know I recognize I find John to be insincere
If these were factive or response stance, their interpretation would be
rendered as follows.
(45) We know I recognize / find 8e[insincere(J,e)]
But this is incorrect. The state described by the complements in (8) is not
within the discourse frame: it is being put forward by the speaker as an
evaluation of John. The meaning of the sentences in (8) might be roughly
captured by taking the complement to be propositional, since the evaluation
of John is part of the mental model of the world held by the subject. But in
any event, it would not be in the discourse frame, so there is no reason to
regard the predicates in (8) as factive. Thus the sentences do not defy the
generalization that factive predicates do not take ECM infinitival
complemen ts.
Some comments are in order concerning the analysis of factivity
developed here. On this analysis, a factive complement clause has its
semantic value computed in terms of a-binding of its event position, as in
(46) below.
(46) a. John believes that Max visited London
b. ae [visit(Max,London,e)]
The expression in (46) is a definite description of an event: it denotes the
event corresponding to the file card in the discourse frame which has the
entries "is an event" and "is the event in which i visited j", where i is the
index of the file card for Max, and j is the index for the file card for
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London. More casually, the expression in (46b) denotes the event within
the discourse frame in which Max visited London. With the semantic value
of the complement expressed in terms of the definite description in (46b),
the factive complement induces the presupposition of a definite description,
namely, the presupposition that there is a unique entity within a relevant
domain satisfying the description, in this case, a unique event within the
discourse frame. This reduces the factivity of the factive complement to a
presupposition, particularly, to the presupposition of a definite description.
Note that the complement of a factive verb is not even t-denoting; it is
only being claimed here that this complement induces a presupposition.
What one realizes, recognizes, points out, or knows, is not an event, but
rather the fact t.hat a particular event occurred. Consider the sentence in
(47).
(47) John recalls that Mary denounced Bill
If what John recalls in (47) is the event in which Mary denounced Bill,
then the complement in (47) has the same semantic value as that of the
gerund complement in (48).
(48) John recalls Mary's denouncing Bill
But this is not right. (47) can be true if John only heard that Mary
denounced Bill, even if John did not witness the event himself. Provided
that the event actually occurred, and that the occurrence of the even t is
causally related in the right ways to Joho' s hearing about it, it follows that
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(47) is true. 14 But (48) is true only if John recalls the actual event,
through having witnessed it himself or through direct acquaintance with its
consequences. The same problem can be raised, but in a way relating to
ungrammaticality, by noting that there are contexts in which a factive that-
clause cannot be substituted for an event denoting expression, as in the
following pair, from Peterson (1979).
(49) a. Mary's refusal of the offer was followed by silence
b. * That Mary refused the offer was followed by silence
So the semantic value of a factive complement cannot be, strictly speaking,
an event. It must be the fact that an event occurred. But none of the
combinatorial mechanisms being developed here is affected by these
remarks, and the general point remains that a-binding within the factive
complement induces a presupposition, out of the structure involved, and
that this presupposition is expressed as a definite description (of a fact, as
it happens), so that the factivity of the factive complement reduces to the
factivity of a definite description. 15
14The right kind of causal relation is required since, if John comes to believe that an event
of Mary denouncing Bill occurred, but the way in which John comes to this belief is
accidental or fortuitous, in some way unrelated to the actual occurrence of the event, then
John cannot be said to know (or to have known) that this event occurred, and therefore
cannot be said to recall it.
15An attractive alternative would be to assume that it is a contribution of the higher,
factive, predicate, to compose 'ae[visit(Max,!..ondon,e)]' from (46) into 'the fact that the
event e occurred wherein Max visited London'. Then the that -clause factive complement
would have inttinsically the semantic content of a definite description of an event, and the
context of the factive predicate would convert this into a definite description of a fact.
But then the that -clause sentential subject in (49b) would denote an event, which
wrongly predicts that (49b) should be grammatical. The sentence (49b) is out on the
grounds that the that - clause denotes a fact t whereas the context of (49b) demands an
event denoting subject (at least. that is the explanation being adopted here). To maintain
this explanation under the assumption that the that-clause is intrinsically event denoting,
we would have to assume that something in the context of (49b), and any similar
examples we could fmd, converts an event denoting definite description into a fact
denoting one. But then this conversion must be effected independently in a variety of
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2.2 The Event Structure of Infinitival Complement Clauses
In this section, the event structure of infinitival complement clauses
will be examined. Three classes of infinitival complements will be
identified, based on their event structure, namely, propositional infinitive
complements, irrealis event complements, and factive (or implicative)
complements.
2.2.1 Nonimplicative (propositional and "irrealis") infinitivals
In infinitive complements, there is no (Tns] morpheme and no that
complementizer to discharge the event position. Thus, we would expect the
event position to be projected up to the bounding node of the infinitive
complement. This seems to be the case for a variety of infinitive
complement types. These include the following, classified into the verb
classes identified by David Pesetsky (Class lectures, Fall 1988).
(50) believe class
Mary believes [Bill to have shredded the documents]
other verbs: consider, imagine, suppose, suspect, figure,
presume, expect
(51) want class
Mary wants [Bill to shred the documents]
Mary wants [PRO to shred the documents]
other verbs: desire, wish, prefer
(52) try class
Mary tried [PRO to shred the documents]
apparently unrelated contexts. Thus, there is reason to assume that the that -clause is
intrinsically fact denoting. Then the explanation for (49b) follows automatically.
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other verbs: arrange, decide, endeavor, hope, need, prepare,
refuse
In (50), Mary believes that some event or other occurred in which Bill
shredded the documents. This is the sort of interpretation that was
encountered in the previous section with tensed complements and identified
as propositional. Thus, the event position of the complement clause is
projected up to the bounding node of the complement; assuming a standard
"S·bar deletion" structure, this would be IP. So the complement clau se is
of the form IP<e>, and the event position of the complement is 9-bound by
the higher verb. This induces an interpretation such as the following.
(53) [3eeME: shred(B,d,e)] believe(M,e)
M = Mary's mental model
ME = the set of events in Mary's mental model
As argued by Pesetsky (Class lectures, Fall 1988), want or try expresses
an attitude towards an irrealis event. In (51), Mary wants some (currently)
irrealis event to be realized, and in (52), Mary tried to realize some irrealis
event. Pesetsky argued that these complements take a null prepositional
complemen tizer, for, which is an optional governor, shielding a PRO
subject from government by the higher verb (minimality, or relativized
minimality), and which assigns accusative case to an overt subject. If this
is correct, then these complements are CPs, introduced by the prepositional
complementizer. If the prepositional complementizer were to have no effect
on the event position, then the complements in (51) and (52) would be of
the form CP<e>, and hence would be propositional. This would obliterate
any distinction in semantic argument type between the irrf .lis complements
in (51) and (52) and the propositional complements in (50). Suppose
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I
i
I
Iinstead that for selects an IP<e>, and that for a-binds the open event
position in its compl~ment. The resulting structures are then of the
following form, where/the parenthesized for in (54b) must be phonetically
I
null.
(54) a. Mary wants [Cp<> for fIP<e> Bill to shred the documents ]]
b. Mary wants [Cp<> (for) [IP<e> PRO to shred the documents ]]
As a lexical property of for, the IP<e> complement of for with its event
position bound by for will not be interpreted as propositional, but rather
as irrealis event denoting.
2.2.2 Implicative infinitivals
Certain infinitival complements defy the expectation arrived at in 2.2. 1
that infinitival complements should be propositional or irrealis. These
include complements of the following verbs.
(55) perception verbs: see, warch, hear, feel
a. John saw [Mary leave]
b. John heard [Mary enter the room]
(56) make
a. John made [Bill leave]
b. John made [Bill angry)
(57) cause
John caused [Bill to lose the race]
(5M) manage
Joho managed [PRO to enter the barn)
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These can be used when the complement describes an event that has already
been established within the discourse frame. However. they can also be
used to introduce the event described within the complement. Thus, we
will assume that no presupposition is induced by the event structure of the
~omplement. That this is correct is indicated by the fact that no
presupposition induced by the event structure of the complement is
preserved under negation in these sentences (as pointed out to me by
Howard Lasnik, p. c.). Contrast the implicative under negation in (59a)
with the factive under negation in (59b).
(59) a. John didn't see [Mary leave]
b. John dido't notice [that Mary left]
c. We don't like it [that Mary left]
The presupposition that Mary left is preserved under negation in (59b,c),
but (59a) could be used to describe a situation in which John has been
watching the exit, and Mary never left. As it happens, (59a) can also be
used when it is presupposed that Mary left, but this seems to be a
nonstructural matter, with the presupposition generated on purely pragmatic
grounds in such cases.
The complements in (55) are naked infinitive complements; they have no
inflection at all. For present purposes, the naked infinitive can be analyzed
as a small clause, that is, as a direct projection of its predicate.
For the perception sentences in (55), the analysis of Higginbotham
(1983) will be adopted here, revised slightly to put it within the framework
of his later papers.. The following three desiderata, from Barwise (1981)
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(with (1IIb) added by Higginbotham), repeated from (20) above, are taken
as criterial for the analysis.
(60)
(I)
(II)
(III)
Veridicality: If the complement is quantifier-free and S is a full
clause, taking its tense from the matrix, and expressing the
content of the complement, then the sentence as a whole entails S.
Principle of Substitution: The context of the complement is
referentially transparent (in the sense of Quine 1960~ p. 144).
Exportability of Quantifiers: Conditionals of the following sort
are true:
a. If John saw somebody leave, then there is somebody who John
saw leave.
b. If John saw nobody leave, then there is nobody who John saw
leave.
Note that these hold for the perception sentences in (55). If the sentence in
(55a) is true, then: (I) Mary left is true; (II) If Mary happens to be a spy,
whether or not John knows that Mary is a spy, the sentence John saw a spy
leave is also true; and the conditionals in (III) are true. 1 6 On
Higginbotham's analysis, the naked infinitive complement is interpreted as
inducing a restricted existential quantifier over the event variable
in trod ueed by the verb of the complementt as show n in (61 a), w here this
variable itself is the semantic argument of the perception verb; putting this
within the semantic context of the entire perception sentence, with an
existential quantifier over the event position of the Inatrix clause, gives
(61b) (ignoring tense).
(61) a. [3e: leave(Mary,e)]
b. 3e' [3e: leave(Mary,e)] see(John,e,e')
16This is not true of tensed and full infinitival complements of see. If John saw that Bill
was Q"ested is true, and Bill happens to be a spy, it doesn't follow that John saw that a
spy was arrested is true.
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This interpretation can be obtained compositionally if the perception verb
complement is treated as an indefinite description of the event
corresponding to the event position of its verb. Under the existential
interpretation of indefinites, the naked infinitive complelnent raises to the
matrix IP, after which we have the following structure, where XP is the
category of the naked infinitive.
(62) [IP [XP<e> Mary leave]i [IP John [I [+Tns]] [VP<e'> saw ti ]]]
At this point, we need to say how the quantificational structure over the
event variable e of the naked infinitive complement is established. We will
appeal to the analysis of Heim (1982, chapter II, p.138) in which an
unindexed quantifier 3 is adjoined to the nuclear scope of every quantifier.
This would introduce 3 adjoined to the higher segment of IP in (62) if there
were a higher quantifier to license it on Heim's analysis. But there is no
higher quantifier in (62) because there is no overt quantifier at all in the
sentence (61 a). However, the [+Tns] morpheme in INFL introduces
existential quantification over the event variable of the matrix verb, and the
raised constituent XP<e> is within the m-command domain of INFL.
Thus, XP<e> in (62) is effectively within the scope of the quantifier
induced by a-binding of e'. I'll assume that this licenses the introduction
of the unindexed quantifier 3 in (62), yielding (63).
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(63) IP
A
3 IP
/~
XPi<e> IP
66
Mary leave Jahn saw ti
The unselective quantifier 3 in (62) can then bind the open variable in the
raised naked infinitive [XP<e> Mary leave], yielding the res tdeted
quantifier in (61a). The interpretation of (63) is then (6tb).
The analysis of (55) as an indefinite is strengthened by the fact that, in
the presence of an adverb of quantification, the naked infinitive
complement participates in unselective binding. Thus, the sentence (64a)
has the interpretation in (64b).
(64) a. John rarely saw Mary leave
b. rarely(e)[leave(Mary,e)] 3e' saw(John,e,e' )
The interpretation in (64b) can be obtained analogously to other cases of
unselective binding, discussed in Heim (1982), provided that the event
variable of the naked infinitive complement is an open variable intrinsic to
this complement. That this will be the case is assured by the lack of
potential a-binders of the event position within the naked infinitive
cornpIernent.
The desiderata in (60) follow directly from the analysis in (61 b). The
property in (I) follows since anything of th,., form 3x[A(x)] B(x), entails
61
3xA(x). The property in (II) follows since if the position of an NP ex is
referentially transparent in A(x), then the position of ex is referentially
transparent in 3x[A(x)] B(x). Finally, from 3x[3yA(x,y)] B(x), it follows
that 3y3x[A(x,y)] B(x), so (III) holds. 17
Note that the desiderata in (60) hold for the sentences in (56)-(57) as
well. This suggests that the analysis of perception sentences given in (61)
be extended to these sentences as well. The mechanisms would be the
same: the event position would remain undischarged within the complement
clause, and would thus remain as an open variable, allowing for an
interpretation of the complement as an indefinite. In the presence of an
adverb of quantification, the event position of the complement in (56)-(58)
can be bound by this adverb. 18
(65) a. John always made Bill leave
b. always(e) [leave(Bill,e)] make(John, e)
(66) a. John always caused Bill to lose the election
b. always(e) [lose(Bill,the election, e)] cause(John,e)
Note that these complements, even the full infinitivals, are distinguished
from propositional complements in that the higher verb in (55)-(58) does
not discharge the event position of its complement clause. Having its event
posit.ion bound by a higher verb is the hallmark of a propositional
17John saw nobody leave, after quantifier raising, would be
(i) -3x[John saw x leave]
Interpreting the bracketed expression in (i) yields
(ii) -3x3e' [3e: leave(x,e)] see(J,e,e')
The condition (IIIb) can be derived from this together with (lIla).
18The representations in (65b) and (66b) are written assuming that causative verbs like
cause and make introduce no event variable of their own. This is an open question that
will not be settled here. If they do have an event variable of their own, it would be
quantified out in the nuclear scopes in (65b) and (66b), and would not impinge on the
present discussion.
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complement, and this discharge prevents the interpretation of the
complement as an indefinite. Thus, the matrix verb conditions the
availability of the interpretation of an infinitive or naked infinitive
complement as an indefinite description of an event. If the verb selects an
open complement of the form XP<e>, but does not a-bind its event
variable, then this event variable remains open, and the complement can
raise and be interpreted as an indefinite.
Complements of manage, in (58), behave differently. The event of
managing to do X is the same event as doing X, suggesting that the event
positions of the complement and matrix should be identified. Assume the
infinitive complement of manage with its open event position raises at LF
and adjoins to the matrix VP, where its event position is a-identified with
the matrix event position. Then the contents of the complement clause are
asserted to occur as much as the contents of the matrix; this captures the
fact that manage is implicative. Furthermore, identification of the event
position of the infinitive complement of manage with the matrix event
position, and its subsequent binding by the matrix INFL, blocks the
possibility of q uantificational variability. This is empirically correct.
(67) a. John always managed to meet Bill
b. always(e) [meet(John,Bill,e)]
The sentence in (67a) doesn't mean that on each occasion of meeting Bill,
John always managed it. Rather, (67b) means that on each occasion of a
given or understood sort (say, of Bill coming to town), John managed to
meet Bill. Thus always in (67a) implicitly quantifies over those given or
understood occasions, not over occasions of John meeting Bill.
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Appendix to 2.2.2: Response to Neale (1988)
In deferring to Higginbotham (1983) for an account of (55)-(58), there
arises the necessity to address the critique of HIgginbotham's article
published in Neale (1988). A number of Neale f s criticisms concern the
inexplicitness of mechanisms in the 1983 account, but these are mostly
rt'medied in the subsequent publications Higginbotham (1985, 1989). For
example, Neale points out the lack of an explicit derivation of the truth
conditions in (61h) from the LF in (62). But such derivations were
provided above using material from Higginbotham and Heim. To take
another instance of this sort, Neale argues that Higginbotham' account
cannot derive a representation for the reading of (68) below where what
John sees is a single scene in which the students all leave.
(68) John saw every student leave
However, this is mistaken. If the quantifier every student raIses and
adjoins to the naked infinitive complement, and then the naked infinitive
raises and adjoins to the matrix IP, we get the LF in (69) below.
(69) [IP [XP<e> [NP every student]i [XP ti leave]k] [IP John saw tk ]]
In (69), the event variable of the naked infinitive remains open on the
highest segment of the XP boundary node of this constituent. Thus, the
entire complex XP is an indefinite, and the unbound variable must be
quantified out above the highest segment of the XP node. Thus, the
quantifier every student adjoined to XP will not suffice to license an
unselective 3 quantifier for the interpretation of the indefinite. The only
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quantifier in the sentence with scope over the higher segment of XP is the
existential quantifier introduced by the matrix INFL, which binds the event
position of the matrix verb. Thus an unselective 3 quantifier must be
introduced adjoined to the matrix IP, above XP. This quantifier will bind
the open event variable of XP<e>, yielding the interpretation in (70).
(70) 3e' [3e: [\ix: student(x)] leave(x,e)] saw(John,e,e')
This is precisely the desired interpretation.
Other problems raised by Neale can be dealt with using the same
resources. A major one concerns sentences with negation, such as the
following.
(71) a. John saw Mary not raise her hand
b. John saw Mary not leave
As recognized by Higginbotham, this cannot be captured by placing an
overt negation at any point in the semantic representation of the
corresponding sentence without negation; attempts to do so would yield the
representations in (72).
(72) a. 3e[-raise(Mary, her hand,e)] John saw e
b. 3e[raise(Mary, her hand,e)] -John saw e
c. -3e[raise(Mary, her hand,e)] John saw e
(71) means that John saw Mary on an occasion in question, and Mary was
not raising her hand. None of (72a, b,c) can capture this meaning since
none of them requires John to have seen Mary (on the relevant occasion).
(72a) is true whenever John saw some event that was not of Mary raising
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her hand. (72b) asserts that there was an event of Mary raising her hand,
but that John did not see it. As a representation of (71), this asserts both
too much and too little: (71) does not require that there be an event of Mary
raising her hand, but it does require that John see Mary. Finally, (72c) is
true if John saw nothing, and so does not require John to see Mary.
Higginbotham (1983) suggests a solution to this problem based on
identifying antonymic predicates, a solution which Neale finds ad hoc. But
a perfectly natural solution is available in terms of constituent negation of
VP, using the semantic representations of Schein (1986), used in
Higginbotham (1989). Consider (7tb) for illustration. Decomposing the
predicate leave into a base leaveo and the thematic roles of its (NP)
arguments, we have
(73) leave(x,e) <---> Agent(x,e) & leaveo(e)
The negation in (71) is a constituent negation of VP, which applies only to
the root Vo. The truth conditions of (71) can then be written as follows.
(74) 3e' [3e: Agent(Mary,e) & -leaveo(e)] saw(John,e,e')
This means that John saw an event of which Mary was the agent, and that it
was not an event of leaving, the required interpretation.
Another problem raised by Neale concerns the trigger for raising an
infinitive complement. This seemed like a problem within the 1983 account
since Higginbotham assumed there that event variables were present only in
naked infinitive complements, and that therefore the presence of an event
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variable triggered raising of the complement clause. But within the context
of the present chapter, a principled answer can be given in the framework
of Higginbotham (1985, 1989), using the analysis of indefinites in Heim
(1982). The complements that raise are ones with an open event position
which is not discharged by the higher verb. In order for this event position
to be bound, there is no other option available than for the complement to
raise and be interpreted as an indefinite in these cases.
2.3 The Event Structure of Gerunds
To begin with, four sorts of gerund will be identified. The first three
categories are standardly named and discussed in the literature (Chierchia
1984, Abney 1987, Zucchi 1989); the fourth kind was identified at leas t by
Abney (1987). The two sorts of ing-of gerund in (75) will be collapsed
together.
(75) ing-of
a. John's drinking of the coffee
b. the drinking of the coffee
(76) POS S-ing
John's drinking the coffee
(77) ACC-ing
Jahn drinking the coffee
(78) PRO-ing
PRO drinking the coffee
For the gerunds in (75), the structure in (79) will be adopted here, and for
those in (76), the structure in (80). 19
19In (80), spec-VP is indicated as being either empty or as containing a subject trace. If
spec-VP is empty, it is also possible that it is not projected at all.
67
(79) ing-of
I
drinking
(80) POSS-ing
DP
A
John 0'
A
D VP
16
I S drinking the coffee
of the coffee
These are close to the structures adopted by Abney (1987), and the fairly
extensive argumentation given there will justify most aspects of these
structures.
For ACC-il\g gerunds, I will assume the structure in (81) below.
(81) ACC-log
IP
Bil~I'
1--------'VP
[
~~ns 1~
[Ag:r;.CC] meeting Sam
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This shares with Abney's analysis (and many oth(,"rs) the presence of
clausal structure above the verb. The tense in T is null, and T is marked
with a nominalizing feature [+N]. For the PRO-jng gerund, the following
structure will be adopted here.
(82) PRO-ing
IP
A
PRO I'
A
I VP
16[~!~SJmeeting Sam
These phrase structures will be assumed without further discussion, as we
t'.ifn now to the event structure of these gerunds.
To begin with, note that all four gerund types have instances in both
subject and object positions which can be interpreted as definite.
(83) a. [John's/the sighting of a raccoon] surprised us
b. [John's sighting a raccoon] surprised us
c. [J ohn sighting a raccoon] surprised us
d. [PRO sighting a raccoon surprised us
(84) a. We watched [John l s/the building of a model]
b. We watched [John t s building a model]
c. We watched [John building a model]
d. We remember [PRO building a model]
All of the gerunds in (83)-(84) can be interpreted as having the same
reference as a definite description of an event. This follows if each of
these gerunds has the resources to internally o-bind an event, which in turn
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follows if each contains a O-bi'lder. The ing-of and POS S-ing each have a
determiner head which can plausibly act as a 8-binder; this is supported by
the intuition that in bottom-to-top composition in these gerunds in (83)-
(84), reference to a unique event is established at the determiner. In the
ACC-ing and PRO-ing gerunds, the candidate for o-binder is less obvious;
I'll assume that the [+N] head I is capable of performing this function.
Each of the gerunds has occurrences as an indefinite in both subject and
object positions. 20
(85) a.
b.
c.
d.
(86) a.
b.
c.
d.
[Bill' s/the singing of that song] attracted the atten tion of
Rolling S tone on one occasion
[Bill's singing that song] attracted the attention of Rolling
S tone on one occasion
[Bill singing that song] attracted the attention of Rolling
S tone on one occasion
[PRO singing that song] attracted the attention of Rolling
S tone on one occasion
John enjoyed [BUr s/the singing of that song] on one occasion
John enjoyed [Bill's singing that song] on one occasion
Joh n enjoyed [B ill singing that song] Oil one occas ion
Jahn enjoyed [PRO singing that song] on one occasion
20Portner (1991) denies that subject gerunds can be interpreted as indefinites, but the
examples he cites, given in (i) below, do not warrant this conclusion.
(i) a. Lifring those clocks didn't tire me out
b. Ifplanting cacti tired Sam out, he will surely die
In (ia), the indefinite interpretation is not pragmatically salient since the cumulative effect
of lifting many clocks is more likely than some particular event of lifting to tire one out.
Consider instead the gerund in (ii).
(ii) It is not the case that lifting the clock broke it; somedling else did
This can deny that many liftings through an extended episode of liftings of the clock had
the cumulative affect of breaking it, or it can deny that some particular lifting in an
epis<Xie of many liftings broke it. The gerund is an indefinite in the latter interpretation.
In (ib), the predicate tire is again at fault. Replacing it with something that is more
readily realized in a single planting among many allows the gerund to be indefinite, as in
(iii).
(iii) If planting cacti disturbed the sewer line, ...
This can be used ifone slip of the shovel disturbed the sewer line, and then the gerund is
indefmite.
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This can also be seen in the context of quantificational variability, as
follows.
(87) a. [Bill's/the singing of that song] rarely attracted the aaention
of Rolling Stone
b. [BUI's singing that song] rarely attracted the attention of
R ?Iling Stone
c. [Bill singing that song] rarely attracted the attention of
Rolling Stone
d. [PRO singing that iiong] rarely attracted the attention of
Rolling Stone
(88) a. John rarely enjoyed [Bill's/the singing of that song]
b. John rarely enjoyed [Bill's singing that song]
c. John ra.rely enjoyed [Bill singing that song]
d. Jehn rarely enjoyed [PRO singir g that song]
As a suitable background for the interpretations of these gerunds as
indefinite, suppose that Bill has been singing the song in question
repeatedly, several times a day, for the past month. In this context, (85)
can mean that some event or other of Bill singing the song attracted the
attention of Rolling S tone magazine, and (86) can mean that John enjoyed
some event or other of the many in which Bill sang the song. Assuming
Heim's (1982) approacl. to indefinites, the interpretation of the gerunds in
(85)-(86) as indefinite involves the gerund having an open event position,
being raised to IP where an unselective quantifier 3 is projecied above it,
where 3 then binds the open event position of the gerund. To be
interpreted as indefinites on this account. the gerunds in (85)-(86) must be
of the form XP<e>. This can be obtained if each of the 8-binder~ in these
gerunds can exercise the option not to bind the event position of the
gerund, which we will now assume to be the case. There is an exception to
the availability of indefinite interpretation for gerunds, namely, when ACC~
iog and PRO-iog gerunds occur as objects of a propositional verb (p-verb),
as below. (This is discussed in Portner 1991.)
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(89) a. John imagines [Bill drinking hemlock]
b. John imagines [PRO drinking hemlock]
As Portner notes, these do not mean that there exists some event or other
that John imagines, as is the case with ing-of and POSS-ing gerund objects
of imagine.
(90) a. John imagines [B ill' s/the dr.inking of hemlock]
b. John imagines [Bill's drinking hemlockl
With the definite determiner introducing the gerund, (90a) means that there
is a particular event of drinking hemlock, which John imagines. (90b), and
(90a) with Bill's, mean that for some event or other in which Bill drinks
hemlock, John imagines that event. Th us the exceptions in (89) to the
pattern of availability of indefinites is to be noted. It will be taken up and
explained below in conjunction with a related issue.
As objects of a propositional verb, ACC-ing and PRO-ing gerunds can
be interpreted as propositional, but ing-of and POS S-ing gerunds cannot.
(91) a. John thought about [Bill' s/the winning of the Boston
M~.rathon]
b. John thought about [Bill's winning the Boston M3rathon]
c. John thought about [Bill winning the Boston Marathon]
d. John thought about [PRO winning the Boston Marathon]
In (91 a, b), the gerund can be interpreted as definite, denoting a particular
event in which Bill won the Marathon, or as indefinite, denoting some
event or other in which Bill won the Marathon. But they cannot be
interpreted as propositional, meaning that John imagined that Bill won the
Marathon. But the gerunds in (91 C, d) can be propositional (although they
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need not be): (91c) can mean that John imagined that Bill won the
Marathon, and (91d) that John imagined that he-himself won the Marathon.
The propositional interpretation is obtained as follows. The gerund sits
in place (it does not raise), and its internal o-binder (the determiner in ing-
of and POSS-ing gerunds; the [,Tns,+N] head I in ACC-ings and PRO-
ings) exercises the option of not o-binding the event position of the
gerund. Then the event position of the gerund is unbound, and the gerund
eOlerges as XP<e>. If the gerund is the object of a higher propositional
vero, then this verb can discharge the open event position of the gerund,
giving it a propositional interpretation.
It looks like the same thing could happen in ing-of and POS S wing
gerunds. If the determiner exercised the option not to O-bind the event
position of the gerund, then the gerund would emerge as DP<e> and could
be taken as a propositional complement of a propositional verb. Yet we
found in (91 a, b) that these gerunds are not propositional. In order to
explain why ing-of and POS S~ing gerunds cannot be propositional,
suppose that nominal arguments (in A-positions) must be closed
categories. 21 Since ing-of and POSS-jog gerunds are DPs on the structures
adopted here, aHd hence nominal, they cannot occur in an argument
position with an open event position; therefore, they cannot be interpreted
21 Higginbotham (1985, 1989) assumes that arguments must be closed categories. We
have depaned from this assumption in analyzing propositional CPs to have an oPen evert
position. However, we made this departure in the context of a theory in which the open
event position of a propositional CP was discharged syncategorematically in semantic
composition with the propositional verb. Therefore, we have not embraced the
possibility of arguments having open positions in general. The present assumption
recovers Higginbotham's assumption for nominal arguments.
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as propositional. A DP<e> ing-of or POSS-ing gerund which raises and
adjoins to IP, where it can be indefinite or participate in unselective
binding by an adverb of quantification, is allowed since then the DP<e> is
in an A' -position.
In subject position, all four gerunds can participate in unselective
binding of their event position by an adverb of quantification. The gerund
DP<e> or IP<e> raises at LF and adjoins to the higher IP.
(92) a. [John's/the singing of that song] is always fun
b. [Joho' s singing that song] is always fun
c. [Jahn singing that song] is always fun
d. (PRO singing that song] is always fun
In object position, ing-of and POSS-ing gerunds can generally have their
event position unselectively bound by an adverb of quantification.
(93) a. We rarely watch/imagine [Bill' s/the Tunning of the Boston
Marathon]
b. We rarely watch/imagine [Bill's running the Boston Marathon]
However, ACe-ing and PRO-ing object gerunds occurring within the
context of an adverb of quantification exhibit a split, depending on whether
the selecting verb is propositional. The event position of ACe-ing and
PRO-jng gerunds can be bound by an adverb of quantification when the
gerund is the object of a non-p-verb, but not as the object of a p-verb.
(94) a. We always watch [Bill running the Boston Marathon]
b. We always resented [PRO finding the neighbors dog in our
garden]
(95) a. We always imagine [Bill running the Boston Marathon]
b. We always think about [PRO running the Boston Marathon]
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The fact that ACC-ings and PRO-ings cannot enter into unselective binding
of their event position by an adverb of quantification when they are objects
of a p-verb patterns with the fact noted earlit:r that exactly these two
gerunds cannot be indefinite when they are objects of p-verbs. These facts
can be explained if it can be maintained that an IP<e> must remain in-situ.
From this it follows that if an IP<e> can be interpreted propositionally,
then it must be so interpreted, since the only other opportunities for
interpretation available to a gerund XP<e> are to raise and be interpreted as
indefinite or as (having their event position) quantified out by an adverb,
and raising of IP<e> is blocked, by hypothesis. The principle that IP<e:->
must remain in-situ follows from a general principle. Quite standardly,
there is no exportation of an indefinite out of a referentially opaque
domain, as illustrated in (96a) below; compare with the definite in (96b).
(96) a. John imagined [a man riding a purple horse]
b. John imagined [Bill riding on Air Force One]
Correspondingly, there is no exportation of an indefinite when it
constitutes an opaque domain; thi8 is illustrated in (97).
(97) a. Joho imagined a unicorn
b. John imagined an even prime number greater than 2
When an ACC-jng or POSS-ing IP<e> occurs as object of a propositional
verb, it is the opaque domain of that verb. By the principle just discussed,
it cannot be exported, so it must remain in-situ.
The data examined in this section is summarized in (98).
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(98) Summary
Definite subject: All
Definite object: All
Indefinite subject: All
Indefinite object:
of non-p-verb: All
of p-verb: All except ACC-ing, PRO-ing
Propositional: ACe-ing, PRO-ing
Quantificational variability in subject: All
Quantificational variability in object:
of non-p-verb: All
of p-verb: All except ACC-ing, PRO-ing
The availability of 8-binding internally to gerunds implies, on the
account developed here, that they should be able to occur as complements
of factive verbs. This is borne au t.
(99) a. John men doned/forgot ... [Bill' s/the running of the
marathon]
b. John mentioned/forgot [Bill' running the marathon]
c. John mentioned/forgot [Bill running the marathon]
d. John mentioned/forgot [PRO running the marathon]
The possibility which gerunds of each type have to emerge with an open
event position implies that they should be able to occur as complements of
p-verbs. This is only partially borne out: there is variation across the p-
verbs, as shown in (100).
(100)
p-verbs that take gerund complements: assume, consider, envisage,
fancy, feel, imagine, propose, suspect, think
p-verbs that don't take gerund complements: allege, assert, believe,
claim, conclude, conjecture, decide, declare, figure, reckon,
say, state, suggest
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The p-verbs that take gerunds are all verbs that ascribe a mental state;
however, not all such p-verbs take gerunds: note believe, decide, figure,
reckon. All verbs of stating or communicating fail to take gerunds. I have
no explanation for these facts. Some, but not all of the p-verbs which take
a gerund require a preposition to accompany the gerund, presumably to
case mark it.
2.4 The Structural Generation of Some Other Presuppositions
In this section, a number of standard contexts of presupposition will be
examined, and the generation of the presupposition will be detailed in terms
of the structural operation of B-binding of an event variable. The adjunct
extraction properties of these contexts will be examined in chapter 3 and
will be seen to depend on the structural conditions examined below
underlying the generation of the presuppositions. It should be stressed at
this point that what is being offered here is a structural theory of
presupposition generation, and a reduction of a variety of
presuppositions to the presupposition involved in definite descriptions. A
theory of what prr.suppositions are is not being offered here, and in
particular, no stance will be taken, or need be taken here, on whether
presuppositions are ultimately a semantic or a pragmatic phenomenon. The
significance of what is said here for our conc~ption of presuppositions, and
for some of their classical properties, such as their defeasibility and their
capacity to project, will be discussed in section 2.5
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2.4.1 Temporal adverbial clauses
Temporal adverbial clauses introduced by before, after, and w hi/e,
involve a presupposition as to the existence of the event described in the
adverbial clause.
( 101) a. John finished his paper [before Mary arrived]
b. John joined the Communist Party [after he met Bill]
c. Joho shredded the documents [while Bill stalled the
reporters]
The target semantic representatio:t for these sentences is as given in (102).
(102) 3e [ finish(John,his paper,e) & before(e,ae' [arrive(Mary,e' )]) ]
For the moment, our concern is the generation of the presupposition
indicated in the second argument of the temporal adverbial. Suppose that
the temporal adverbial 8-binds the event position of its complement. 22
Then the expression oe' [arrive(Mary,e')] in (102) can be taken
straigh tforwardly as an argument of the temporal adverbial. The event
position of the adverbial clause cannot be discharged by its INFL, since the
clause is not a root clause. Therefore there is no way for the event position
of this clause to be discharged internally to it, so the event position
emerges on the maximal projection of the complement clause where it is 0-
bound by the temporal adverb. The resul!ing structure is given in (103).
22See Lasnik and Saito (1991) for arguments that the adverbial clauses in (101) are CPs,
with the temporal adverbial in C. Thus the structure of the adverbial phrase in (lOla) is
the following.
(i) [cp before [IP Mary arrived]]
Then the assumption is that the temporal adverb in C &-binds the event position of the
adverbial clause projected on the IP node, yielding the following structure.
(il) [CPo before [JP<e> Mary anived ]]
78
(103) John finished his paper (cp<> before [IP<e> Mary arrived]]
1 +
This structure will be referred to in Chapter 3.
2.4.2 Change/continuation of state verbs
Verbs such as stop, begin, start, finish, expressing change or
continuation of state, involve some presuppositions. First consider the
following.
(104) a. John stopped drinking coffee before bed
b. The army finished killing schoolteachers
These assert that the activity expressed in the gerund came to an end, and
they presuppose that the activity expressed in the gerund had been going on
up until the time associated with the matrix verb. So (104a) presupposes
that loho was drinking coffee up until the time he stopped, and so on.
Thus, the sentences in (104) can be represented as in (105).23
(105) a. John stopped 8e[drinking(PRO,coffee,e)
& before(bedtime,e)]
23 In order to represent these more precisely, it might be desirable to render the PRO-ing
gerund in (I04a) along the lines of Parsons' (1990) treatment of the progressive as
follows, where t is a time variable.
(i) 3t[drinking(e) & Agent(e,John) & Theme(e,coffee) &Hold(e,t)]
The dispensation of the unbound event variable in (i) is as discussed in section 2.3
above. Further specification of t in (i) depends on the tense of the sentence in which the
gerund is e~bedded The first three conjuncts in (i) amount to a thematic decomposition
of the verb such as was employed in the appendix to section 2.2.2 under slightly different
notation (V0 for Y-ing); the last conjunct indicates that the event characterized as a
drinking holds at the time t The representation in (i) can then be paraphrased as follows:
there was an event of drinking, involving lohn as agent and coffee as theme, and it was
going on at time 1, specified further according to the tense of the embedding clause. This
fuller representation won't be needed for the purposes of this chapter-- the
representations in (105) will be adequate.
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b. The army finished 8e[kilHng(PRO, schoolteachers, e)]
With verbs such as stop, the gerund complement expresses a
presupposition, analyzed here as the presupposition induced by the 0-
operator, which acts like a definite description of events. N ow consider
sentences with begin.
(106) 11. John began drinking coffee before bed
etc.
The complements of these express material that is asserted, not
presupposed. The presupposition in (106a) is that John had not been
drinking coffee before bed prior to the time when he began to do so. But
this presupposition is not related to event str-acture in any way that we can
readily explicate in terms of the mechanisms of this chapter, and so will not
be captured. In the next chapter, we will see that there are reasons in
adverbial w h extraction facts to assume that the presupposition in (106) is
not induced by a-binding in the way argued here for the complements of
stop.
Verbs such as continue might be said to involve a presupposition that
the event referred to was going on, of which it is being asserted that it
continues.
(107) The security services continued torturing labor leaders
But it is more accurate to analyze these not as involving a presupposition
that the event in question was going on prior to the time at which it is being
asserted to continue, but as involving identification of the event with its
continuance: for an event to continue just means for the same event to
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continue. Assume then that the complement clause of continue raises at LF
and adjoins to the matrix IP, where its event position is a-identified with
the event position of the matrix VP. Support for this analysis of
complements of continue over a presuppositional analysis will be given in
chapter 3.
2.4.3 Iteratives and continuants
Adverbs such as still and again induce presuppositions concerning the
content of the clause which they modify.
(108) a. John offended Mary again
b. The flying saucer is still sitting in the garden
The sentence in (108a) presupposes that John has periodically offended
Mary in the past; (lOSb) presupposes that the flying saucer has been sitting
in the backyard for some period of time up until the time of utterance.
Since the content of the clause in (108) is not being asserted (merely that it
happened again, or is still happening), It 11 assume that the [+Tns]
morpheme in these sentences should not discharge the event position.
Instead, the adverb 5-binds the event position of the verb, and the adverb
introduces an event position of its own which is B-bound by [+1'os] in
INFL.
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(109) IP
A
John I' <>
~
I VP<e' >
[+Tns] VP<e>
A
V<e> NP
i ,
offend Mary
ADV<e'>
I
again
The logical forms are along the lines given in (110).
(110) a. 3e' again(8e[offend(John,Mary,e)],e')
b. 3e' still(8e[sit(the flying saucer,e) & in(the garden,e)],e')
2.4.4 Clefts and pseudoclefts
Consider the cleft in (lIla) and the pseudocleft in (111 b).
(111) a. It was Henry that kissed Ann
b. What John lost was his wallet
These have the structures indicated in (112).
(112) a. Henry is x in oe[kiss(x,Ann,e)]
b. The x in 5e[lose(John, x,e)] was his wallet
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Note that the complementizer that is obligatory in the cleft (111 a).
Furthermore, note that no 8-binder of the event position is available outside
the that clause. Assume that 8-binds the event position of the clause. In
the pseudocleft in (111 b)t the o-binder is whatever it is in headless
relatives.
2.4.5 Implicit clefts with stressed constituents
The contrastive stress in (113a) induces a presupposition that John
bought something, as in (113b).
(113) a. John bought THE STEREO
b. The stereo was x in 8e(buy(John,x,e)]
Assume that the stressed constituent raises at LF and adjoins to IP where it
a-binds the event position of the clause.
(114) £Ip (the stereoli hP<e> John bought ti ]]
1 '1'
2.5 Presuppositions, Defeasihility, and Modal Contexts
2.5.1 Defeasibility
Presuppositions are defeasible: under certain circumstances t a
presupposition that would normally be generated by a sentence fails to
materialize. Such presupposition failure can be explicated in terms of the
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notion of a discourse frame, adopted here from Kamp (1981) and Heim
(1982). Some standard examples follow.
(115) a. I don't know that Bill left
b. Sue died before finishing her thesis24
c. You say that someone in this room will betray you. Well,
maybe so. But consider: it won't be John who will betray
you, it won l t be P~ul who will betray you, and it won't be
Bill who will betray you. Therefore, you are knistaken.
In (lISa), the complenlent of know should presuppose that Bill left, but
the matrix sentence states that exacdy this is uncertain, and therefore it
cannot be presupposed. In (115b), the complement of before is supposed
to presuppose that Sue finish.ed her thesis, but the matrix implies that this
could not have been the easc. Finally, in (lISe), the negated cleft clauses
such as it won't be John who will betray you are supposed to p'Cesllppose
that someone will betray you, yet the conclusion of the discourse is that
precisely this is false.
Consider what happens in casts like these on the account developed
here. Starting with (lISe), the speaker begins by entertaining the belief of
his addressee. This e:,.~ablishes a discDurse frame D' which the speaker
regards as pureiy hypothetical, and which is distinct from the discourse
frame D that the speaker uses for non-hypothetical discourse. The cleft
sentences then do indeed involve a-binding (If the relevant event r'.sitions,
but they are bound within the discourse frame D'. Thus, presuppositions
are generated, but only within D'. At the end of the discourse, we conlpute
presuppositions of the entire discourse as presuppositions within the "base
24Actually, note that before has a prevalent interpretation in which the complement is
presupposed not to have occurred. (pointed out by Howard Lasnik, p.c.)
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discourse frame" D, and of course, none of the presuppositions of the cleft
sentences emerge there.
On the view developed here, presuppositions (at least a large class of
them) are just a-binding within the discourse frame. As such, they are
computed compositionaUy in a bottom-up fashion, as part of the process of
semantic composition.
The idea is the same in the other examples. In (115b), the before clause
involves o-binding in a discourse frame, which would normally be the base
frail~e of the discourse, yielding the presupposition that Sue finished her
thesis within this frame. liowevcr, the ill formation that Sue died before
finishing her thesis nlakes it impossible for the discourse frame in which it
is presupposed that she finished her thesis to be th~ base frame.
Therefore, the dis..:ourse frame of the before clause has to be shifted to a
hypothe~ical f ..ame distinct from the base frame. Similarly, in (115a), the
presupposition that Bill left is generated, but when preJupposition
composition reaches the matrix clause, it bt:comes clear that this
presupposition is incompatible with what is being entered into the base
frame by vir·'le of what ,s asserted by the clause, and then the frame of the
complement has lO be interpreted as a hypothedcal fram:.
The discourse fram: of a presupposition can be shifted not only by
trigg~rs vt'ithin the linguistic context, as in the examples in (115), but also
by one's backgrou'ld knowledge. If the participants in a discourse know
:hat John did not Jet his PhD, and one of them says, At leas~' Jol'n won't
r'!gret :I,o.t he did a PhD, everyone understands the complement cIt-use of
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regret as nonfactive. Ou the present account. the event position of the
complement clause is a-bound. but the background knowledge establishes
that the discourse f;rame in which this event position is a-bound is distinct
from the base frame. and hypothetical. As a result. the sentence means
something like, "At least John will not be in a situation of having done a
PhD wherein he will regret having done a PhD. "
2.5.2 Modals and presuppositions
Modal operators can have the effect of forcing a re-identification of the
discourse frame associated with an embedded clause. This can effect
determinations of definiteness. Consider the following gerund subjects.
(116) a. [John's killing of a raccoon] would have disgusted us
b. [John's killing a raccoon] would have djsgust~d us
c. (John killing a raccoon] would have disgusted us
d. [PRO killing a raccoon] would have disgusted us
Sentences like those in (116) without the modal were considered in section
2.4 above and were found to ~dmit interpretations on which the gerunds are
definite. But with the modal. these gerunds cannot be definite in the sense
of r~ferring ,0 an event within the base discourse frame. Consider what
happens. As th~ semantics of the gerund is comvuted, the event position of
the gerund can be S-bound. and the gerund interpreted as definite;
howe',t:r, once the moda~ would in ide mSltrix is encountered, the discourse
fra-ne of the gerund is established to be hypothetical, and other than the
base frame. At this point, the event position of the gerund remains 8-
bound. so the gerund remains definite, but it is definite ins orne
discourse frame other than the base frame. Thus the getund is
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indefinite in the sense that the even t referred to is es tab lis hed to be in some
discourse frame or other, however definitely it is established within that
discourse frame. This phenomenon is not limited to gerunds, but can be
observed throughout the event-definites that have been considered in this
chapter. A sample follows.
(117) a. (If it were raining,) John would have mentioned that we
needed an umbrella
b. (If Mary had been able to leave,) John would have seen
Mary leave
c. (If he were a thief,) John would have stopped stealing
coffee by now
d. (If he were the thief), Jahn would steal again tonight
Thus, modals donI t cancel presuppositions, they merely shift them to a
hypothetical discourse frame, just as other instances of presuppositions
being cancelled are really instances of the presupposition being preserved,
but in a non- base discourse frame.
87
Chapter 3
Adjunct Extraction
3.0 Introduction
This chapter develops a theory of adverbial wh extraction using the
structures developed in Chapter 2.
In this chapter, a notion of antecedent government will be needed along
the lines af that given in LRsnik and Saito (1984; 1991, chapter 2). In
particular, antecedent government will have to apply between a and t', and
betwe~n t l and t, in the configura.tion in (1), and be blocked between a and
t in the configurations in (2), where Ii in each case is a head that directly
selects its complement CP or NP.
( 1) [CP a [IP J3 [cp t' [IP t ••• ]] ] 1
(2) a. [cp a IIp P [cp "( IIp t •.. ]]]]
b. [cp a IIp J3 [NP •.• N [cp t •• £Ip ... ]]]]
The configuration in (1) arises in (3), and those in (2) arise in (4).
(3)
(4)
Why does John believe [cp t' lip Mary left early t ]]
a. * Why does John wonder [cp whether £Ip Bill was fired t ]]
b. * Why does John believe [NP the claim [ep t' that £Ip Bill
was fired t ]]]
L&S define antecedent government as follows:
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(5) ex antecedent governs ~ iff
a. ex binds ~ (a c-commands (it and a and ~ are coindexed}t
and
b. There is no y (y = NP or S') such that ex c-commands 'Y
and y dominates ~, unless Ji is in the spec of 'Y.
In Chapter 4, antecedent government, with essentially the characteristics of
the formulation in (5), will be defined in terms of the government domains
of governing heads.
At various points in the following, it will be said that adverbial w h
phrases are construed through their traces; specifically, this means that the
event position of the adverbial can be a-identified with an event position
accessible in the position of its trace, thus effecting construal of the w h
adverbial through its trace. These might alternatively be analyzed as
instances of reconstruction of the adverbial wh phrase.
3.1 Adverbial Extraction from Tensed Complements
The gOdl of this section is to give an account of adverbial wh
extraction from tensed clausal complements in terms of the event structure
of the complement clause coupled with the characteristic o)ode of
interpretation of adverbial elements. At a further remove, this supports the
thesis that the event a-position (Higginbotham 1985, following Davidson
1980) should be grammaticalized in the syntax in such a way that it
interacts intricately with other aspects of syntactic structure.
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3.1.1. The basic exh'ar.:tion facts
It is well documented that adverbial wh elements in English cannot be
extracted by wh movement out of the complements of factive verbs, while
they extract freely out of complements of nonfactive verb$ (Kiparsky and
Kiparsky 1971; Cattell 1978; Melvold 1986; Cinque 1990). Thus the
adverbial wh elements in (6) can be interpreted as associated with the
embedded clause, but not those in (7).
(6) a. Why do you believe [that John left 1
b. How do you suppose [that John fixed the car l
(7) a. * Why do you regret [that John left l
b. * How diJ you point out [that John stl>le the file 1
Objects, in contrast, differ little irl their extraction possibilities from
factive and nonfactive complements.
(8) a. Who do you regret [that John met 1
b. What do you recall [that John found 1
(9) a. Who do you think [that John met ]
b. What do you suppose [that John took 1
Assessment of the possibilities of subject extraction from thes" complement
types is a more delicatt: task. Speakers separate into two categories
concerning subject extractic'n from factive complemen.ts, namely, those who
find such extraction genl:rally quite go{)d, and those who find it
consistently bad. A selecti/Jn of subject extractions from complements of
factive and nonfactive verbs are given in (10) and (11) respectively.
(10) (7*) for some speakers
a. Who did he admit [ participated in the break in]
b. What did he admit [___ made hhu change his mind]
c. Who did you forget [ escaped]
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d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
J.
k.
(11 )
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.j.
k.
,
1..
m.
Who did John mention [ hired Bill]
What did John mention [ would convince him to go]
Who did John notice [ left early every day]
Who did you poin t ou t [ met B ill at the station]
Who did you realize [ looks like Bill]
Who does John recall [ met Bill at the station]
Who do you regret could not make itl
Who do you regret stole the file]
Who do you assume [ lnet Bill]
Who do you believe [ met Bill]
Who do you claim [ stole the file]
~Vho do you claim [ would make a good candidate]
'Nho do you figure [ stole the file]
Who do you maintain [ mel Bill]
What did you suggest [ caused the accident]
Who do you think [ stole the file]
Who do you suspect [ stole th0 file]
Who ~() you think [__ ._ would make a good candidate]
??Who did John state [ stole the file]
??Who did you assert [ stole the file]
??Who do you conjecture [ s tole the file]
The subject extractions from propositional complements are gOvd t except
for those that require a complementizert as in (llk,ltm). In Chapter 2 it
was suggested th?.t complementizers a: e obligatory on the surface vnly
when they playa role at LF. If this is right, then the complementizers of
factive complements, being obligatory, ar~ present at LF, and the same is
true uf the complementizer of propositional complements when they are
obligatory. Since semantic&lly contentful items cannot be inserted in the
course of n derivation,l it follows thut such complementizers must be
present at D~structure and S-structure, as well as at LF. Therefore, the
questions in (10) and (11k,ltm), in which these con1plementizers are
missing, are expected to be bad. This will be taken up later in this chapter.
'See Lasnik & Saito (1984), where it is argued that Affect a cannot delete or iosen
semant,;a11y contentful material.
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3.1.2. Syntactic accounts in the literature
Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971) argue that the factive complement is a
complex NP of the form [NP the fact [s that ... ]], and is therefore an
island to movement. But then, by standard theories of constraints on
movement (Lasnik and Saito 1984, 1990; Chomsky 1986b; Rizzi 1990), the
object extractions in (8) should be degraded on the order of a subjacency
violation (as noticed by Cattell 1978), contrary to fact.
Cinque (1990, p.30) argues that factive CP complements are a-marked
but not L-marked (in the sense of Chomsky 1986b, p. 15); therefore, factive
complements t\re not directly selected by the factive verb, so they are
barriers to government. However, the grounds for Cinque's conclusion
that factive complements are not L-marked are quite questionable. Yie
assimilates factive complements to complements of manner of speaking
verbs, such as yell, in the following ~ontrast (noted in Kayne 1983c,
fn.23).
(12) a. * WhOi did you say tk to ti [that Bill was here]k
b. WhOi did you yell lO ti [thatt Bill was h;.:re]
Assuming tha~ (12a) exhibits crossing of A' -dependencies, this suggest~i
that the complen1ent of the manner nf speaking verbs in (12 b) is generated
higher than the prepositional dative, and is therefore not directly selected
as the most internal argument of the verb. But facliv~ complements do not
pattern with (12b), and when they are separated from the verb by a
prepositional dative, they take an expletive associate occurring as the
internal argument of the verb:
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(13) a. ?ltrWhoj did you menti"n to ti [that Bill was here]
b. Whoj did you mention itk to ti [that Bill was here]k
This suggests that factive complements are directly selected by the verb.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that factive complements cannot be
left behind by do so substitution, which is generally capable of leaving
behind anythi"g not directly s~lected by the verb.
(14) a. * John mentioned to Mary [that Bill was crazy], and Tom
did so [that Bill was dangerous]
b. John mentioned (that Bill was crazy] to Mary, and Tom
did so to Julie
The data in (14) hold as well for complements of manner of speaking
verbs, suggesting that these too are internal arguments of the verb. Their
behavior in (12) therefore rests on other grounds. Maybe (12b) is a result
of r~structuring [v yell to], where such restructuring is not available to
propositional V+to or factive V+to in (12a) and (13a).
For a different approach, suppose tha.t a fact;ve operator 0 is eitht. ..'
moved to spec-CP of a factive complement at LF, or generaled there: at LF
(Melvold 1986).2 Assuming the extraction theory of Lasnik & Saito
(1984), it follows that the presence of 0 blocks adjunct extracti(ln while
leaving argument extraction unaffected. In particular, the extraction
proceeds through spec-CP of the complement clause, leaving an
intermediate trace there at S-structure, as in (15).
2'fhe operator 0 is a sentential or propositionai operator which takes the factive IP as its
argument. It is not a variable-binding operator. The factive operator cannot be in spec-CP
of the complement clause at S-structure since, if it were, then the object extractions in (8)
would exhibit a subjacency violation.
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(15) a. Whaq does John regret [ep til that IIp Bill stole till
b. WhOi does Jaho regret [ep ti' [IP ti could not make it to the
meeting]]
c. * WhYi does John regret [ep ti' that hp Bill issued the
order ti ]]
On Melvold's account, in (15a), the initial trace ti of the object is 'Y·marked
as [+y] at S-structure by the lower verb, stole, so the intermediate trace ti'
can delete at LF, allowing the factive operator 0 to be generated there. In
(I5b), the intermediate trace ti' 'Y-marks the initial trace ti as [+1] at S-
structure, so there too the intermediate trace can delete at LF, making way
for the factive Ctpera!or. But since traces of adjuncts are only y-marked at
LF, the intermediate trace in (15c) mus t be presen t at LF to 'Y -mark the
initial trace ti as [+y], preventing the factive operator from being
introduced in spec-CP of the complement clause.
The presence of the factive operator in spec-CP of the complement
clause will cause problems with sentences like those in (16).
(16) a. John knows [ep whYi [Bill left ti])
b. J oh n forgot [ep hOWi [B ill fixed the car ti ]]
The account can be amended to get around this problem (David Pesetsky,
p. c.) if we suppose that the factive operator 0 is adjoined at LF to a fact\ve
CP complement and if we assume that a factive operator adjoined to CP
blocks antecedent government into spec-CP. 3 Then argument extraction
p:ooceeds as before, relying on y-marking at S-structure. But adjunct
extracti"n, as in (15c) above, is blocked since the operator 0 adjoined to
CP blocks antecedent government of the intermediate trace, so the
_1 _
3This won't follow automatically on Rizzi's (1990) Relativized Ivfinimality condition since
that condition refers to Al spec positions, not adjoined positions.
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intermediate trace is marked [-y], and the structure is therefore
ungrammatical. In (16), the operator adjoined to CP does not intervene
between the wh f" ~ments in the intermediate COMPs and their traces, so
these extractions are unaffected by the factive operator. Thus amended,
this account captures the extraction data in (15)-(16). It involves
adjunction to an argument CP, which is problematic in some frameworks
(such as that of Chomsky 1986b), and involves a generalization of the
Rizzi's Relativized Minimality condition. A more principled account of
these facts will be sought here across a much wider range of cases deriving
from the rnech1nisms of presupposition generation developed in Chapter 2.
,'t .. l .. 3 Adverbial extraction and event structure
The extraction data in (6)-(11) wiH be addressed in this section. As
the foundation for this discussion, three bac.kground assumptions will first
'be in trod uced.
Assumption 1. Adverbial wh elements have an event a-position, and
construal of the adverbial w h element is by 9-identification of this event
position with that of the modified clause.
This assumption is part of the larger framework of assumptions adopted
here from Higginbotham (1985, 1989). For reason aC:verbials, the relevan!
notions were elaborated in Chapter 1 above. As mentioned there, 6-
identification by itself is too simple to capture all the properties of
adverbial modification. However, it captures a locality restriction that
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seems to hold on adverbial modification generally, and it is this locality
restriction that will be critical to the following discussion.
Assumption 2. There is no antecedent government across a
complementizer. There can be antecedent government across CO when it
contains no complementizer. 4
This captures the effects of the Minimality condition of Chomsky (19 86b)
as it applied to the C system. Assumption 2 will follow from the
formulation of antecedent government to be undertaken in the next chapter.
Assumption 3. An overt complementizer that is optional can delete at
LF. An overt complementizer that is obligatory cannot delete at LF.
We assume that complementizers are obligatory when they playa role at
LF. In factives and res,onse stance complements, an LF role for the
complementizer was delineated in Chapter 1, namely, to discharge the event
position of the complem,ent clause. In most propositional complements, the
complementizer is optional, and is therefore not present at LF. For
propositional complements in which the complementizer is obligatory,
assumption 3 requires that the complementizer be present al LF. Support
for assumption 3 will be given below in section 3.1.4. In the meantime,
since the account to be developed here depends critic:lHy on the presence or
absence of a complementizer, we need to complete the ~xtraction data by
4For now, we are only concerned with the presence or absence of the oven complementizer
that. The lack ofantecedent government over null complementh.ers will be considered
later.
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considering adjunct extraction out of propositional complements when the
compleinentizer is obligatory. For the data cons idered so far, the pattern is
the same as for other propositional complements, given in (6), (8), and
(11) above. In particular, adjunct extraction is available as follows.
(17) a. Why did John assert [that Bill should be fired l
b. Why did John state [that Bill is unhappy l
c. Why did John conjecture [that Bill left the meeting early l
d. Why did Joho propose [that Bill go before the committee l
As final preparation for the account, we extend the data to response
stance complements. Cattell (1978) noted that the extraction pattern out of
factive complements holds as well for the response stance verbs.
(18) a. What do they agree / deny I doubt [that John stole _-_l
b. Who do they agree / deny / doubt £ would make a good
candidate]
c. * Why do they agree I deny I doubt [that John leit __-l
d. * How do they agree I deny I doubt [that John caused the
accident --_l
Thus the class of verbs exhibiting the '/factive tl paradigm is exactly the
class of verbs whose complement involves o-binding of its event position,
on the account of chapter 2. Recall from section 2. 1 that CP complements
of p(ropositional)-verbs have an open event position whereas the event
position in complements of f(active)-verbs and r-verbs is discourse bound
by the complementizer that.
(19) a. forget [Cp<> that (YP<e> Max [I'<e> I [VP<e> visit Spain]]]]
1 +
b. believe [CP<e> that [IP<e> Max [l'<e> I [VP<e> visit Spain]]]]I t
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We now develop an account of the data. Consider the possibility of
adverbial wh extraction from the three contexts given in (20), where the
complementizer that is optional in (20a) and obligatory in (20b, c).
(20) a. Why do they believe [(that) Mary hired Bill ---l
b. Why did they state [that Mary hired Bill ---l
c. Why did they forget Lthat Mary hired Bill --_l
The LF structure of these relevant for purposes at hanG is the following,
where the adverbial wh element has a chain with an internlediate trace (' in
the embedded spec-CP, and an initial trace within the embedded IP.
(21) a. [cp why do £Ip they believe [Cp t' [IP Mary [VP<e> [hired
Bill] t ]]]]]
b. [ep why did [IP they state [CP<e> t' that (YP<e> Mary
[VP<e> [hired Bill] t ]]]]]
c. [cp why did [IP they forget [CP<> t' that [IP<e> Mary
[VP<e> [hired Bill] t ]]]]]
In (21a), the complementizer that is missing at LF, so t' antecedent
governs the initial trace t of why. Ass uming the movement chain indicated
in (21a), the event position of why can a-identify through the trace t with
the event position of the lower verb, contained in the a-grid of the verb
projected up to VP. The resulting event position then propagates to the
lower eft node where it is discharged in semantic composition with the
propositional verb believe. This part of the event structure in (21a) is not
cdtical to the construal of the wh adverbial, and so was not indicated. The
wh adverbial why is thereby construed with the lower clause in (20a). In
(21 b), the complementizer that is obligatory and therefore, by assumption
3, remains in place at LF. By assumption 2, the intermediate trace t' does
not antecedent govern the initial trace t. Therefore, the construal chain is
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broken at t l for purposes of adverbial wh construal. Nevertheless, why
can be construed with the lower clause through the intermediate trace tl
since the event position of the lower clause is available at CI for 9-
identification with the event position of why under sisterhood with the
trace tt. This yields construal of why with the lower clause in (20b). In
(21c), the complementizer that is also obligatory and so, by assumption 3,
present at LF. So tl does not antecedent govern t in (21c). However, there
is no way to recover construal with the lower clause in (21c) as there was
in (21 b). The complement of forget is a closed CP whose event position is
discharged at IP by the complemetizer that; the event position of the
complement clause is therefore not available at the CI node for 8-
identification with the event position of why under sisterhood of C' with
t'. Thus (20c) lacks the interpretation involving construal of why with the
complement clause. In (21c), the only trace of why that can be construed
with the complement clal' 5<.:: is the initial trace t, but since the chain is
broken by the failure of antecedent government over the complementizer,
this does not yield the construal indicated in (20c).
Object extraction out of the contexts in (20a, b,c) goes through
unaffected by the event a-structure of the complement clause. In particular,
object wh NPs extract as freely from the cOlnplement clause in (21c) as
from the complement clauses in (21 a, b). This is in accord with the object
extraction data in (8) and (9).
Subject extraction out of factive complements, and complements of
response stance verbs, poses a problem at this point. The complementizer
of the complement clause must be missing upon subject extraction, since
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otherwise a that-trace configuration is generated. Yet in factives and
response stance complements, as well as the complements of a few
propositional verbs, the complementizer is obligatory. This leads US to
expect that subject extraction from these complements should be fully
ungrammatical. For some speakers, this seems to be the case. But other
speakers find these subject extractions to be on the whole grammatical,
with some variation depending on the matrix verb. The account given here,
articulated to this point, accounts for the judgments of the former speakers,
and provides no explanation for the judgments of speakers in this latter
group.
3.1.4 Adverbial extraction out of multiple embeddings
It is possible to extract adverbial w h elements out of deeply embedded
propositional clauses, provided any intervening complementizers are
nonobligatory. As illustrated in (22), this holds when the intervening
complementizers are present overtly, as well as when they are absent.
(22) a. Why does John think [(that) Mary said [(that) Bill was
fired ]]
b. Why did John suggest [(that) Mary claimed [(that) Bill
assumes [(that) Linda was fired --_ll]
Since the nonobligatory complementizers can delete at LF, these structures
allow for unbroken chains, with successive members related by antecedent
government, from the adverbial wh element in its surface position down to
an initial trace in a position for construal with the most deeply ernbedded
clause. The LF structure of (22a), in particular, is that shown in (23).
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(23)
[cp Why does £Ip John think [Cp til hp Mary said [Cp t' [IP Bill
was fired t ]]]]]]
With factive or response stance complements, there is no possibility of
deriving such a licit structure since the presence of the obligatory
complementizer blocks antecedent government into a complement clause
even at a single level of embedding.
Particularly revealing cases are provided by adverbial w h extraction out
of multiply embedded propositional complements when some of the
intervening complementizers are obligatory. To begin with, adverbial wh
extraction is blocked when all the complementizers are obligatory, as in
(24a), which has the structure in (24b).
(24) a. Why did John conjecture [that Mary asserted [that Bill was
fired 1
b. [Cp why did [IP John conjecture [Cp ttt that [IP Mary asserted
[Cp t' that [Bill was fired t ]]]]]]
In this example, antecedent government fails between ttl and t', and
between t ' and t. A further test case for the assumptions adopted here can
be constructed by replacing either the higher or the lower verb in (24), but
not both, with a propositional verb taking a complement with optional
complementizer. This yields the two sets of examples in (25) and (26),
where that is optional only in the higher complement in (25), and on Iy in
the lower complement in (26).
(25) a. Why did John say [(that) Mary conjectured [that Bill is
unhappy 1]
b. Why does John believe [(that) Mary stated [that Bill was
fired 1]
c. Why does John think [(that) Mary proposed [that Bill
should go before the committee 1]
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(26) a. * Why does John conjecture [that Mary said [(that) Bill is
unhappy ---ll
b. * Why did John state [that Mary believes [(that) Bill was
fire.d 11
c. * Why does John propose [that Mary should claim [(that) Bill
was fired ll
The extractions in (25) are obtainable, but not those in (26). These results
are what we expect on the assumptions adopted here. The relevant LF
structure in (25) is shown in (27).
(27) Why did John say [Cp til [IP Mary conjectured [CP<e> tl that
£!P<e> Bill is unhappy t ]]]]
In this structure, ttl antecedent governs t l , and t l can be construed with the
lower clause by virtue of the event position of the lower clause which
remains undischarged on the CP node of that clause, where it is accessible
for a-identification at C' with the event position of the adverbial through
the trace t'. In this way, the fact that t' does not antecedent govern t does
not impinge on the construal of why with the lowest clause in (25).
The relevant LF structure in (26) is that shown in (28).
(28) Why did John state [Cp til that £Ip Mary believes [CP<e> t'
[IP<e> Bill was fired t ]]]]
In this structure, til does not antecedent govern t'. Thus, although both t'
and t can be construed with the lowest clause, this does not allow construal
of why with the lowest clause since t' and t are not part of a licit chain
headed by why. Of course, f' can be construed with the higher complement
by virtue of the event position of this clause projected up to the CP node
immediately dominating ttl . And the sentence in (26b) has the
corresponding interpretation in which why is construed with the higher
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embedde~ clause. But construal of why with the lowest clause is not
available, as necessitated by the structure in (28).
A further, particularly clear, test case is provided when the lowest
clause is infinitival, since the boundary of the infinitival is, in itself,
readily permeable to adverbial wh extraction (as will be discussed in
section 3.2 below). Thus, the extraction of why in (29) below is especially
felicitous, where both verbs are propositional taking complements with
optional complementizer. Contrast with (30).
(29) Why did John say [(that) Mary believes [Bill to be
unhappy ---Jl
(30) • Why did John state [that Mary believes [Bill to be
unhappy --_l]
Despite the permeability of the infinitival boundary in (30), why cannot be
construed with the infinitival complement in this question since the
obligatory complementizer in the complement of state is present at LF and
thus prevents there being a chain from why to its trace (if any) within the
infinitival.
In some languages, including much of Romance, complementizers are
obligatory in all fully tensed (nonsubjunctive) complement clauses.
including all propositional complements. The account developed here
predicts that. in such languages. adverbial wh construal should be
impossible out of tensed complements beyond one level of embedding.
This prediction is apparently borne out in French, Spanish. and Catalan,
which have obligatory complementizers. Examples frum French and
Catalan follow. In (31). object extractions from one and two levels of
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embedding are exhibited in Catalan; adverbial wh construal into one level
of embedding and two levels of embedding in Catalan is exhibited in (32)
and (33).
a.(31) Que creus que va comprar en Guillem
what you-think that aux-3s buy the G.
'What do you think that G. bought?'
b. Que creus que va dir la Maria que va comprar
en Guillem
what you-think that aux-3s say the M. that aux-3s buy
the G.
'What do you think that M. said that G. bought?'
(32) a.
b.
Per que creus que en Guillem va marxar
why you-think that the G. aux-3s leave
•Why do you think that G. left?'
Com creus que en Guillem va arreglar el cotxe
how you-think that the G. aux-3s fix the car
I How do you think that G. fixed the car?'
(33) a. ?*
b. ?*/??
Per que creus que la Maria va dir que en Guillem
va marxar
why you-think that the M. aux-3s say that the G.
aux-3s leave
'Why do you think that M. said that G. left?'
Com creus que la Maria va dir que en Guillem
va arreglar el cotxe
how you-think that the M. aux-3s say that the G.
aux-3s fix the car
'How do you think that M. said that G. fixed the car?'
Spanish data are similar to the Catalan. In French, the three corresponding
sets of judgments are as follows.
(34) a. Que penses-tu que Bill a achete
what think-you that B. bought
h. ? Que penses-tu que Marie a dit que Bill a aehete
what think-you that M. aux said that B. bought
b.
a.(35) Pourquoi penses-tu que Bill est parti
why think-you that B. left .
Comment penses-tu que Bill a repare la voiture
how think-you that B. fixed the car
(36) a. * Pourquoi penses-tu que Marie a dit que Bill est parti
why think-you that M. aux said that B. left
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b. lie Co.mment penses-tu que Marie a dit que Bill a repare la
votture
how think.. you that M. aux said that B. fixed the
car
In Italian, the adverbial wh can be construed with a clause at two levels of
embedding, but only when this clause has pro subject.
3.1.4.1 On a processing account of the data
There is a difficulty in evaluating data of the sort dealt with in this
chapter. In order to construe an adverbial wh iiI the matrix COMP with an
embedded clause, it is necessary to filter out or put aside the interpretation
with the adverbial wh construed with the matrix clause. And the latter
interpretation is often somewhat more salient or easier to get than construal
with an embedded clause. This suggests the possibility that failures of
construal with an embedded clause might be a processing effect, essentially
a garden path effect, in which the adverbial wh is interpreted at the first
opportunity in the course of processing the sentence from beginning to end,
yielding construal with the matrix clause. 5 This possibility can be
addressed in the following contexts, considered above.
(37) a. * Why did John notice [that Bill moved the furniture l
b. * Why do they agree [that Bill quit school _-_1
(38) a. * Why did John state [that Bill quit school __-l
b. * Why do you conjecture [that Bill quit school 1
(39) * Why did Jahn state
assert
[that Mary said [that Bill quit 1
However, note that even if the lack of lower construal in (37) .. (39) is due
to a garden path effect in processing, this effect must fail to obtain in the
5This was pointed out.to me by Noam Chomsky and David Pesetsky, independently.
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processing of questions involving adverbial wh extraction out of
propositional complements such as those in the following.
(40) Why did John say [(that) Mary believes [(that) Bill quit
school ---l]
The generalization seems to be the one adopted here: that adverbial w h
extraction is readily available over nonobligatory complementizers, and not
readily available over obligatory complementizers. 6 This, by itself, does
not rule out the possibility that the contrasts are due to garden path or other
processing effects: it is conceivable that processing effects are at work, and
that they are triggered by an obligatory complementizer, or by some aspect
of the interpretation, hitherto unnoticed, which is correlated with
obligatoriness of the complementizer. However, pending the establishment
of such a connection in processing studies, this involves an appeal to an
unknown connection between processing and the obligatoriness of the
complementizer. The syntactic explanation offered above in this chapter,
on the other hand, provides an explicit explanation of the observed
contrasts and of the underlying generalization. Under these circumstances,
the explanation offered here should stand, although it should be recognized
that this explanation would be undermined if garden path effects or the sort
described above were shown to occur in the data under consideration.
6A gocxl minimal pair is provided by the following.
(i) a. Why did John say that Mary thinks [Billieft-l
b. • Why did John state that Mary thinks [Bill left-l
assert
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3.2 Adverbial Extraction and Event Structure: Other Contexts
We turn now to adverbial wh extraction from other contexts whose
event structure was discussed in Chapter 2.
3.2.1 Nonfactive infinitivals
We begin with extraction from nonfactive infinitivals.
(41) believe class
a. Why did Mary believe [Bill to have left 1
b. How did Mary suspect [Bill to have stolen the car 1
(42) want class
a. Why does John wan t [Mary to he hired 1
b. Why does Mary want [Bill to shred the documents 1
c. Why does Mary want [PRO to be liked 1
d. How does Mary want [Bill to get on the roof 1
(43) try class
a. Why did Mary try [PRO to be liked 1
b. How did Mary try [PRO to get into the Peace Corps 1
c. Where did Mary try [PRO to be assigned l
The complements in (41) are bare IPs, selected by the higher verb; the
adverbial wh element therefore antecedent governs its trace within the
infinitival complement. In (42a, b,c), construal of a rationale adverbial
with the verb want of the higher clause must be carefully distinguished
from construal with the lower clause. The existence of a lower construal is
most easily detected with a for phrase, as given in (44a, b), construed as
rationales associated with the lower clauses of (42a, b), respectively. 7
(44) a. For her journalism experience.
b. For kindling.
7'This was pointed out to me by James Higginbotham and Howard Lasnik, independently.
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And (42d) readily admits construal of how with the lower clause.
Following Pesetsky (Class lectures, Fall 1988), the complements in (42)
are CPs introduced by a null prepositional complementizer, for, expressing
an attitude towards an irrealis event. For is thereby regarded as taking an
irrealis event argument, so for rlischarges the event position of the
complement clause. The relevant structure is given in (45).
(45) [CP why does [IP Mary want [CP<> e for [lP<e> Bill to be
elected t ]]]]
Given its argument structure, and its capacity to assign case to a lexical
subject, for has more than just the categorial and unmarked features of a
complementizer. It follows that the wh adverbial in (45) can extract out of
the infinitival IP, and be construed with the event position of this clause.
Thus, construal of the wh adverbial with the lower clause is expected to be
available in (42).
Lower construal of the wh adverbial is also available in (43), as
indicated by the suitability of the answers in (46) as associated with the
complement clause.
(46) a. For her diligence.
b. As an alternate.
The verb try also takes a CP complement with a for complementizer, so
the structure of (43) is that in (45), and the availability of adverbial wh
construal with the lower clause follows.
108
3.2.2 Perception verbs and implicative verbs
Next, consider adverbial w h extraction from complements of perception
verbs and implicatives.
(47) a. Why/for what reason did John see [Mary leave _--l
b. How did John see [Mary fix the car _.__1
(48) a. Why did John make [Bill jump into the lake l
b. How did John make [Bill fix the car - __l
(49) a. Why did John cause [Bill to jump into the l'lke l
b. How did John cause [Bill to discover a dinosaur bone --_l
(50) a. Why did John manage [PRO to get into the barn --_J
b. For what reason did John manage [PRO to get into the
barn l
c. How did John manage [PRO to fold the Inap ---l
In (47)-(50), the wh adverbial can be construed with the infinitive or
naked infinitive complement in a way distinguishable from construal with
the matrix clause. In (47), the distinction between the interpretations
associated with the two positions of construal is not subtle. In (48)-(50),
the lower construal is implicated in possible answers such as those in (51)
for (48) and those in (52) for (49).
(51) a. To cool off. (Joho forced Bill to work in the hot sun.)
b. In his best clothes. (John wouldn't let Bill change into
overalls. )
(52) a. To extinguish the fire. (John lit Bill's clothes on fire.)
b. By instructing Bill to dig up the backyard.
U sing Higginbotham's (1983) analysis of perception sentences, and
mechanisms from Heim (1982), these were all analyzed in Chapter 2 as
involving LF adjunction of the complement clause, with its event position
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open, to the matrix IP, where an un selective binder 3 is projected to bind
the open event position of the raised complement.
(53) IP
A
3 IP
~
XPi<e> IP
6 6
Mary leave John saw ti
The extraction structures in (47) and (4S)-(50) at LF are then of the form
given in (54).
(54) a. [cp whYk did [IP 3 (Jp [XP<e> Mary leaveJi [IP John saw tj ]
tk ]]]
b. [cp WhYk did [IP 3 [IP [XP<e> Bill fix the carli hp John
made ti ] tk ]]]
In this configuration, the wh adverbial can be extracted from the position
of tk and and thereby construed (through its trace tt) with the complement
clause through a-identification of its event posititJn with the open event
position in XPi<e>. Thus construal of the wh adverbial with the
complement clause is available in (47)-(49).8 The sentences in (50) are
good, but it is to be noted that construal of the adverbial wh with the
SAn alternative approach to factivity is developed in Uribe-Etxebatria (1990). She assumes
that factive that -clauses raise at LF and adjoin to the matrix IP; thh; is the structural
condition for interpretation as factive on her account. Uribe-Etxabs1rria then argues that
antecedent government would fail across the raised CP, blocking adjunct extraction out of
the factive complement. If this is correct, and if complements of pel'Ception verbs and
cause and make also raise and adjoin to IP, yielding their factive interpretations, then on
the account of Uribe-Etxabania., adjunct extraction should be blocked from these
complements as well, contrary to fact
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infinitival complement of manage is indistinguishable from construal with
the matrix clause. In Chapter 2, it was argued that the infinitival
complement of manage raises at LF with its open event position and adjoins
to the matrix VP, where its event position is O-identified with the event
position of the matrix verb; thus managing to do X and doing X are the
same event. It follows on this analysis that adverbial modification of the
complement of manage is indistinguishable from modification of the matrix
clause. So the facts concerning the construal of the adverbial w h elements
in (50) follow from the event structure presented in Chapter 2.
3.2.3 Gerunds
For extraction out of gerund complements, we need to consider both
definite and indefinite gerunds. Recall from Chapter 2 that there are four
types of gerunds, jog-of, POSS-iog, ACe-jog, and PRO-jog, to which we
assigned the following structures.
(55) jng-of
DP
~~eo:n~
D NP
[
,Is 1
the J drinking of the coffee
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(56) POSS-ing
DP
A
John D'
A
D VP
16
, s drinking the coffee
(57) ACC-jng
IP
Bi~I'
I~VP
[ ~~Sl~[Agr ACe] meeting Sam
(58) PRO-ing
IP
A
PRO I'
A
I VP
16[ '':~S1meeting Sam
The ing-of and POSS-jng are definite when the contents of DO 8-bind the
event position; the ACC-ing and PRO-jng are definite when the contents of
1° B-bind the event position. Since they are not L-marked (cf. Chomsky
1986a), the NP and VP complements of D in the ing-of and POSS-ing
gerunds are barriers to antecedent government. Therefore, we expect that a
w h adverbial cannot across these nodes and 'ilntecedent govern its trace. In
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a definite ing-of or POS S-ing, where the event position is discharged by
the contents of DO, it follows that a wh adverbial cannot extract and
antecedent govern its trace in a position where the event position of the
gerund is available for a-identification; therefore, we expect that a w h
adverbial cannot be cons trued as modifying a definite jng-of or POS S-ing
gerund. The possibility of wh adverbial construal inside a definite ACe-
ing or PRO-ing gerund depends on whether the 1°(+N] head in these
gerunds is an ex tended projection of V. (S ee Chapter 4 below.) If the
IO[+N] is not, then these gerunds will pattern with the ing-of and POSS-ing
gerunds. This will turn out to be the case, when we examine the data
below. In all four gerunds, an indefinite interpretation, or the possibility
of quantificational variability, arises when the designated 8-binder
exercises the option not to discharge the event position, so that the maximal
projection of the gerund emerges with an open event position. The
indefinite gerund raises at LF and adjoins to the matrix IP. This allows
that a w h adverbial can extract from a position adjoined to the matrix IP
and and be construed with the gerund DP<e> or IP<e>, by having its event
position a-identified with that of the gerund.
(59) a. Why does John deplore [Bill's talking to Sam]
b. [ep whYk does [IP 3 hp [DP<e> Bill's talking to Sam]i
[Jp John deplore tj ] tt ]]]
Relevant data are given below. Where data are given for the POSS~ing,
they hold equally well for the jng-of, and where data are given for the
ACe-jog, they holds equally well for the PRO-jng.
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(60) Indefinite pas S wing (& ing-of)9
a. For what reason does John object to [Bill's quitting jobs ]
b. How does John object to [Bill's bursting into rooms ]
For rationale modifiers, the judgment with for what reason is more secure
than witb why. The two interpretations, involving construal of the
adverbial wh with the matrix and embedded clauses, can be distinguished
in light of appropriate answers under each interpretation, as in the
following for (60a, b).
(61) a. Because he (John) thinks Bill does a good job. [matrix
construal]
b. Because he (Bill) wants more money. [embedded construal]
The questions in (60), construed as indefinite, allow an interpretation for
each of the possible answers in (61). But with the gerund in (62)
construed as definite, only matrix construal of the wh is available.
(62) Definite POS Swing (& ing-of)
a. lie For what reason did John object to [Bill's quitting his job l
b. lie How did John object to [Bill's bursting into the room ]
On the interpretation of (62) on which the gerund is definite, there is
understood to be a definite occasion at issue of Bill quitting his job, or
bursting into a room. The pattern for ACC-jngs and PRO-jngs is the same,
as in the following.
9Certain features of the sentences that follow, including the tense of the matrix and the
definiteness of the object within the gerund, are chosen to facilitate an interpretation of the
gerund as definite or indefinite, as indicated. However, the surface fonns given, as strings
of words, are not inherently definite or indefmite, but admit definite or indefinite
interpretations, more or less felicitously, as the case may be. Likewise, the grammaticality
judgments given for these sentences are given for the question with the gerund interpreted
as definite or indefmite, as indicated.
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(63)
a.
b.
(64)
a.
b.
Indefinite ACC-ing (& PRO-ing)
For what reason does John object to [Bill quitting jobs ]
How does John object to [Bill bursting into rooms ]
Definite ACC-ing (& PRO-ing)
lit For what reason did John object to [Bill quitting his job ]
lit How did John object to [Bill bursting into the room ]
Note that construal of an adverbial wh into a definite ACC-ing or PRO-ing
is as bad as into a definite ing-of or POS S-ing. It follows that the IO[+Nl
head in these gerunds must not count as a projection of V to block
antecedent government into the non-L-marked VP, wh~re the event position
of the gerund is available for construal. This covers adverbial construal
into definite and indefinite object gerunds. Note that objects extract freely
from the definite gerunds, where construal of an adverbial wh is blocked,
and subjects extract when their point of origin is more deeply embedded.
(65) a. [Whatli did Joho object to [Bille s) quitting til
b. [Which roomli did John object to [Bille s) bursting into til
c. WhOi did John object to [Bill(' s) taking ti to the beach]
d. WhOi did John object to [Bill(' s) claiming [ti" Agri [ti
helped Mary]]]
So these contexts exhibit the paradigm observed with respect to factive and
response stance complements: arguments extract freely, while adverbial w h
construal is completely blocked.
When the event position of the gerund is quantified out by an adverb of
quantification, then, since this interpretation is similar to the indefinite in
involving raising of the gerund with an open event position, we expect
adverbial wh construal into the gerund to be available, as is the case.
(66) a. For what reason I how do you always enjoy [Bill's singing
of that song ]
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b. For what reason I how do you always enjoy [Bill's singing
that song ]
c. For what re-.ason I how do you always enjoy [Bill singing that
song ]
d. For what reason do you always enjoy [PRO singing that
song ]
As happens almost throughout these data, the judgment with for what
reason is more secure than with why. This looks similar to the greater
extractability of which phrases on the theory of Cinque (1990), according
to which the which phrase ranges over a delimited set and is thereby
referential, lending it greater extractability over weak islands. However,
one should be cautioned against adopting this explanation for the greater
extractability of for what reason over why in the examples above since in
examples like (66), for what reason can be understood as ranging over a
thoroughly nondelimited set of possible rationales.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, gerund complements of factive verbs are
factive, with the event position of the gerund 8-bound by the contents of
DO or 10. As we expect, adverbial wh elements cannot be construed within
the gerund complement of a factive verb.
(67) a. * Why!how did John mention [Bill's capturing of the
raccoon ]
b. * Why!how did John mention [Bill's capturing the
raccoon ]
c. * Why!how did John mention [Bill capturing the
raeeoo n ]
d. lie Why!how did John mention [PRO capturing the
raccoon ]
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ACC~ing and PRO-ing gerunds occurring as complements of p-verbs can be
propositional; in this case, adverbial wh construal into the gerL'nd is
possible.
(68) a. Why/how did John imagine [Bill being led to the
gallows ]
b. Why/how did John visualize [PRO being charged with
sedition ]
lng-of and POSS-ing gerund complements of p-verbs cannot be interpreted
as propositional; they must be either definite or indefinite. First, consider
definite jng-of alld POSS-ing complements, as in the following. 10
(69) a. John imagined Bill's holding off of the tiger
b. John imagined Bill's holding off the tiger
With the gerund interpreted as definite, adverbial wh elements cannot be
construed into the gerund, as we expect. The construals indicated in (70)
are out when the gerunds denote a definite (actual) event of Bill holding off
a tiger.
(70) 8.· How did John imagine [Bill's holding off of the tiger ]
b. * How did John imagine [Bill's holding off the tiger ]
An jng-of or POSS-ing gerund complement of a p-verb can be interpreted
as indefinite, or it can enter into quantificational variability; in these cases,
adverbial wh construal into the gerund is available. Thus, (71) can mean
that on each occasion of Bill drinking coffee or stepping to the microphone,
John visualizes it.
10TI1e gerunds in (69) are not intrinsically definite, but are being considered here under an
interpretation as definite. Likewise, the wh adverbial construals in (70) are not
intrinsically ungrammatical, but are so under the interpretation of the gerund as definite.
Similar comments hold for the indefInites in (71) below, and the adverbial wh construals
in (72).
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(71) a. John always visualizes Bill's drinking of coffee
b. John always visualizes Bill's stepping to the microphone
With the interpretation of (71) on which always quantifies ovrr the event
position of the gerund, adverbial wh construal into the gerund is possible.
(72) a. How does John always visualize [Bill's drinking of
coffee ]
b. How does John always visualize [Bill's stepping to
the microphone ]
This completes an examination of adverbial wh construal into object
gerunds. Note that argument extraction is free out of the contexts in (67)
and (70).
(73) a. Whati did John mention [Bill(' s) capturing til
b. [What animalli did John imagine [Bill(' s) holding off til
We now turn to subject gerunds. The maximal projection of a complex
subject is a barrier to antecedent government. Thus an adverbial wh
element cannot extract from a subject gerund and antecedent govern its
trace. This prevents construal with a definite subject gerund, as in the
following.
(74) 8. * How did [John's holding off of the tiger l make
him famous
b. * How did [John's holding off the tiger _--l make
him famous
c. * How did [John holding off the tiger l make him famous
d. * How did [PRO holding off the tiger l make John famous
However, on the analysis adopted here, indefinite gerund subjects, like
indefinite gerund objects, have an open event position, and raise and adjoin
to the matrix IP, where their event position is bound by an unselective
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binder. This leads us to expect that adverbial w h elements can be
construed with an indefinite subject gerund, as with an indefinite object
gerund, by extracting from a position adjoined to IP, at which the event
variable of the gerund is available for a-identification with the ever.t
variable of the adverbial wh element, through its trace in this position.
Surprisingly, in light of commonly observed extraction patterns, this seems
to be the case.
(75) a. For what reason did [John's bursting into rooms l get
him fired
b. For what reason did [John bursting into rooms 1get
him fired
c. For what reason did [PRO bursting into rooms 1 get
John fired
(76) a. How would [John's holding off (of) a tiger 1 make
him famous
b. How would [John holding off a tiger 1make him famous
c. How would [PRO holding off a tiger ---J make one famous
Likewise, when the event position of a subject gerund is unselectively
bound by an adverb of quantification, an adverbial wh can be construed
with the gerund.
(77) a. How does [John's singing (of) that song 1 always
cause Mary
to shudder
b. How does [John singing that song 1always cause
Mary to shudder
c. How does [PRO singing that song 1always make
John lose his voice
Meanwhile, argument extraction out of these subject gerunds is as
impossible as it is out of that -clause sentential subjects.
(78) a.· What song wo~ld [John's singing (of) t 1make
Mary shudder
b. * What song would [John singing t ] make Mary shudder
c. * What song would [PRO singing t] make John lose his voice
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So gerund subjects whose event position is unselectively bound, either by
3 or by an adverb of quantification, constitute a domain out of which
arguments cannot be extracted, but into which adverbial wh elements can
be construed. The existence of such domains strongly supports the view
that construal of adverbial wh elements is based in part on processes
particular to adverbials.
3.2.4 Temporal adverbials
As discussed in Chapter 2, the sentences in (79) with temporal
adverbials have the structure given in (80a), and the semantic
representation given in (80b).
(79) a. John wrote his paper before he met Mary
b. John joined the Communist Party after he met Bil:
c. John did the dishes while Mary read the newspaper
(80) a. John wrote his paper [pp<> before [IP<e> he met Mary]]
b. 3 e [ write(J, his paper, e) & before(e, 8e' [meet(J, M, e t )]) ]
The temporal preposition which introduces the adverbial clause B-binds the
event position of the adverbial clause, as indicated in (SOb). The adverbial
PP is therefore a closed expression.
Sinee the PP node in (80a) is unseleeted, it is a barrier for antecedent
government. Therefore, an adverbial w h element could not extract across
this node, and antecedent govern its trace in a position where it could be
construed with the event position of the adverbial clause. This explains
the judgments in the following data.
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(81) a. lie How did Joho write his paper [before he met Mary J
b. * Why did John return from Europe [after he met Bill - __J
c. • How did John join the Communist Party [after he met
Bill 1
d. lie How did Oliver ship the arms [while Bill duped the
press 1
3.2.5 Change/continuation of state verbs
Verbs like stop or continue, which indicate a change or continuation of
state, were discussed in Chapter 2 in the context of sentences like those in
(82).
(82) a. John stopped drinking coffee before bedtime
b. The army stopped killing students
c. John stopped Bill(' s) embarrassing his wife
d. The security services continued torturing labor leaders
Adverbial wh elements cannot be construed into the complement of stop in
(82a, b), but they can be construed into the complement of continue in
(82d), as shown in (83).
(83) a. * Why did John stop [PRO drinking coffee before
bedtime - __ l
b. * How did the army stop [PRO killing students ---l
c. * How did John stop [Bill(' s} embarrassing his wife _-_l
d. Why did the security services continue [PRO torturing
people 1
e. How did the security services continue [PRO torturing
people __1
Contrast (83a, b, c) with the questions in (84), for which suitable ans wers
with lower construal of the adverbial wh are given in (85).
(84) a. Why did John think about [PRO drinking coffee before
bedtime 1
b. How did the army think about [PRO killing students 1
c. How did John consider [Bill(' s) embarrassing his wife - __l
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(85) 8. In order to have productive dreams
b. By sending tanks onto the campus
c. By criticizing her in public
The account of (83) will depend on the structures put forth for these
questions in Chapter 2. In particular, stop takes a definite gerund whose
event position is discharged by the contents of DO (for jng-of or POS S-iog)
or of 1° (for ACC-jng and PRO-iog).
(86) a. [cp whYi did hp John stop [IP<> PRO I [VP<e> drinking
coffee ti ]]]]
b. [Cp HOWi did IIp Joho stop [DP<> Bill [D IS]
[VP<e> embarrassing his wife ti ]]]]
Since the complement of the gerund 10 or DO is a barrier to antecedent
government, it follows that the adverbial wh element cannot extract out of
this complement, leaving a trace in a position where it cao be construed
with the event position of the gerund. Hence, it can only be construed with
the matrix clause, yielding the interpretations indicated in (87), with the
definiteness of the gerund displayed.
(87) a. Why did John stop 5e[drink(PRO,coffee,e)]
b. How did John stop oe[embarrass(Bill,his wife,e)]
Turning to (83d,e), on the account of Chapter 2 the complement of continue
is raised at LF and adjoined to the matrix VP, where its event position is 9-
identified with the event position of the matrix verb. Hence, construal with
the matrix clause is indistinguishable from construal with the embedded
clause. The reason for John continuing to do X is the reason for the doing
of X (at least in the continuation, even if it wasn't the original reason for
doing X), and the manner of continuing to do X is just the manner of doing
X (at least in the continuation).
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Note that in (83a,b,c), where adverbial wh construal is blocked over
stop, arguments extract freely.
(88) a. Whati did John stop [PRO drinking ti before bedtime 1
b. WhOi 4id the army stop [PRO killing til
c. Whoi did John stop [Bill(' s) elnbarrassing til
d. WbOi did Jobo stop [PRO asserting [ti" Agri [ti insulted
Bill]]]
This is in line with the paradigm, by now familiar, in which adverbial wh
construal is blocked where arguments extract freeiy.
3.2.6 Iteratives and continuants
The sentences in (89) involve the structurally induced presuppositions
indicated in (90).
(89) a. John offended Mary again
b. The flying saucer came again
c. The flying saucer is still spinning in the garden
(90) a. 3e' again(~e[offend(John,Mary,e)],e')
b. 3e' again(~e[come(theflying sancer,e)],e')
c. 3e' still(oe[spin(the flying saucer, e)&in(the garden, e)], e')
The adverb still or again is adjoined to VP, where it 8-binds the event
position projected from V, inducing the interpretations given in (90).
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(91) IP
A
John I'
~
I VP<e' >
[+Tns] VP<e>
A
V<e> NP
I I
offend Mary
ADV<e'>
I
again
Nevertheless, adverbial wh elements can extract and be construed with the
event position of the clause, as in the following.
(92) a. How did John [ [offend Mary 1 again]
b. Why did the flying saucer [ [come 1 again]
c. How is the flying saucer [ still [spinniug in the garden _--ll
This follows since the adverbial wh element in spec-CP can antecedent
govern its trace adjoined low enough within VP to allow for a-identification
of its event position with that of the clause, undischarged within VP.
3.3 Referential Indices and Secondary Predicates
Following Cinque (1990) and Rizzi (1990), we assume that wh
elements that are assigned a referential a-role have a referential index, and
are thereby capable of long movement. In the previous sections of this
chapter, it has been argued that adverbial wh elements are construed by G-
identification of their event positions with the event position of the clause
that they modify. Recall that adjectives are construed by 8-identification of
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their open position with that of the head of the modified NP. We therefore
do not expect them to be subject to limitations of extraction that derive
from the mode of intepretation of adverbials. In the following data, an
adjectival w h element in the matrix spec-CP can be construr.d in the
..
position of a secondary (depictive) predicate over standard barriers for
antecedent government, including obligatory complementizers, thus
exhibiting a m'.trkedly different paradigm from that of adverbial wh
elements.
(93) a.
b.
What color does John regret [that Mary painted the
car --_J
What color does John believe [that Bill said [that
Mary painted the car ll
c. What color did John state [that Bill said [that
Mary painted the car ]]
d. ? What color do you wonder [whether Mary painted
the car _--l
e. ? What color do you wonder [who painted the car l
f. ? What color do you believe [the claim [that Mary painted
the car ]]
In (93), the adjectival wh behaves similarly to a referential element. Thus
the split between wh elements which don't leave traces, and are construed
by wh lowering, and referential elements is not simply a split between
adjuncts and arguments. 11 In (93), the adjectival wh element behaves like
11As noted by Rizzi (1990), further evidence that the distinction in question is not simply
one between arguments and adjuncts is provided by the fact that selected adverbials, as in
(i), are fully ungrammatical when questioned over standard islands, as shown in (li).
(i) a. John worded the letter carefully
b. John behaved badly
(li) a. * How badly does John wonder [whether Bill behaved --l
b. * How carefully does John wonder [who worded the letter --l
c. * How badly does John believe [the claim [that Bill worded the petition --3]
d. • How badly does John believe the rumor [that Bill behaved-l
In this respect, the selected wh adverbials t though arguments, behave like unselected
adverbial wh elements.
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an element with a referential index. Thele is, in fact, a way in which it
could acquire a referential index, namely, through predication. Following
Williams (1980), predication is coindexation of a predicate and its
argument. We might therefore conjecture that a secondary predicate or
other adjectival element gets a referential index from a referential element
via predication. However, there are instances of secondary predicate w h
elements which cannot extract over standard islands, including the
following.
(94) 8.· How raw do you wonder [whether Jahn ate the meat l
b. * How fully loaded do you wonder [who flew the
plane l
The conjecture thus cannot be true in this simple form. In order to clarify
the issue, a brief examination will be made of when secondary predicate
adjectival wh elements can undergo long movement. The focus will be on
object oriented depictives since these are widely extractable (unlike some
classes of subject oriented depictives which don't extract at all), though not
uniformly so.12
As argued in Ike-Uchi (1991)f the object depictive secondary predicates
that extract most successfully are resultatives and other depictives which
are generated lowest within the VP, closest to the verb. This is true as
well for long movement of object depictives, as the contrast between (95)
and (96)-(98) shows.
(95) a. * How cooked do you wonder whether the John ate the meat
b. • How cooked do you wonder ""ho ate the meat
12por a thorough discussion of secondary predicates in English, and of their extraction
properties by classes, see Ike-Uchi (1991).
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(96)
(97)
(98)
c. *
a. ?
b. ?
a. ?
b. ?
c. ?
a. ?
b. ?
c. ?
How cooked do you believe the claim that John ate
the meat
How ragged do you wonder whether they ran their Nikes
How flat do you believe the claim that John hammered
the metal
Which side up do you wonder whether John dropped
the toast
\Vhich side up do you wonder who dropped the toast
Which side up do you believe the claim that John
dropped the toas t
How stupid do you wonder whether John considers Bill
How stupid do you wonder who considers Bill
How stupid do you believe the claim that John
considers Bill
The examples 1n (96) involve resultatives, and those in (97) involve
resultatives of a sort. The examples in (98) involve a small clause
complement of consider from which the secondary predicate is extracted.
The problem is to find what these all have in common with one another and
with the case of straightforward adjectival modification involved in (93).
Only a speculation can be offered in the present work. Note that the
depictive predicates in (93) and (96)-(98) characterize the a-role assigner as
much as the a-role assignee. In (93), the color semantically characterizes
the act of painting: it is a painting red; red modifies not only the car but the
process of painting. In (97), the side of the toast which surfaces after it
drops characterizes the nature of the action of dropping. In (98),
considering Bill smart is a semantically different way to consider him than
considering him stupid; stupid modifies consider as well as B ill. In
contrast, the connection between the quality assigned by the secondary
predicate in (95) is related to the action denoted by the verb only by natural
law or convention. This is recorded in the following.
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(99) Conjecture: A secondary predicate has a referential index
just in case it characterizes the a-role assigner 01 its object.
In this case, it has the referential index of its object.
This explains why the adjectival wh what color in (93) has the same
distribution as a referential element: since it modifies both the object the
car and the a-role assigner paint, it acquires the referential index of its
object. Not all adjectival wh elements have this distribution, as noted in
the literature, which follows from (99) since not all adjectival wh elements
modify the a-role assigner of their object.
We can now extend the discussion to movement of some other
predicates. First, note that VP preposing can take place quite readily over
standard islands.
(100) a. ? Leave tbe room, I wonder whether Bill ever did
b. ? Leave the room, I wonder who did
c. ? Leave the room after the crime, I believe the claim
that Bill did
(101 ) a. ? Leave the room, John didn't do for a moment
b. ? Leave the room, John never did
(102) a. Leave the room, Jobn denies that Bill ever did
b. Leave the room, I remember that Bill did often
Thus, VP preposing exhibits the pattern for extraction of a referential
element. The conjecture advanced in (99) will not directly cover the
assignment of a referential index to VP. However, if we suppose that VP
assigns a a-role to the subject compositionally, as assumed in Chomsky
(1981) and (1986b), we might understand the assignment of a referential
index to VP as a reduced case of (99) where the predicate, rather than
characterizing the a-role assigner of its object, is identical to the 6-role
assigner of its object. In this case, being identical to something can be
128
taken to be a limiting instance of characterizing it. Then VP acquires the
referential index of the subject, so its capacity for long movement is
accounted for.
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Chapter 4
Wh Movement and Legitimate Objects at LF
On the account of adverbial wh extraction given in Chapter 3, adverbial
wh chains cannot be established across complementizers which are
obligatory on the surface and which are therefore. on the assumptions
adopted here, presen t at LF. This holds for the obligatory complementizers
in various Romance languages, and for English that in factive
complements, and in propositional complements of the few verbs, such as
assert, speculate, and conjecture, that require a complementizer in their
tensed complements. The obligatory complementizer seems to establish IP
as a barrier to antecedent government, or to induce some sort of Minimality
effect. The purpose of the present chapter is to develop a theory of
antecedent government which incorporates this effect of obligatory
complementizers. With this theory of antecedent government, and the
notion of a uniform LF object from Chomsky (Class lectures, Fall 1990),
the theory of AI movement, developed along the lines of Lasnik and Saito
(1984, forthcoming), can be considerably simplified.
4.1. Legitimate LF Chains
One of the central problems for the extraction theory of arguments and
adjuncts is that adjuncts seem to extract freely over complementizers,
which would produce that-trace violations for subject extraction within the
same environment. This can be seen in (1).
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(1) a. • Whoj do you think [ep tj I that [IP ti won the race]]
b. WhYi do you think [Cp til that [Ip John fired Bill ti ]]
In light of the mechanisms of Chapter 3, the pair in (1) does not really
illustrate the problem since it was described there how the adverbial wh
element could be construed with the lower clause through its trace til due to
the accessibility of the event position of the lower clause projected up to
the CP node of this clause. On these assumptions, the link (til, tj ) in the
adjunct chain is not critical for the construal of the wh adverbial with the
lower clause, so antecedent government across the complementizer is not a
critical issue in (1 b). However, with adjunct extraction from a more deeply
embedded complement clause, as in (2), construal of the wh adverbial with
the lowest clause can only be achieved through the chain of the moved
element, so antecedent government across intervening complementizers is
an issue in this example.
(2) WhYi do you think [CP li II that [Ip Mary said [cp til that
[IP John fired Bill ti ]]]]
For L&S, examples like these motivate the y-assignment mechanisms, with
different requirements on argument and adjunct traces, on which their
theory of the ECP is based. In particular, since they require argument
traces to be y-marked at S-structure, the trace ti in (1 a) is marked [-y] since
the complementizer intervenes in antecedent government of ti by til.
Adjunct traces, on the other hand, are not y-marked until LF, at which
point the complementizers in (1 b) and (2) have deleted, allowing antecedent
government of ti and ti' (as well as ti") in (lb) and (2).
Certain features of the L&S theory are determined or influenced by the
theoretical framework that it adopts. To begin with, L&S assume that
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complement clauses have the structure [SI COMP [8 ... ]], where COMP
takes the index of its head. Antecedent government by an element (X in
COMP is only possible when a is the head of COMP. and is actually
realized as government by COMP, with the index of a. A.ntecedent
government by (X in COMP is blocked when there is a complementizer in
COMP since the complementizer is the head of COMP and therefore blocks
the transmission of the index of a to COMP. If we go along with much
work of the past half decade and assume, following Chomsky (1986b), that
the projection of C has the phrase structure [cp spec [e· C XP]], similar
to that of other heads, then we lose the means by which L&S prevent
antecedent government over a complementizer. In this case, the failure of
antecedent government over a complementizer must be established in some
other way. A way of realizing this will be discussed below.
As summarized in Chapter 1, L&S assume that argument traces are 1-
marked at S-structure, while adjunct traces are y-marked at LF. The 'Y
feature is a binary feature, [±y] , with properly governed traces being
assigned [+y], and other traces being assigned [-y]. y-marking of argument
traces is required at S-s tructure in order to record a that-trace violation that
occurs at S-structure and which would disappear at LF upon deletion of the
intervening complementizer. y-marking of adjunct traces must be deferred
until LF in order that adjunct traces such as those in (1 b) and (2), separated
from their antecedents by intervening complementizers at S-structure, will
not be marked [-y].
More recent work has provided notions which allow for a considerable
simplification of the L&S extraction theory. In particular, Chomsky (Clas s
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lectures, Fall 1990) suggests capturing properties of extraction theory by
limiting allowable structures at LF through a classification of legitimate LF
objects. The idea is to cut down on the chains that can be derived in the
course of a derivation by assuming that all chains at LF must be uniform in
the occurrence of A or A' positions within the chain. Without such a
condition, the inventory of movement derived up to LF would be as shown
in (3), derived as indicated.
(3) a. (XO, xo, .. ., XO)
b. (A, A, .. Of A)
c. (A', ... , A', A)
d. (A', At, ... , A')
head movement
A-movement
At -movement of an argument
adjunct movement
(3a) is the configuration of a head movement chain, (3 b) of a chain of A-
movement, (3c) is the configuration for A' -movement of an argument, and
(3d) for movement of an adjunct. All of these are uniform except (3c). In
order to make (3c) uniform, all intermediate positions would have to delete
at LF, yielding the structure (A', A). This is an operator-variable chain.
The operator-variable structure must be included in any inventory of
legitimate LF structures, indicating that the position of the opr-rator is
exempt from the condition of uniformity. Then (AI ,A) counts as a uniform
chain. The legitimate chains at LF are then the following.
(4) a. (X O , xo, ... , XO)
b. (A, A, ... , A)
c. (At, A)
d. (At, AI, ... , AI)
The AI -movement of arguments and adjuncts thus involves two quite
different kinds of chain at LF. The movement of an adjunct produces the
structure (A', A', ... t At), with antecedent government between successive
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clements in the chain, whereas AI -movement of an argument yields an
operator-variable structure (AI ,A) at LF, obtained by deletion of
intermediate traces. 1 Frampton (1990a) arrives at this conclusion, arguing
that the trace of (certain forms of) adjunct extraction is not a variable, and
that the relationship between the head and tail of sUlch a chain is not an
operator-variable relation.
Adopting the requirement that LF chains must be uniform objects, we
can formulate extraction theory under the following assumptions; these will
be immediately illustrated in the examples that follow them.
(5) Ass umptions.
1. Chains must be uniform at LF.. Therefore intermediate traces of AI _
moved arguments are deleted in the mapping from S-structure to LF.
2. Complementizers block antecedent government. In particular,
in the following configuration, a cannot antecedent govern into IP.
(6) [cp a [c that] IIp .... ]]
3 .. Principle of Full Interpretation (FI). (Chomsky 1989) All elements
present at LF must play an LF role.
4. Complementizers that are obligatory play an LF role and therefore
must be present at LF.
1Unifonn chain requirements at LF do not necessitate deletion of intermediate traces of A-
movement in (4b). Furthennore, following Rizzi (1990), we might say that the
intennediate traces of A-movement are required to be present at LF for transmission of a 9-
role or for the realization of 9-role assignment to a chain.
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Note that in assumption 1 intermediate traces are assumed to delete in the
mapping from S-structure to LF, rather thau at LF. This is in contrast to
some treatments in the literature, such as that of Epstein (1987), in which
the deletions under consideration, of intermediate traces and
complementizers, is part of an ordered list of procedures at LF. By
assuming that the deletion is effected in the mapping from S-structure to
LF, deletion is assimilated more closely to movement on the derivational
conception, since movement on this cOJ1.ception occurs in the mapping
between levels of syntactic representation; thus movement and deletion are
more viably realizations of a more abstract rule AFFECT a. Furthermore,
with deletion of complementizers and intermediate traces in the mapping
from S... structure to LF, it is assured, without any ordering of LF
procedures, that these elements will play no LF role.
Under these assumptions, consider some basic extraction examples,
including those already discussed.
(7) a. WhYi do you think [cp tit that IIp John fired Bill ti ]]
b. WhYi do you think [ep ti It that hp Mary said [cp ti' that
[IP John fired Bill ti ]]]]
In (7), since the complementizers are not obligatory, they play no LF role,
and therefore must delete in the mapping to LF according to the Pr-inciple of
Full Interpretation. The chain (WhYi, tilt, tit, ti), with antecedent
government holding between successive members, is thus produced at LF
in (7b), and it is a legitimate LF object. Note that the requirement of
antece1ent government on the traces in this chain is met only at LF since
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the complementizer blocks antecedent government at S-structure. Similar
comments hold for the chain (why;, tit, ti) in (7a).
Next, consider the object extraction in (8).
(8) What do you think that John bought
Under the assumptions 1-4 above, we can get rid of a-government as a
means of object traces being properly governed. 2 Suppose that object
extraction involves adjunction to VP and then further extraction, as shown
in (9) below.
(9) Whati do you think [ep tift that [IP John [VP tit [vp bought ti ]]]]
The VP adjoined trace til antecedent governs the initial trace tie Since ti'
must delete in the mapping to LF in order to produce a uniform object at
LF, namely the operator-variable chain (w hat;, ti), there are no antecedent
government requirements on ti' itself. Given that tit 'V-marks ti at S-
structure, in order to keep a record of the licitness of tj at LF where til is
missing, it follows that lexical government of ti is not required. This
allows the disjunction between a-government and antecedent government in
the formulation of the ECP to be eliminated in favor of antecedent
government exclusively. This does not say at what level of the grammar a
trace that appears at LF must be antecedent governed. This point will be
taken up in connection with the next set of examples.
2The following discussion follows Chomsky (1986b) in using adjunction to VP to
eliminate e-govemment of an object in favor of antecedent government by the VP adjoined
ttace.
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Now consider the that·trace violation in (1), repeated in (lOa),
alongside a grammatical instance of subject extraction from a complement
clause in (lOb).
(10) a.· Wboj do you think [CP tit that IIp ti won the race]]
b. WhOi do you think [ep tit IIp ti won the race ]]
In both of (lOa,b), the intermediate trace tit must delete in the mapping '.~
LF in order to produce a uniform object (who;, ti) at LF. Thus, in (lOa), ti
is not antecedent governed at either S·structure or LF, whereas in (lOb), ti
is antecedent governed by tit at S·structure, but not at LF. Thus, for (lOb)
to be grammatical, and distinguished from (lOa), antecedent government of
ti at S-structure in (lOb) must make ti licit at LF. The fact that ti is
antecedent governed at S .. structure in (lOb) must therefore be recorded at
LF, to distinguish the LF of (lOb) from that of (lOa). Thus some sort of y-
marking mechanisms, or their equivalents, are necessary. However, it is
not necessary, for the sake of these examples, to stipulate that 'Y·marking of
argument traces takes place at S-structure. Given free application of 'Y.
marking, only the application at S-structure will license ti in (lOb) (since
til is missing at LF), and either choice, to apply at S-structure or LF, fails
to license ti in (lOa) (since the complementizer blocks antecedent
government of tj at S-structure, and tit is absent at LF.)
Free application of 'Y·marking proGuces the right result in (9) as well,
since tit can y-mark ti at S-structure and then delete in the mapping to LF.
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Recall that L&S require the feature specification [-y] in (lOa) to record
the that-trace violation that occurs at S-structure so that record of the
violation will not be erased at LF upon deletion of the complementizer that.
However, this is not required under present assumptions since til, as well
as that, is missing in the LF of (lOa); the structure could then not be
recovered by antecedent government of ti at LF. We will adopt 'Y as a
privative feature that is assigned to traces that are antecedent governed. A
trace that is not antecedent governed emerges at LF with no y feature at all.
The ECP requirement is then that traces of a certain sort (to be specified in
the following paragraph) must have the y feature at LF.
Within the theoretical context adopted here, the scope of y-marking
turns out to be extremely limited. First note that for argument extraction,
y-marking is required only for the trace in the D-structure position of the
argument since all intermediate traces will delete in the mapping to LF.
Next, consider an adjunct chain C=(a J, a.2, ... , a.n) at LF. In order for
this to be a well formed LF object, it must be the case that (Xi antecedent
governs Ui+ 1 for i = 1, 2, ... tn-I. But then the antecedent government
requirements on successive elements within C is part of the well
formedness conditions on C as an LF object, so they don I t need to be
stipulated as a separate ECP requirement on C12, ••• t an. Thus 'Y-marking is
not needed for traces of adjunct movement. So as it turns out, 'Y-marking is
only needed for the original trace of an argument, that is, the trace in the
D-structure position of the argument. Therefore, there is no need to
formulate the ECP generally in terms of y-marking.
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Based on the foregoing discussion, under the assumptions in 1-4 above,
we adopt y-marking only for the original trace of an argument, assuming
that y-marking is privative and specified to apply freely at S-structure or
LF. A chain of At -movement is then legitimate at LF if it is an instance of
one of the schemata in (11), repeated from (4c, d) above.
(11) a. (At, A[Yl)
b. (At, At, ... , At)
Hence 'Y is required on (and only on) the variable in an operator-variable
structure at LF produced by A' movement of an argument. This use of the
"( feature cannot be dispensed with in favor of a well formedness condition
on the operator-variable chain in (11 a) since the legitimacy of the variable
is a matter of derivational history coded in the "(-feature, and there is no
evident way to capture this information as a well formedness condition on
the operator-variable chain at LF.
In summary to this point, adopt the following.
(12) Extraction Theory
1. Chains must be uniform at LF.
2. Complementizers block antecedent government.
3. Principle of Full Interpretation
4. Complementizers that are obligatory play an LF role and therefore
must be present at LF.
5. The original trace of an argument must have 'Y at LF.
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6. The feature 'Y is privative and is assigned strictly under the
relationship of antecedent government. y-assignment is available at both S-
structure and LF.
The notion of antecedent government will be discussed in the next section.
Before leaving this section, we note some salient features of the theory
of extraction delineated above, and 50me similarities with other recent
proposals. Consider the following sentence from L&S (forthcoming).
(13) Who do you believe that Mary said left early
LF: [Cpo WhOi [C[do]I] [IP you believe [CP tin [c that]
[yp Mary said [CP tit [C ] lIP ti left early]]]]]]
In Chomsky (1986b) or L&S, an example like this would have involved a
long chain of intermediate traces connecting ti to whoj. Under the
assumption~ adopted here, tit antecedent governs ti at S-structure, so ti is
assigned 'Y. Then all the intermediate traces delete in the rr.apping to LF.
Note that on this approach, the extraction of arguments over islands
poses no problems for ECP considerations, provided the first link in the
extraction is established, yielding the assignment of 'Y to the original trace
of the argument. This is illustrated below.
(14) a. '1 WhOi does John wonder whether Bill said [tit [ti likes
Mary]]
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b. ? Whati does John know [ep whoj IIp tj [vp ti' [vp bought ti ]]
c. ? WhOi did John go to London [in order to [vp ti'
[vp meet ti ]]]
In these structures, ti' antecedent governs tit so ti is assigned 'Y. Each of
these Dlovements, however, violates subjacency. See section 4.5 below
concerning this. This is a reflection of differences between arguments and
adjuncts that have been much discussed in recent literature. See Rizzi
(1990), Cinque (1990), FraC1pton (1990), Kroch (1990), and Comorovski
(1989) for discussion of the long movement possibilities of arguments as
opposed to a.djuncts.
4.2. Antecedent Government and Minimality
The generalization that emerges from the cases of adverbial wh
extraction considered in Chapter 3, and incorporat~d into the extraction
theory set forth in (12) above, is that adverbial wh elements can extract out
of a tensed complement whose complementizer plays no semantic role, but
not out of a tensed complement whose complementizer has a semantic
function. By the Principle of Full Interpretation, it follows that adverbial
wh movement out of a tensed complement is illicit just in case the
complementizer of the complement clause is present at LF. This falls out
readily within the framework of Lasnik and Saito (1984), which adopts the
phrase structure lSi COMP [8 ... ]], where COMP is a single category
headed by the complementizer of S' (if there is one), and serving as a
landing site for Al movelnent. Lasnik and Saito assume that COMP takes
the index of its head, if it contains a complementizer. and otherwise takes
the index of the first element to move into it. Antecedent government by an
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A' element a in COMP is realized as head governlnent by COMP with the
index of a. Within this framework, if the complementizer is present at LF,
then nt) intermediate trace in COMP can antecedent govern into S' t so no
legitimate A' chain can involve an element in COMP. This phrase structure
conflates the head and At -specifier positions of the complementizer system.
If this conflation is maintained for the complementizer system alone, then it
makes the complementizer system an exception within X' theory, on no
apprarent grounds other than stipulation. On the other hand f if the
conflation of head and A' -specifier positions is maintained across
categories, then much work of the past half decade, founded on the
distinction' between head and A' -specifier positions, must be revised or
rejected. Therefore, this phrase structure will not be adopted here, and the
uniform X' schema of Chomsky's (1986b) Barriers will be assumed
instead, in which the structure of a tensed complement is given as follows.
(15) [Cp spec [c' Co IP]]
The task at this point is to capture the effects of a complemen tizer in C on
antecedent government.
We might suppose that IP is a barrier to government, contrary to
Barriers; if some means could be found to void the barrierhood of IP just in,
case the complementizer is missing, then the desired results would follow.
Furthermore, if it could be maintained, this approach would have the
desirable consequence of removing the defectiveness of IP within the
framework of Barriers. Note that the complementizer does not L-mark IP
since it does not a-mark IP. Thus IP remains a barrier for government so
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long as the complementizer alone is present in C. In order to consider how
the barrierhood of IP might be voided when C is empty, we will assume, in
a tradition following Pesetsky (1982), that I raises to C at LF in indicative
and complement clauses. 3 However, this will have to be implemented in
light of the operations of head-to-head movement that combine a verb with
its inflectional morphology, as set forth in Pollock (1989) and Chomsky
(1989). Given the formation of the verbal complex [vVRI], formed (in
English) by I-to-V affix lowering, the movement of I-to-C at LF must be
realized as movement of the complex [V-I] to C at LF. As with I-to-C in
int~rrogative clauses, assume that [V-I] substitutes into C when Co is
empty. In this case, [V-I] in C is capable of L-marking IP (as must be the
case if [V-I] is to govern its trace in 1).4' But when there is a
complexnentizer in Co, [V-I] cannot substitute into C, and so must adjoin to
C instead. At this point, the analysis faces the question of whether [V-I]
adjoined to C, with a lexical complementizer in Co, will L-mark IP. There
are two reasons why it must do so. First, [V-I] adjoined to C must L-mark
IP in order to govern its trace in I. Second, in V-to-I languages, in which
V raises and adjoins to I at S-structure, V occurring in the configuration
[IV I] must L-mark VP in order to antecedent govern its trace in V, despite
the presence of lexical (inflectional) content in I. So in general it does not
look like an L-marking head a, adjoined to another head ~ with lexical
content in the configuration ... [p a ~] 1 .. It should be prevented from L-
marking 'Y. So IP gets L-marked at LF in any event, whether or not there is
a complementizer in C, so the presence of the complementizer has no effect
3Also, see Law (1991) for argu!l1ents that I raises to Cat LF in complement clauses.
4This is extrapolated from the analysis of Chomsky (1989), in which a lexical head can L-
mark the complement of a head into which it moves.
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on antecedent government across IP. Thus, the attempt to capture the
effects of a complementizer on antecedent government by appeal to the
barrierhood of IP does not straightforwardly go through.
Instead of pursuing this approach, note that the effect of a
complementizer on antecedent government is a sort of Minimality effect,
along the lines of Borriers. In Barriers, Minimality is defined as follow s
[p.42].
(16) a. a does not govern P in (16b) if Yis a projection of 8
excluding a.
b. . .. a ... ['Y ••• 8 ... P ... ]
More loosely put, for our purposes, an element a does not antecedent
govern p across a head 8, where government across 8 means government
across any projection y of 8 to which a is not adjoined. 5 In this case, we
can assume, as above, that IP is z. potential barrier to government, but that
the verbal complex [V-I] raised to C at LF L-marks IP, thus systematically
voiding the barrierhood of IP in a complement CP, whether or not there is a
complementizer in C at LF.
But the formulation of the Minimality Condition in Barriers creates a
number of complications, some of them noted and discussed within
Barriers itself. In order to prevent the head I from inducing Minimality
effects anytime an adjunct is extracted out of IP, the I system was assumed
in Barriers to be defective for the formulation of Minimality, as it was for
5We will assume that Minimality is not induced by ara empty head X. We will not asswne
that X' is missing in this case, as Chomsky (1986b) does.
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the definition of Blocking Categories. Furthermore, on this formulation,
X' nodes must be absent when spec-XP is empty, as discussed in Barriers
[p.47]. These, and other, complications arise since Minimality, as
formulated in Barriers, applies to any head whatsoever, whether or not
there are demonstrable Minimality effects induced by that head. In the
remainder of this section, a framework will be developed which will
capture Minimality effects with respect to certain heads, such as
complementizers, but not with respect to others, such as V and I. What
follows might be taken as a substitute framework which reduces the
Minimality Condition of Barriers to a descriptive artifact. This is,
however, not what is intended. What is intended is a set of conditions
which will constrain Minimality to apply to heads which demonstrably
exhibit (descriptively) Minimality effects, in particular, to nongoverning
heads such as complementizers, and not to heads for which the application
of Minimality creates complications.
Adopt the following definitions.
(17) am-commands Piff a does not dominate p, p does not
dominate a, and every maximal projection dominating a
dominates p.
(18) a governs Piff
a. a and P are mutually m-commanding, or
b. a selects YP and P=Y or P is in spec-YP. 6
6Kayne (1983a) argues for government of spec-CP by a verb selecting CP, and Stowell
(1981) argues for government of C by a verb selecting CPo Kayne (1983<1) argues that
when N takes a clausal complement, N does not govern the subject position of this
complement. If this is correct, then the condition (b) of (18) must be restricted so as not to
hold for complements of N.
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Following Chomsky (1986a), possible governors include N, V, A, P, NP,
and VP. Going beyond this list, AP, PP, and CP will have to be governors
given their possibilities for extraposition and/or w h extraction.
Furthermore, for present purposes, INFL will have to count as a governor.
The definition of m-command in (17) is due to Aoun & Sportiche (1983),
except that we assume additionally that p does not dominate a so as to
exclude m-command by X of XI and XP. The definition of government in
(18) is essentially that given in Chomsky (1986a).7 In particular, condition
(b) is motivated by the configuration of ECM in which a verb, taking an IP
complement, assigns case to the NP in spec-IP; assuming that this case
assignment is under government by the verb, it follows that the verb
governs the spec of its complement. Define the government domain (GO)
of a head X as the set of all nodes that X governs. Consider the
configuration in (19).
XI
XP
A
AX yp
A
~ y'
Ay
a
(19)
Then
(20) GD(X) = (a, YP, p, yI, Y)
7Chomsky assumes that when a governs yP then a governs Y and spec-YP. This would
make a verb govern the specifier of an adjunct, which is not a desirable result for present
purposes. So we use select instead of govern in (ISb).
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Assume that the government domains of V and I are fused into an extended
government domain (EGO). This could be justified on the grounds that I is
an extended projection of V, as a result of which INFL carries verbal
features. 8 The EGD of the V-I system therefore is spanned by the subtree
which extends from the IP node down to the head of the complement of V,
if any. Define antecedent government as follows.
(21)
a antecedent governs Piff
a. ex binds P (ex c-commands p, and a and pare coindexed) and
b. There is an extended government domain containing both
ex and p.
But a means will be required to augment the extended government domain
of the V-I system beyond IP. Notice that on the definition in (21), a wh
subject extracted to spec-CP of a root clause will not antecedent govern its
trace in spec-IP.
(22) [ep whOi Co £Ip ti left]]
In (22), if the structure remains as shown, the EGO of V-I does not extend
beyond IP, so there is no EGO that contains both who; and tie However,
based on auxiliary inversion over the subject, and do support in English,
there is reason to believe that I raises to C in [+wh] clauses, including
matrix questions. Suppose that when Co is empty, I substitutes into C. In
this case, the presence of verbal features in C should extend the EGO of the
V-I system to include the C system. Then EOD(V-I) includes the contents
STIte EGO of V and I, defined as the union of the ODs of V and I on the grounds that I is
an extended projection of V, is essentially equivalent to Chomsky's (Class lectures, Fall
1989) notion of L-related, defmed as follows: a is L-related to pif a is governed by a
projection of p, pa lexical category, where I is an extended projection of V.
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of spec-CP. It follows that who; will antecedent govern its trace in (23),
the LF of (22).
(23) [ep whOi [c II [{p ti left]]
Return now to the basic that-trace violation discussed in the previous
section. 9
(24)
LF:
* Who do you think that won the race
{cp whoj [cldo]I] hp you think [ep til [C[that]l]
[Jp tj won the race ]]]]
For this example, and many more to be dealt with in this chapter, assume
as above that I raises to C at LF in indicative clauses and complement
clauses. 10 As above, within the context of Pollock (1989) and Chomsky
(1989), the heads V and I have been combined at S-structure into a complex
head [V-I], and I-to-C raising at LF is implemented as movement of [V-I]
to C in the mapping to LF. Furthermore, if the barrierhood of IP needs to
be voided, the implementation of I-to-e as movement of [V-I] to C is
critical in order to L-mark IP. Nevertheless, for expository convenience,
the movement of [V-I] to C in the remainder of this chapter will be referred
to and indicated as I-to-C movement.
As with I-to..C in interrogative clauses, assume that I substitutes into C
when Co is empty. In this case the verbal features of I are transmitted to
Co, so the EGO of V and I is extended to the C system of the clause. But
when there is a complementizer in Co, it will not be possible for I to
9t'''aes of wh..in-situ will be discussed in section 6 below.
10Alsot see Law (1991) for arguments that I raises to C at LF in complement clauses.
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substitute into C. Assume that I adjoins to C when there is a
complementizer in Co, and that in the resulting configuration, the verbal
features of I are not transmitted to C. Now return to the example in (24).
With the complementizer that present in the lower clause in (24), I adjoins
to C, and the C system of the lower clause remains outside the EGO of the
lower V-I system. Thus, by (21), ti' does not antecedent govern ti at S-
structure. Since the complementizer is optional, it deletes in the mapping
to LF, but this is too late for l-marking of ti since ti' is also missing at LF.
Now consider this example with the complementizer absent.
(25) Who do you think won the race
LF: [cp whOi [eldo]I] lIP you think [Cp ti' [cIl
lIP ti won the race ]]]]
When the lower C is empty, as in (25), I substitutes into C; then the verbal
features of [V-I] are transmitted to C, making the lower C system part of
the EOD of [V-I], and then ti' antecedent governs ti by (21). Furthermore,
due to the presence of the verbal element do in the matrix spec-CP, the
matrix C system is part of the EOD of the matrix V-I, as is the lower spec-
CP, so who; antecedent governs til in (25).
The next task is to consider more extensively the configurations under
which ODs are united into EGOs. Before doing this, however, the new
assumptions adopted so far in this section are summarized.
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(26) As s umptions.
1. I-to-C raising occurs at LF in indicative clauses and [-wh]
complement clauses, in addition to I-to-C at S-structure in interrogatives
and [+wh] complements.
2. I-to-C takes the form of
a. substitution of I into Co if there is no complementizer
b. adjunction of I to Co if a complementizer is present in C.
3. If I substitutes into C, in the mapping to S-structure or to LF, then
the verbal features of [V-I] are transmitted to C, and so spec-CP becomes
part of the EGD(V-I), so a constituent in spec-CP can antecedent govern
into IP. If I adjoins to C, then the verbal features of [V-I] are not
transmitted to C, and the C system is not included in the EGD(V-I).
We now consider more closely the conditions under which GDs are
extended to EGDs. First we record the EGDs that are formed in the
structures we have already looked at. These structures are the following,
with EGOs as indicated.
(27) a. Whoj does John think [ep ti' [c [that] I] [Ip ti left ]]
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ n_
b. Whoj does John think [ep ti' [c I] [Jp ti left ]]
++++++++++++++++++++++++
c. [ep Whoj [C I] [IP ti left ]]
++++++++++++++++++
As discussed above, the presence of I with verbal features in the
complement Co extends the EGD of the complement V-I to the C system of
this clause. However, the EGD of the lower clause does not fuse with the
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EOD of the higher clause to form one EGD comprehensive of the entire
sentence. That this is the case can be seen by creating a w h island and
extracting an adjunct over this island, as follows.
(28) a. * WhYi does John wonder [cp whoj [C I] [IP tj [[left] ti ]]]
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b. * HOWi did John ask [ep whatj [C I] [IP Bill [[fixed tj ] ti ]]]
+++++++++++++++++++++++++
The adverbial wh element in the matrix spec-CP does not antecedent govern
its trace in the lower clause in (28). Thus the presence of I in CO does not
fuse the EOD of the lower clause with that of the higher clause. This might
be because EGDs are intrinsically clause bound by definition. But
consideration of further cases will suggest more general structural
constraints on the extension and fusion of EODs.
To consider one such further case, adjunct extraction from out of
multiple ECM complements indicates that the EGDs of separate V-I systems
unite into a larger extended government domain when they overlap. This is
illustrated in the following example.
(29)
LF:
Why does John believe [Bill to require [Sam to fix the car 1]
[CP whYi [c[does]I] [IP John believe [IP Bill to require
[IP Sam to fix the car ti ]]]
There are no intermediate landing sites at the boundaries between clauses
for the movement of the adverbial wh in (29). Furthermore, the event
position of the lowest clause is not a.vailable at any point that would allow
WhYi to be construed with it without moving across clauses. Therefore
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whYi must antecedent govern ti in (29). From this we conclude that the
EOD of the matrix clause in (29) fuses with the EGOs of each complement
clause. producing one EGO comprehensive of the entire sentence. At this
point, we ask what conditions the extension of the clausal EGDs in (29)
into one larger EOD? The EGOs of successive clauses overlap. but this in
itself cannot be the structural feature operant for the fusion of EODs. For
if simple overlap sufficed to stitch together EGOs. then the complement
clause in (28) would constitute an EGD with its superordinate clause,
allowing the extractions given there. as follows. After I-to-C raising
applies in the lower clause in (28). the C system of that clause will be part
of the EGD of V-I. Then the EGD of the lower clause will overlap at spec-
CP with that of the higher clause, so if simple overlap fuses EGDs, then
why; and how; will antecedent govern ti, yielding the wrong result."
Noting that exceptional case marking is involved in (29), another
conjecture would be that case marking across the boundary of two EGOs
suffices to fuse them into one. However, the following example shows
this to be false. 12
(30) Why does Bill seem to be expected [to leave ---l
11 Note that if ti is adjoined to the lower IP in (28), then the movements in (28) could be
argued to exhibit crossing of paths, which would rule it out independently. (See Pesetsky
1982 and 1987.) In the case at hand, the paths would actually cross only at a segment of
the complex IP node fonned by adjunction, which makes it unclear whether this should
count as a crossing of paths.) However, the derivation shown in (28), with ti adjoined. to
VP, is nevertheless available, so ifoverlap of EGOs in (28) sufficed to fuse them, then this
derivation would produce a grammatical Stnlcture, contrary to fact We conclude that there
should be no general principle that overlap ofEGOs suffices to fuse them.
121 am indebted to N. Chomsky (p.c.) for this point and for the example.
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LF: [ep whYi does [IP Billk seem tIp ttl to be expected (Jp tt
to leave ti ]]]]
In (30), there is no case assignment across the IP complement of seem.
Nevertheless, the extraction is good, with antecedent government of ti by
whYi, indicating that the entire sentence is one EGO.
I will suggest instead that the structural feature conditioning the fusion
of GDs and EGOs is the presence or absence of independent tense
operators. Specifically, two overlapping ODs or EODs which contain
independent tense operators cannot fuse, whereas two overlapping GDs or
EGOs can fuse when they do nnt contain independent tense operators. I
will say that two tense operators are independent when they are distinct and
they have independent [Tns] specifications for [±past]. The possibility that
infinitivals might have a [Tns] operator, but one unspecified for [±past]
derives from Stowell (1982). 13 He argues that when a clause lacks a [Tos]
operator specified as [±pas t], then its tense is dependent on the t~nse of its
W superordinate clause. The claim here is that ECM infinitival complements
lack a [Tns] operator specified for [±past]. This might be because they
lack a [Tns] operator altogether (they might have an empty I or T nod.e), or
because their [Tns] operator is necessarily unmarked for [±past]. Now
consider the structure of multiple ECM complementation.
13Stowell claims that the absence of an independent [Tns] operator is evident in the
infmitival complement in (ia), in conttast with the gerund complement in (ib).
(i) a. John tried [PRO to unlock the door]
b. John tried [PRO unlocking the door]
The sentence in (ia) can mean that John tried to unlock the door without success, whereas
that in (ib) means that John actually unlocked the door, in the course of trying of ttying it
out, to see what it is like, or in trying to achieve some further end. The reading in (ib) in
which the unlocking of the door is actually achieved by John is supposed to be due to the
presence of an independent [Tos] operator in the gerund complement
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(31) Why does [John believe [Bill to require [Sam to fix the car ]]]
++++++++++++++++
000000000000000000000000
For each instance of IP infinitival complementation, the higher verb
governs the IP, spec-IP, I', and I nodes of the complement. Thus the EGO
of the lov,er clause overlaps that of the higher clause at these four nodes.
Since the infinitivai complement in each case lacks an independent [Tns]
operator, its EOD fuses with that of the higher clause. Thus in (31), the
three EGOs indicated fuse into one, so lvhy can antecedent gov~rn its trace
in the position of the gap indicated. In (30), the infinitival comple...nents
will likewise lack an independent [Tns] operator, so the EGDs of these
clauses fuse with one another and with the EOD of the matrix.
The system of assumptions in (26) is thus expanded to that in (32),
adding the condition in 4.
(31) As s umptions.
1. I-to-C raising occurs at LF in indicative clauses and [-wh]
conlplement clauses, in addition to I-to-C at S-structure in interrogatives
and [+wh] complements.
2. I-to-C takes the form of
a. substitution of I into Co if there is no complementizer
b. adjunction of I to Co if a complementizer i~ present in C.
3. If I substitutes into C, in the mapping to S-structure or to LF, then
the verbal features of [V-I] are transmitted to C, and so spec-CP becomes
154
part of the EGD(V-I). If I adjoins to C, then the verbal features of [V-I]
are not transmitted to C, and the C system is not included in the EGD(V-I).
4. Two overlapping GDs or EGOs can fuse into one EGO if and only if
they do not contain independent tense operators.
Uncer these assumptions, A-movement in raising is allowed by the fact
that the [Tns] operator of the IP infinitival complement is dependent on that
of the next higher clause, so the EGD of the IP infinitival fuses with that of
the higher clause. Thus John; antecedent governs ti in the following.
(33)
a. JOhni seems [ti to like Boston]
b. Johni is expected [ti to like Boston]
c. We expect Billi [ti to have gone to Boston]
d. We believe Billi [ti to have gone to London]
The fusion of EGOs in these examples is indicated by the possibility of
adverbial w h extraction, as follows.
(34)
a. WhYi does Johnj seem [!i to like Boston ti ]
b. WhYi is J ohDj expected Ltj to like Boston ti ]
c. WhYi do you expect Billi· (tt" to have gone to Boston ti ]d. WhYi do you believe Bi lj tj to have gone to London ti ]
However, if an IP infinitival is embedded under a tensed clause, an NP
cannot raise over the tensed clause. The resulting configuration is called
super raising in the literature, and is ill 11strated in (35), which can be
contrasted with (36).
(35)
a. * JOhni seems [that it is likely [ti to go to Boston ]]
b. • J Ohni seems [that it is expect(;;d [ti to wash the dishes ]]
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(36) a. It seems [that Johni is likely [ti to go to Boston ]]
b. It seems [that Johni is expected [ti to wash the dishes]]
In (35), the EOD of the IP complement fuses with that of the tensed
complement, but the EOD of the tensed complement extends only up to the
CP node of this complement. Thus John; does not antecedent govern ti in
(35). 14 A similar explanation rules out nonlocal passivization of the sort
illustrated in (37a) (sometimes called super passive); contrast with (37b).
(37) a. * Johni seems [that [it was told ti [that Mary will be fired ]]]
b. It seems [that [John was told [that [Mary will be fired ]]]
We are assuming that the [Tns] operator in infinitivals is unspecified
for [±past], which we will indicate by saying that INFL in such clauses has
the tense operator [et>Tos]. :furthermore, we assume that 1[et>Tns] is not
capable of discharging the event position of its clause. This shows that
I[4»Tns] is weaker than I[Tns][±past]] in that it lacks one of the capabilities
of the tensed INFL. Nevertheless, the GO of l[tllTns] fuses with the GD of
the infinitival verb, as indicated by the possibility of raising from object to
.
subject position in an infinitive, which requires antecedent government
from a position in GD(I) of a position in GD(V).
(38) We want [Johni to be elected ti ]
In view of this state of affairs, we might ask whether 1[4»Tns] raised to C in
a CP infinitival is capable of extending the EGD(V-I) to the C-system.
14If raising in (35) proceeded through sPeC-CP, leaving an intennediate trace there, then
this trace could assign "'(to tit and then delete in the mapping to LF. However, this
derivation would violate binding theory since the A-trace, ti, is an anaphor which would
not be bound within its governing category at S-structure. Thanks to Sabine Iatridou for
discussion of this example.
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Examples of the following sort provide instances in which. under the
assumptions adopted here. I[q-Tns] raises to C in an infinitival CP. 15
(39) Why did John try to visit Mary
LF: WhYi did John try [Cp ti' [c I[epTns]] [IP PRO to visit Mary ti ]]
But this example does not show that I[.Tns] has extended the EGD(V-I) to
the C system since. on the mechanisms developed in this dissertation,
construal of why with the infinitival complement in (39) could be obtained
without antecedent government of ti by ti'. namely. through a-identification
of the event position of why with that of the infinitival clause. projected to
the C' node of the infinitive.
A suitable diagnostic for whether I[epTns] extends the EGD of its clause
is provided with stacked infinitival CP complements. as in (40).
(40) a. Why does John want to try [to be hired ]
b. Why does John need to want [to be accepted 1
The relevant LF structure of these examples is shown in (41).
(41) WhYi does John want [cp ti" [C I[,Tns]] £Ip PRO to try
[ep ti [C I[epTns]] [IP PROj to be hired tj ti ]]]]
The intended interpretations of these sentences are perfectly clear. The
intended interpretation in (40a) would arise if John is trying to get hired
for a job which is ill-matched to his qualifications; a suitable answer would
be "For his journalism experience". The intended interpretation of (40b)
might arise in a psychological therapy session; a suitable answer in (40b)
15Pesetsky (Class lectures. Fall 1989) has argued that the infinitival in (39) is a full CPA
IS7
would be that John needs to try to be accepted by others for himself, and
not just for his accomplishments. Insofar as these sentences have these
interpretations, they indicate that I[t1>Tns] in C has extended the BOD(V-I)
to the C system in each of the embedded clauses, yielding the chain (w hy;,
ti"t ti', ti) as a well formed LF object. If they do not have these
interpretations, this indicates that an infinitival I[epTns] is incapable of
extending the EGD of its clause. The interpretations in question seem, in
fact not to be readily available. 16 Therefore, it will be assumed that the
INFL of infinitival CPs is not capable of extending the EGD of the
infinitival clause. This will have implications for the analysis of some
examples in section 4.5 below.
A more striking confirmation of assumption 4 within the context of the
system (32) is provided by the following contrast.
(42) a. * Why did John propose [that Mary said [that Bill quit ll
b. Why did John propose [that Mary suggest [that Bill
be fired ]]
In (42a), propose takes an indicative complcinent, and means something
like tlput forth as an explanation". In (42b), propose takes a subjunctive
complement. Assuming that the subjunctive complement does not have an
independent tense operator, it follows from the assumptions in (32) that
why antecedent governs its trace in the lowest clause in the LF of (42b),
given in (43).
16Similar questions with how or how quickly in place of why seem to more readily allow
the corresponding interpretations.
(i) a. How does John want to try [to be regarded-l
b. How quickly does John want to try [to be accepted --l
I have no account of this difference at the present time.
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(43) WhYi did John propose [Cp [c [that]I[,Tns]] £Ip Mary suggest
[Cp [c [that]I[,Tns]] IIp Bill be fired ti ]]]]
By (32,4), EGOs can fuse when they do not contain independent tense
operators. Since the tense operator of the subjunctive is dependent on that
of the higher clause, it follows that INFL of the subjunctive clause sitting
in COMP in (43) does not preven~ fusion of the EGDs of the clause of
propose and its complement clause, and likewise, of the clause of suggest
and its complement clause. Thus even though the complementizer is
obligatory in the complement of propose in (42b), antecedent government
can be established over this complementizer due to the dependent nature of
the tense operator of the subjunctive clause. In (90a), however, where the
complementizer in the complement of propose is also obligatory, the tensed
INFL raised to C has an independent tense operator from that of the higher
clause; thus fusion is not possible between the EGO of the clause of
propose (the matrix clause) and the EGD of the complement of propose, so
the construal in (42a) is not derivable.
Next, consider the [+wh] complements of verbs like wonder.
(44) a. * Who do you wonder whether saw John
b. * Why do you wonder [whether [John hired Bill __1]
(45) a. * WhOi do you wonder [whatj [ti bought tj ]
b. * WhYi do you wonder [whatj [John [bought tj ] ti ]]
In (45), we might assume that there is a null WH complementizer in Co
of the complement clause, or that Co is empty. But the account goes
through equally well in either case. If there is a null WH complementizer,
then the EGD of the lower clause extends no further than the IP node of
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that clause, whereas if Co is empty in the lower clause, then the EGD of
that clause extends up to the CP node of that clause. But in either event,
who; I why; does not antecedent govern its trace tit so the structure is out.
In (44), if whether is in spec... CP, as argued by Iatridou (1991), then
the explanation for (44) is identical to that for (45), based on the possible
structures shown in (46).
(46) a. [cp whether [c WH] [Ip ... ]]
b. [Cp whether [c ] [Ip ... ]]
Assuming that whether is in spec... CP, the structure in (46b) with empty
complementizer will be used in section 4.5 below to account for some
differences in subjacency effects for extraction out of tensed and infinitival
whether complements.
Finally, the account of the adjunct island in (47) below will highlight a
fine point of the definition of government given in (18), repeated below.
(47) * How is it time [for John to fix the car 1
(18) a governs P iff
a. a and Pare mutually m-commanding, or
b. a selects YP and (J=Y or Pis in spec-YP. 17
The structure of the example in (47) is shown in (48).
(48) HOWi is it time [ep tit for £Ip John to [[fix the car] ti ]]]
17Kayne (1983a) argues for government of spec-CP by a verb selecting CP, and Stowell
(1981) argues for govemment ofC by a verb selecting CPo Kayne (1983d) argues that
when N takes a clausal complement, N does not govern the subject position of this
complement. If this is correct, then the condition (b) of (18) must be restricted so as not to
hold for complements of N.
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In this question, the adjunct CP is not selected. Since we have chosen
select instead of govern in (18b), it follows that in (48), the matrix V (or I)
governs only the CP node of the adjunct, not spec-CP and Co. Therefore
the intermediate trace ti' fails to be antecedent governed. Thus, since the
intermediate trace is required to form a legitimate chain at LF, adjunct
extraction from an adjunct island, as in (47), is blocked.
4.3. Complementizer Agreement and the COMP .. trace effect
In embedded clauses in West Flemish, there is a pattern of
complementizer agreement with the embedded subject, as discussed in
Bennis and Haegeman (1983), Haegeman (1990), and Law (1991). There
is also a lack of COMP-trace effects upon subject extraction from [-wh]
embedded clauses. In the present discussion, an account of the
complementizer agreement phenomenon will be adopted from Law (1991),
and it will be shown that the lack of COMP-trace effects follows readily in
terms of the theory of antecedent government developed here. The account
extends readily to the que/qui alternation exhibited by subject extraction in
French. I am indebted in this section to Law's (1991) discussion of the
complementizer agreement phenomenon, and its effect on subject
extraction, although the mechanics of the ECP as developed here are quite
different from those invoked by Law.
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As exhibited below, there is a pattern of complementizer agreement with
an embedded subject in West Flemish. 18
(49) a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.j.
K weten dan-k (ik) goan weggoan
I know that I go leave
"I know that I am going to leave"
Kweten da..j (gie) goat weggoan (tlthat you leaven)
K weten da-j (ij) goat weggoan ("that he leave")
K weten da-se (zie) goat weggoan (tlthat she leave")
K weten da.. t (tet) goat weggoan ("that it leaven)
K weten da-me (wunder) goan weggoan ("that we leaven)
K weten da-j (gunder) goat weggoan ("that you leavetl )
K weten dan-ze (zunder) goan weggoan ("that they leave")
K weten da Jan goat weggoan ("that Jan leaven)
K weten dan Jan en Marie goan weggoan ("that Jan
en Marie leaven)
As an account of this agreement, assume, following Law, that the
complementizer with its ,-features (persoll, number, and gender) is freely
inserted. Subsequent processes in the grammar then validate this insertion,
leading to a grammatical structure, or fail to validate it, leading to an ill-
formed structure. In particular, assume with Law, and in line with the
assumptions of this chapter, that I raises and adjoins to C at LF.19 If the
, .. features of C and the I adjoined to it match, then the structure is
acceptable and the complementizer that was freely inserted is thereby
validated. If the ct> .. features of C and the I adjoined to it doni t match, then
the structure is out due to a clash of features; in this case, the freely
inserted complementizer is not validated.
18Data from Bennis and Haegeman (1983) and Haegeman (1990), reProduced in Law
(1991).
19]:t might be that INFL alone raises to C, or, as Law assumes, that the V·I complex
fonned by V-to-I raising does so. This doesn't matter for present purposes.
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The following data, consisting of some West Flemish relative clauses,
show an optional alternation between the complementizer da and a form die.
(From Law 1991).
(50) a. Den vent da/*die Jan gezien heet
the man that J seen has
"the man that Jan saw"
b. Den vent da/die hier geweest heet
the man that here been has
"the man that has been here n
c. Den vent da/*die Jan peinst da/*die Marie gezien heet
the man that J thinks that M seen has
lithe man that Jan thinks that Marie saw"
d. Den vent da/*die Jan zegt da/die hier geweest heet
the man that J says that here been has
"the man that Jan says that has been here"
Following Law, assume that the form die is a complementizer reflecting the
extraction of a subject agreeing with it. The structure relevant to the
occurrence of die is therefore the following, in (51 a) for (SOb), and (51 b)
for the lowest clause in (SOd).20
(51) a. [ep whi da/die [IP ti ... ]]
b. . .. [ep ti' da/die IIp ti .•. ]]
And as (SOd) illustrates, the die form must occur adjacent to the extraction
site of the subject; thus (52).
(52) • [ep Whi die [Ip ... [ep ti' da/die IIp ti ... ]]]]
This is the basic outline of the phenomenon.
2Ofollowing Chomsky (1977, 1981, 1986b), assume that relative clause fonnation
involves movement of an operator, identified here as wh following Chomsky (1977), by
wh movement to a position where it can be identified with the head of the relative.
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Within the extraction framework developed here, this pattern follows
directly from the account of complementizer agreement given above.
Assuming that the occurrence of die reflects complementizer agreement with
the subject, it follows that when die occurs, INFL has raised and adjoined
to C, validating the ~-features of the complementizer. It follows that,
when die occurs, the EGD of I and its associated V is extended to the C
system in which die occurs. Thus a wh operator or an intermediate trace of
the subject in spec-CP antecedent governs the initial trace in spec-IP. For
example, the LF configurations of (50b,d) are the following, with relevant
EGOs marked below the examples.
(53) a. [NP den vent [cp whi [C [die]l] IIp ti hier geweest heet ]]]
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b. [NP den vent [Cp whi da [IP Jan zegt [cp til [c [die]l]
++++++++++
£Ip ti hier geweest heet ]]]]]
++++++++++++++++
In the CP of (53a), both Whi and ti are contained within the EGD of the
clause containing the subject trace; thus whi antecedent governs ti.
Likewise for tit and ti in (53b). Something more must be said to limit die
to introducing clauses from which the subject has extracted; see Law
(1991) on this point. 21,22
210n the account of Law, the complex [V-1] in C acts as a head governor of the initial trace
of the subject in spec-CP, and L-marks IP allowing for antecedent government of this trace
by the wh or intennediate trace in spec·CP. This appeals to a conjunctive fonnulation of
the ECP, as proposed in Rizzi (1990). among other sources.
22The subject cannot extract over olda, the equivalent of whether in West Flemish.
Following Law (1991), assume that ofda is composed of two morphemes, of, in spec-CP,
and the complementizer da, in CO. Then the configuration of olda is as follows.
(i) ...[cp of [c da] lIP ...
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The account of the que/qui alternation in French is similar to the
above. 23
4.4 Inner Islands
In previous sections of this chapter, factive islands were analyzed as
Minimality effects, due to the failure of the EGD(V-I) to extend to the C
system when the complementizer that has a semantic function and is
therefore present at LF. The weak islandhood of response stance
complements, and of the few propositional complements which take an
obligatory complementizer, follows on the same grounds. In the case of
inner islands, induced by negation, there is no complementizer to appeal to.
Nevertheless, inner islands can be accounted for on the basis of the
mechanisms developed here, as will be discussed below.
The extraction data of interest to us regarding negation include the
following.
(54)
a. * Why didn't John [leave l
b. * How didn't John [fix the car 1
c. * Why didn't John say [that Max drove to Boston 1
But then even if I raises to C and extends the EGD of the IP to include the C system, there
will be no landing site for the relative wh operator in spec-CP where it (or an intermediate
trace of it) can antecedent govern the initial trace in spec-IP. Therefo~ the analysis of Law
in (i) is sufficient to rule out subject extraction over ofda on the formulation of the ECP
adopted here as strict antecedent government
23Qerman and Dutch also show a lack of COMP-trace effects, but with no overt
morphological complementizer agreement. To account for this, we would have to assume
that there is nevenheless complementizer agreement with the subject in these languages,
although it is not overtly manifested.
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d. * Why did John say [that Max wasn't angry 1
e. Who didn I t John hire t
As noted in the literature, the construals indicated in (54a, b,c,d) can be
obtained if negation (and the constituent it is cliticized onto, if any) is
stressed. This amounts to focussing negation, and yields a different
structure, which will not be addressed here. The form in (54e) just
confirms the weakness of the island induced by negation.
Follo\ving much recent literature (especially Pollock 1989, Chomsky
1989) I'll assume that in sentences with negation there is a head Neg
projected between IP and VP. In examples like John didn't fire the gun,
negation occurs cliticized onto an auxiliary verb, which we assume to be in
I. In this case, then, Neg has raised to I by head movement. In examples
.'ike those in (54), negation occurs cliticized onto an auxiliary that has
raised to C. In examples like these, Neg has raised to I, and the complex
head [Neg-I] has then raised to C at S-structure. There are examples in
which Neg does not seem to raise to I at S-structure, such as in John would
always not wash the dishes, or Why did John not wash the dishes. Given
that Neg sometimes combines with I at S-structure, and given that we are
assuming that I moves to C at LF, if it hasn't already by S-structure, the
question arises whether Neg might uniformly move to I at LF, and then
move with I to C, if it has not already doue so by S-structure. This might,
for example, be a precondition for the interpretation of Neg.
The scope interactions of Neg with the quantifier in (55) are
problematic for these assumptions. 24
241am indebted to discussion with David Pesetsky on this point.
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(55)
a. Someone didn't leave
b. Why didn't someone leave
In (55a), the quantifier someone has wide scope with respect to negation;
the meaning is 3 x-leave(x) , OT with event structure represented,
3x-3e[1eave(x,e)]. In (55b), on the other hand, the quantifier someone has
narrow scope with respect to negation; the meaning is that depicted in (56).
(56)
a. [for what reason cp] -3x[leave(x) for reason cp]
b. [for what reason cp] -3~3e[leave(x,e) & because(e,fP)]
Assuming that the subject quantifier in (55) is adjoined to IP at LF (May
1985, 1977), it appears that Neg is lower than IP at LF in (55a), and Neg
is higher than IP at LF in (55b). But if Neg has raised to I in (55a), and if
I raises to C at LF, then Neg should be above IP at LF, giving it scope
over the quantified subject in (55a), contrary to fact. However, quantifier
scope interactions with Neg are on the whole quite equivocal. The s~ntence
in (57) has both of the interpretations shown in (58).
(57) Everybody didn't leave
(58)
a. (\;:/ x)-leave(x)
b. -CV x)leave(x)
In order to obtain the interpretation in (58b), according to assumptions that
have been adoped so far, Neg would have to appear above IP at LF; in
(57), this would happen as a result of Neg raising to I at S-structure, and
then the complex head [Neg-I] raisin8 to C at LF. If Neg is uniform in its
behavior, the quantifier scope data ar~ thus problematic whether Neg raises
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"rl'ith I to C at LF or not. If it does, then (55a) is unaccounted for; if it
doesn't, then one interpretation of (57) is unaccounted for. The problem
remains under other standard theories of quantifier scope interactions with
Neg. Lacking an adequate account of scope interactions that c3ptures the
correct interpretations of both (55) and (57), the quantifier scope
interactions ,,"ith Neg are pretty inconclusive regarding the behavior of
N~g.
But if we are to suppose that Neg induces Minimality effects,
interfering with antecedent government, then there is evidence that Neg
does inde.:d raise to C at LF. Note that A moven:a-Jnt occurs freely over
Neg in raising construc~ions and the passive.
(59)
a. JOhni wasn't hired ti
b. J Ohni seems not hi to be tired]
c. J Ohni doesn't seem [ti to be tired]
Recall ti\~t A movement is local, requiring antecedent governmen~ between
successive links in the chain. If we suppose that the head Neg interferes
with antecedent government, then Neg would block antecedent government
of ti by Johni in (59) if Neg remaiiled in place. However, if Neg raises
with I to C at LF, then only its trace intervenes between ti and John; in
(59). On these grounds, it will be assufiled that Neg raises with I to C at
LF, if it has not already done so by S-structure.
Returning to (55b), Why didn't someone leave, the structure of COMP
in the LF of the interrogative is then the following.
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(60)
C
I
I
A
I Neg
I I
did n't
In this configuration~ I does not dominate Neg since not all segments of I
dominate Neg (see Chomsky 1986b). We will assume that this
configuration is one in which Neg c-commands 1. 25 This makes it plausible
to say that Neg in (60) makes I opaque for the transmission of verbal
features to C.26 Assuming this, the presence of Neg adjoined to I in C
blocks the EGD(V-I) from extending to include the C-system. Therefore,
an element in spec-CP will not be able to antecedent govern into IP when
Neg is present within the INFL complex in C.
Now return to the inner island data in (54). In (54a,b), Neg adjoins to
I and appears overtly .vith the I complex in C.27 This b!\)cks extension of
the EGD(V.. I) to the C..system~ so the adverbial wh element in spec-CP
does not ant~cedent govern its trace within IP. The same explanation holds
for (54c). In (54d), the clause containing Neg does not have a [+wh]
COMP~ therefore, I does not raise to C at S-structure, so Neg does not
appear in C on the surface. Nevertheless, we assume that I raises to C at
LF in indicative clauses and tensed complement clauses, so we expect that
Neg should occur within the I complex in C in the complement clause in
(54d). The LF structure of this example is the following.
25See Laka (1990) for the claim that when a is adjoined to p, a c-eommands p.
26This was suggested to me by David Pesetsky. Likewise, the Neg-I complex could not
lower to V since Neg would block the transmission of inflectional features from I to V.
271t is immaterial to this point, as it is to most other points in this dissertation, whether a
verbal complex [V-I] raises to C, or whether I raises to C without V.
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(61)
whYi did John say [cp tit [c h was Neg]k that] [IP Max tk angry ti ]]
Since Neg occurs in the I complex in C of the complement clause, the
EOD(V-I) of this clause does not extend to the C system, so til does not
antecedent govern ti in (61). This accounts for (54d).
Other negative elements also induce inner islands. This is illustrated in
(62).
(6'.)
a. * Why did nobody [leave 1
b. * Why do few people [cross the river each day 1
c. * Why did John never [call Mary up 1
These follow from the discussion above if there is a head Neg in each of
these examples. The presence of Neg in (62a,b), where there is a negative
subject, might follow from requirements of spec-head agreement of the
subject in spec-IP and the complex in I, to which Neg can adjoin if it is
present. The presence of Neg in (62c), where there is a negative adverb
never, might follow from the licensing conditions of negative adverbs. If
different kinds of adverbial elements are licensed by specified heads, as
argued in Travis (1988), then the presence of a Neg projection in (62c)
would follow from the licensing requirements of the negative a.dverbial.
40 S. S ubjacency
In Chomsky (1986a) and L&S (1990), subjacency is defined in terms of
the system of barriers used to define the locality domains for antecedent
government. In this section we investigate the prospect of defining
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subjacency in terms of the system of government domains used here to
define an tecedent governmen t.
Consider the following sentences.
(63)
a. WhOi did you say Tom saw ti
b. ? WhOi do you wonder whether Tom saw ti
Assuming that the whether complements have an empty Co, with whether in
spec-CP, the forms in (63) have the LF structures shown in (64), with
EGOs indicated; adjunctions to VP are not pertinent to the present
discussion and will be disregarded. 28
(64)
a. [cp whOi did IIp you say rcp ti' [C I] £Ip Tom saw ti ]]]1
b. [cp WhOi do IIp you wonder [Cp whether [c I] [IP Tom saw ti ]]]]
In both examples, the EODs of the higher and lower clauses overlap in the
C system of the lower clause. These EGOs remain distinct, and do not
fuse, since the complement clauses have independent [Tns] operators. The
presence of subjacency effects in (64b), and their absence in (64a), suggest
that when a moved element crosses the intersection of two EGOs, it must
28The domains indicated in (64) are actually the subtrees spanned. by EGDs. As defined
above, GDs and EGDs are not subtrees; see (19) and (20) above. So talk below of a
movement being encompassed by, or contained within, an EGO is quite loose. It could be
made precise by defining the subtree spanned by an EGO and the subtree spanned by
nodes crossed by a movement, and defining containment of a movement within an EOD in
terms of subgraphs. I will informally continue to talk of movements being encompassed
by EGOs.
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stop in it. Now consider the subjacency violation in (65), with the LF
structure in (66), with EGDs indicated, this time distinguished by minuses
and pluses.
(65) ? What do you believe the claim that John saw
(66) [ep whati do £Ip you believe [NP the claim [cp tit [c [that]I]
IIp John saw ti ]]]]]
+++++++++++
In this example, there is no overlap of EGDs at all. Successive cyclic
movement of the wh element exits the lower EGD, stops at spec-CP in the
gap between the two EGDs, and then enters the higher one. Putting this
example together with the ones in (64), the subjacency violations in (64b)
and (66) involve a movement which is not fully encompassed by any EGO,
whereas in (64a), the movement to the lower COMP is entirely contained
within the EGD of the lower clause, while the movement to the matrix
COMP is entirely contained within the EGD of the matrix clause. This
suggests the following formulation of subjacency.
(67) Subjacency: A movement violates subjacency when there is no
EGO, D, such that the movement is entirely contained in the
subtree spanned by D.
But consider the following.
(68)
LF:
Whati do you think that Tom saw
[cp whati do [IP you think [cp til [c [that]I] [IP Tom saw ti ]]]]
-------- ---------- ----- -- ----- ------ --- ----- .. ---- -- +++++++++++
In this example, the subtrees spanned by the two EGOs are adjacent, but do
not overlap. The movement from within IP to the lower COMP is not
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contained in the subtree spanned by anyone EGD. Thus this movement
violates the formulation of subjacency in (67), showing this formulation to
be incorrect as it stands. However, it turns out consistently, as in (68),
that (67) captures subjacency in English if adjacency of EGDs is ignored
in the following sense: suppose that for the purposes of computing
subjacency, adjacent EGDs are fused into one; then (67), computed on the
resultant configuration of EGOs, captures subjacency in English. For
example, in (68), fusing the adjacent EGDs indicated by '-' and '+', the
sentence becomes one big EGO for purposes of subjacency; therefore, the
movement from the position of ti to that of ti' does not violate
subjacency.29 Of course, at this point, nothing would prevent movement
from the position of ti in (68) to the position of what;. Thus, the
conception of subjacency under consideration does not force successive
cyclic movement. We will take this problem up below. In the meantime,
we record the conception of subjacency under consideration in (69).
(69) Subjacency: A movement violates subjacency when there is no
EGD, D, such that the movement is entirely contained in the
subtree spanned by D, 'with EGDs computed up to adjacency
(=fuse adjacent EGDs in evaluating this condition).
Somew hat nlore precisely, this says the following.
(70) Subjacency: Given a movement, there must exist an EGO, D,
such that the spanning subtree of the movement is a subtree
of the spanning subtree of D, with EODs computed up to
adjacency.
29When EGOs are adjacent, they don't fuse for purposes of antecedent government.
Rather than saying that they fuse for subjacency, it is less misleading to say that the
boundary between adjacent EGOs is simply ignored by subjacency.
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This says that any movement must be spanned by a single EOD, modulo
fusion of adjacent EGOs. This way of formulating the subjacency
condition in English highlights its affinity to anteceder L government,
which, as formulated here, is a relationship spanned by a single EOD.
However, in overlooking adjacency of EGOs, this formulation is implicitly
more complex than it appears. Subjacency in English can alternatively be
formulated as follows, where the complexity is overtly manifested as
separate cases.
(71) Subjacency
a. If a movement intersects the spanning trees of two disjoint
(nonoverlapping) EGOs, Dl and 02, then the spanning
trees of Dl and D2 are adjacent.
b. If a movement crosses the intersection of two EODs, then
it must land in that intersection.
The formulations in (70) and (71) can be appealed to equivalently in all
cases.
To take some further examples, this formulation captures Huang's
(1982) CED effects as subjacency violations. The adjunct condition is
illustrated in (72).
(72) ? Who did they leave before speaking to
LF: whOi did they [vp [vp leave] [PP before [ep PRO speaking to ti ]]]
+++++++++++
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CP
A
WhOi c'
A
C IP
A
they I'
A
I VP
· • .. ti
There is no EGD that encompasses the move from spec of the adjunct PP to
the matrix COMP. This example critically relies on the the exact statement
of the definition of government given in (18), repeated below in (73).
(73) a governs Piff
a. a and Pare mutually m··commanding, or
b. cx selects YP and ~=YP or Pis in spec-YP.
With the condition in (b) expressed as Ucx governs pn, the spec-PP in (72)
would be in the EGO of the matrix clause, and then (72) would not be a
subjacency violation. Turning to the subject condition, we have the
example in (74).
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(74)
LF:
? who did pictures of win a prize
[ep WhOi did [}p [NP pictures of ti ] win a prize ]]
++++++++++++
~
I VP
6
win a prize
pictures of ti
CP
A
whOi C'
~
C IP
/~
NP I'
6
did
In (74), the BOD of the clause includes the NP node of the complex
subject, but not any other nodes of it. Thus there is no landing site for the
extracted wh element in the intersection of the EGD of the clause and the
GD of the head N of the subject, so the movement from within the subject
NP to the matrix COMP violates subjacency.
Given this approach to subjacency, a natural account falls out of the
follo\ving contrast, noted in Ross (1967), and discussed in Johnson (1985)
and Coopmans and Stevenson (1991).
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(75) a. He told me about a book which I can't decide whether to buy
b. ? He told me about a book which I can't decide whether
I should read
As discussed in section 4.2 above, when an ::nfinitival I substitutes into
Co, the EGO of V·I is not extended to the C system. Then the structures of
the relative clause CPs (75a, b) are as shown in (76a, b).
(76)
a. [ep whichi IIp I can't decide [ep whether C-I [IP PRO to buy ti ]]]]
_..-.... -.. -- ....--------- ---- ---- -- -- -- --------- --- ----- ++++++++++++
b. [ep whichi £Ip I can't decide [ep whether C-I [IP I should buy ti ]]]]
Thus (75b) involves a subjacency violation, but not (75a).
4.6. Wh-in-situ
The following contrast poses a problem for the account developed here.
(77)
a. * Who do you think that left
b. ? Who thinks that who left
~. ? Who wonders whether who left
The that-trace effect with S-structure movement, exhibited in (77a), was
accounted for in sections 4.1 and 4.2 above in terms of the failure of the
initial trace of the subject to be antecedent governed within an EGO.
Assuming that the in-situ wh who in (77b) moves to the matrix COMP at
LF, the LF structure obtained will be that in (78). (The structure in (78) is
drawn up pending determination of the exact point to which the in-situ w h
element moves. )
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(78) [Cp whoj WhOi [C I] IIp ti thinks [Cp tj' [c [that]I] [IP tj left ]]]]
In this structure, just as with S-structure movement, the initial trace of the
lower subject is not antecedent governed. Furthermore, adjunction to the
lowest IP will not help since the EGD of the lower clause does not include
the position adjoined to IP.
The conjecture that I wish to pursue is that in-situ w h phrases in English
are D-linked, in the sense of Pesetsky (1987), when they are sufficiently
distant from the matrix COMP (or the COMP that defines their scope at
LF). In particular, a wh-in-situ phrase in English is interpreted by D-
linking whenever it fails to be antecedent governed by the [+wh] COMP
with which it is to be interpreted. 30 To begin, let's recall Pesetsky' s
argument for D-linking. Pesetsky argues that so called "pure superiority"
cases such as those in (79) involve movement at LF violating the Nes ted
Dependency Contlition, in (80).
(79)
8. 1'1 Whatj did you persuade whom to read ej
h. lie Mary asked [whatj [who read ej ]]
c. 11 Whoj did you give what to ej
(80) NDC: If two wh-trace dependencies overlap, one must contain
the other.
Compare (79) with (81), where no crossing of paths occurs upon LF
movement of the in-situ wh.
3QAny in-situ wh phrase can be D-linked in suitable settings. The discussion here concerns
obligatory D-linking of in-situ wh phrases.
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(81) a. Whoj did you persuade ei to read what
b. Mary asked [whoj lei read what]]
c. Whatj did you give ej to who
However, the pure superiority effects in (79) fail to show up for certain
kinds of wh phrase, as shown in (82).
(82)
a. Which book! did you persuade which student to read ej
b. Mary asked Lwhich bookj [which student read ej ]]
c. Which spYj did you give which document to ej
Pesetsky explains this by suggesting that the which phrases in (82) do not
move, but are construed through binding by the Q morpheme acting as an
unselective binder. 31 The structure of the questions in (82) is shown in
(83).
(83)
a. [ep Qi,j which bookj lip did you persuade which studenti to read tjll
b. Mary asked [cp Qi,j which bookj [which studenti read tj ]]
c. [ep Qj,j which spYj IIp did you give which documentj to tj ]]
The claim being advanced here is that any w h-in-situ in English which is
not antecedent governed by the nearest [+wh] COMP with which it can be
interpreted, is unselectively bound by the [+Ql morpheme (or [+wh]
feature) of that COMP.
To see evidence for this, consider weak crossover (WeO) effects. In a
sentence like (84a), when the position of B ill is questioned by overt
movement, the result is degraded by weo, as in (84b).
(84)
a. Hisi parents sent Johni to school
John mentioned hisi parents to Billi
31This draws upon ideas in Baker (1970) and Heim (1982).
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b. ? WhOi did hisi parents send to school
? Whoj did John mention hisj parents to ti
That WeD holds for LF movement is indicated by the fact that it emerges in
quantifier raising.
(85) ? Hisi parents sent everyonci to school
In tbe literature, WeD is taken to be a characteristic of the sort of operator-
variable chain established by movement; hence the manifestation of \VeD is
taken as a diagnostic of movement. Now, note that WeD effects are in
evidence with the wh-in-situ in (86), indicating movement of the in-situ w h
to COMPo
(86) ? Which journalistj mentioned hisi parents to WhOi
But when the in-situ wh is more deeply embedded, the WeD effects are not
in evidence: the questions in (87) are perfectly grammatical.
(87)
a. Which journalistj believes that hisi parents abandoned whOi
b. Which recordsj indicate that hisi parents brought whOi to Boston
This suggests that the more deeply embedded wh phrases in (87) do not
move to the matrix COMPo However, these questions have "pair readings·"
just as (86) has; in (87a) suitable answers consist of pairs of journalists
and people abandoned by their parents, and in (87b), of pairs of records
and people brought to Boston by their parents. The lack of WeD in (87)
indicates that these interpretations are not achieved by movement of the in-
situ wh phrase. Nevertheless, the interpretation is obtainable if the in-situ-
wh phrase is unselectivel)' bound to the matrix COMP. The WeD effects in
(86) indicate that this method of in terpretation is not available to a w h
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phrase such as who when it is closer to the COMP that defines its scupe. It
looks like the relevant locality relationship determining whether the D-
linking option is available for the interpretation of an in-situ wh is
antecedent government. The manifestation of WCO effects in (88), where
the in-situ wh phrase WhOi is embedded but still antecedent governed by the
matrix COMP, suggests that the relevant locality relation is antecedent
government.
(88) ? Which journalistj bel~eves hisi parents to expect WhOi to
succeed
Assuming that the relation in question is antecedent government, we record
the conjecture at issue In (89).
(89) In English, an in-situ wh can be D-linked to a [+wh] COMP
that does not antecedent govern it.
Return finally to (77b,e), repeated below as (90), with the LF of (90a) In
(91 ).
(90)
a. ? Who thinks that who left
b. ? Who wonders whether who left
(91) [cp Qitj who] [c I] IIp ti thinks [Cp [c [that]I] IIp WhOi left ]]]]
Since who; is not antecedent governed by Q, it follows by (89) that WhOi
can be unselectively LJound by Q. Thus the correct intei .r,;etation is
obtained without inducing a that-trace viola,tion by movement of w hOi.
The following example, from L&S (forthcoming), further illustrates t:le
point.
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(92) whOl wonders what2 wh03 bought
As L&S note, this has an interpretaticn with the in-situ wh Wh03 Rssociated
with the matrix COMP, but not with the lower COMP; thus the question can
be asking for pairs of people such that the first wonders what the second
bought, but i! cannot be interpreted as asking for people who wondered
about the buying habits of other p,eople in terms of pairs of people and
goods. Note that according to (89), Wh03 can be D-linked to the matrix
COMP, but not to the embedded COMP, yielding the correct result. 32
Stan1ard superiority violati~ns, such as those in (93) below, are all
monoclausal.
(93) What did ~. no buy
These involve movement of the in-situ wh inducing violations of the Nested
Dependency Condition in (~O). If an in-situ w h element in English can be
D-linked to any [+wh] COMP that does not antecedent govern it, as
expressed !r1, (89), it follows that these, as well as the pure superiority
violatio:ls in (79), ough t to improve with embedding, a~ in (94) and (95).
(94) Whati did John say [that [who bought ti ]]
(95)
a. Whp'j do you think that John persuaded whom to read ej
b. Mar)" asked [whati [John thinks [ that [who read ei ]]]]
c. Whoj do you thiilk that John gave whut {:> ei
32ThCl':" is, how'ever, some question as to why (92) could not be derived by adjoining
who3 to ilie lower IP, and then moving it the the embedded COMP, yielding the
interpretation that (92) in fact fails to have. Since I substitutes into C in the lower clause at
LF. the trace adjoined to IP would antecedent govern the initial trace of who3 and by
assumptons advanced in section 3 abo,,'e, the intermediate trac.e would not be subject to the
ECP. It ~nay be that a wh trace adjoined to IP would interfere with the extension of the
EGD of the lower clause upo!: substitution of I into C. I hav~ no better solution of this
problem at this point
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They do seem to improve with embedding, but it is not clear that they
improve to the full grammaticality expected under (89). Compare (94) and
(95) with (96) and (97)
(96) Whati did who say [that [Joho bought tj ]]
(97) a. Whatj do you think that who persuaded Joho to read ti
b. Mary asked [whati [who thinks [that [John read ti ]]]]
c. WhOi do you think that who gave what to ti
The contrast does seem to be borne out, although it is subtle.
Cheng and Demirdash (1990) account for the difference between
standard and pure superiority violations, in (93) versus (79), in terms of
two components of the ECP, one apply.~:ag at S-structure, and one at LF.
The S-structure ccmponent is a requirement of antecedent government by an
XP element, whereas the LF component is a requirement of proper head
government; both requirements are formulated under conditions of
relativized minimality. The standard superiority cases violate both
components, and are hence strongly ungrammatical, whereas the pure
superiority cases violate only the S-structure component, and are therefore
less fully ungranlmatical. On this account, the NDe can be dispensed with
for the ant-lysis of superiority phenomena in favor of this factorization of
the ECP. Applied to (90), this account says that at LF, after the in-situ wh
has moved to the the matrix COMP, the initial trace of this wh elemen t fails
to b3 propel'ly head gCJverned. T'le S-structure component of the ECP is
satisfied, however, so only the mild ungrammaticality indicated in (90)
results. However, is this account were correct, then the judgment in (90a)
183
should substantially change when the complementizer is absent: compare
(98) to (99).
(98)
a. ? Who thinks that who left
b. ? Who thinks that who expects to win
(99)
a. ? Who thinks who left
b. ? Who thinks who expects to win
But the judgment in (99) is not substantially different from that in (98).
Insofar as this is true, the lack of full grammaticality in (99) remains
unaccounted fOf, shedding doubt on any account of (98) that does not
account for (99) as well.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Discussion
5.1 On the Semantic Content of Complementizers
The main claim to emerge from this dissertation is that the
complementizer of a factive complement clause has semantic content,
making it obligatory throughout a derivation, with a corresponding impact
on antecedent government. On this basis we can identify the factive
complementizer as a distinct class of complementizer. The distinguishing
characteristic of a factive complementizer is that it discourse-binds the
event variable of the factive clause. Since a factive predicate taking a
tensed complement selects a complement of the form CP<> with no open
event position, it follows that the factive complementizer is obligatory in
the tensed complement of a factive verb since otherwise the event variable
would not be discharged and the complement would be of the form CP<e>,
violating the subcategorization requirements of the factive predicate.
The complementizer lIf a propositional complement plays no semantic
role and is correspondingly subject to deletion, at S-structure or at LF.
Along the way, it was noted that the complementizer that is obligatory in
the complements of a few propositional verbs, such as assert, conjecture,
and propose. It was conjectured that the complementizer plays a senlantic
role of some sort in the complements of these verbs, although this was not
explored. The propositional verbs which require a complementizer might
be distinguished as expressing some degree of manner, and this might
condition the occurrence of the complementizer. If this were so, then these
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exceptional propositional verbs could be assimilated to manner of speaking
verbs such as whisper and shout, which also take an obligatory
cumplementizer in their complements. The adjunct extraction pattern out of
complements of assert, conjecture, and the like would then be expe~ted to
fallow the extraction pattern out of manner of speaking complements, as
seems to be the case in fact.
Furthermore, it was argued in previous chapters that the treatment of
factive complements given there could be extended to the class of response
stance complements, which are neither factive nor propositional, including
complements of negative verbs such as deny and doubt, and complements
of nonfactive, nonnegative verbs such as agre'! and accept. The response
stance complements behave like factive complements with respect to
adverbial wh extraction. Following Cattell (1978), it was suggested that
response stance complements refer to material at issue in the discourse, and
therefore that the event position of a response stance complement is
formally discourse bound by the complementizer, as is the case in a factive
complement. This assigned to the complementizer of a response stance
complement a semantic function identical to that of the complementizer of a
factive complement, which gave a uniform account of the properties of
adverbial wh extraction out of factive and response stance complements.
Thus, following Cattell (1978), response stance complements were
assimilated in. behavior to factive complements, and a basic cut was made
between propositional complements on the one hand and factive and
response stance complements on the other. On the account developed here,
propositional complementizers have no semantic function in English, by
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virtue of which they are optional (except in complements 0f a few verbs
such as assert and conjecture), whereas factive and response stance
complementizers have the semantic function of discourse binding the event
position of the complement clause. The verb classes could be drawn
somewhat differently. In particular, the response stance complements, as
identified here, include complements of negative verbs such as deny and
doubt, and these might have independent reasons for patterning with factive
complements as they do. This possibility will be explored later in this
section in connection with some recent literature on negative verbs and the
licensing of negative polarity items. Also, accepting that propositional
complementizers play no semantic role in English, the question arises why
propositional comrlementizers are obligatory in many other languages, as
they are in many Romance languages. This issue will also be broached
below in connection with some recent literature, but a full consideration of
it is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Before turning to the literature,
and to discussion of the questions and alternatives mentioaed above, it
might be useful to summarize the claims made so far in t'lis dissertation
...
concerning the event structure of tensed complements, and the semantic
role of thatwty,,;,e complementizers in English.
Pro po S i ti 0 naleom J) ~ emen ts
Verbs: allege, assert, ".sume, believe, clairrl, conclude, conjecture.,
consider, decid(~, declare, envisage, imagine, propose,
report, say, stale.) suggest, suppose, suspect, tell, think
complementizer obligatory: except for assert, conjecture, propose
adverbial wh extraction free: except out of complements of assert,
conjecture, propose
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event structure:
believe [CP<e> (that) [IP<e> Bill drove to Boston ]]I 't"
Mode of discharge of the event position: Quantified out in semantic
composition with the higher verb. The propositional attitude
verb induces quantification over events within the mental
model of the subject.
Factive complements
Verbs: admit, comment, emphasize, forget, inform, know,
rnention, notice, point out, realize, recall, recognize,
regret, remember
Complementizer obligatory.
Adverbial wh extraction not possible.
Event structure:
regret [cp<> that hp<c> Bill drove to :aoston ]]
1 '"
Mode of discharge of event position: discourse bound by the
complementizer
Res ponse Stance CDmplements
Verb~: (Negative) deny, doubt
(N onnegative) accept, agree
(Factive response stance.) confirm, verify
Complementizer obligatory. Even t structure and adverbial wh extraction
facts the same as for factive complements.
At a few points in recent literature, a semantic role for that-type
complementizers has been claimed l or can be discerned. Two such
instances will now be discussed in order to address some of the issues
raised in the above paragraphs, and to reinforce the points that contentful
that-type complementizers can be found f!nd that they have fairly systematic
effects on extraction which can be accounted for in a uniform way.
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5.1.1 Negative Complementizers: Laka (1990)
Laka (1990) attributes a semantic role to the complementizers of
complements of negative verbs like deny and doubt, based on the following
considerations. Negative polarity items (NPIs) can occur in complements
of negative verbs, as illustrated in (1).
(1) a. Joho denies that anybody poisoned the turkey
b. Jahn doubts that Ingrid likes anyone
c. John doubts tbat Sam gives a damn
These verbs also take NP objects, as shown in (2).
(2) a. John denies the charge
b. Jobn dOllbts that claim
c. John dou bts the evidence for that claim
But NPIs do not occur as Dbject of these verbs. When th~se verbs take an
NP object like anybody or anythiTlg, the result is not grammatical with a
negative polarity interpretation of any, but only marginally with a "free
choice" interpretation ofany , which improves the more the object is
stressed.
(3) a. * The witnesses denied anything
b. lie The attorney doubts any explanation
Laka provides solid evidence that the any NPs in (3) are instances of free
choice any, insofar as they are acceptable at all, and that those in (2) are
negative polfl,rity any. The evidence includes the following: (I) inserting
just before an NP with free choice any, as in (3), reinforces the free choice
reading; inserting just before a negative polarity NP with any alters the
189
meaning, producing a free choice any interpretation. (II) Replacing the
negative ver~ by a positive verb leaves the free choice any interpretation in
(3), insofar as it is available, unchanged; doing so in (2) alters the
meaning, producing a free choice any interpretation. (III) An indefinite
description substituted for the free choice any in the context in (3) has an
existeraial interpretation, as in (4) below; an indefinite description
substituted ;or the negative polarity any in (2), with the results shown in
(5), doesn't carry existential fOlce.
(4) a. John denied a single charge
b. John doubts a single explanation
(5) a. John denied thai: a single person entered the r60m
b. John doubts that a single gold coin was missing
Laka argues from (3) that the negative verb does not license negative
polarity items; thus in (2), where NPIs are licensf::d, the licenser must be
something other than the matrix verb. Laka proposes and argues that the
licenser of the NPIs in (2) is the complementizer of the complement clause.
This accords with the proposal of Progovac (1988) that the internal
structure of the complement CP be invoked to account for the licensing of
the NPIs in (2). As Laka notes, taking the licenser to be the
complementizer brings examples like (6) immediately into accord with the
generalization that NPIs must be c-commanded by their licenser at S-
structure;
(6) [that anybody left the room] was denied by the witnesses
the same point is made by the contrast between (7) and (8), which Laka
attributes to David Pesetsky.
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(7) What did nobody do?
a. * Buy any records
b. Buy records
(8) What did Bill deny?
a. That he had bought any records
The contrast in (7) indicates that the NPI licenser must be present i" the
answer to th: question; this is the case in (8a) if the complementizer is the
licenser.
If the complementizer is responsible for licensing NPIs in complements
of verbs like deny and doubt, as Laka argues, tben the complementizer is
playing a semantic role; Laka thereby identifies a class of negative
complementizers occurring in these contexts. Along the lines of the
treatment of factive complements in previous ~hapters of this dissertation,
we can ask whether the Principle of Full Interpretation would then require
that negative complementizers be present at LF. We might be tempted to
conclude that it wouldn't since NPIs seem to be grammatically licensed by
c-command at S-structure. Thus, so far as grammatical licensing is
concerned, relevant aspects of the structure might delete or be obscured at
LF; in the case at hand, we might imagine thet the negative complementizer
deletes at LF, with no impact on grammatical licensing, which takes place
at S-structurc. But if the negative complementizer deletes at LF, then some
record of its presence will nevertheless have to be kept in order to derive
the negative polarity interpretation of NPIs that occurred in the context of
the negative complementizer. Thus Full Interpretation can be violated only
at the expense of introducing quite arbitrary, and otherwise unmotivated t
mechanisms to record the presence 01 the negative complementizer. It is
much more straightforward to suppose that the negative complementb':er
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remains throughout the derivation, serving to license NPIs at S-structure,
and staying on at LF to induce the polarity sensitive interpretation of the
NPI. The point ~s quite general: it is fully conceivable that a grammatical
licensing condition might apply at S-structure, while the structure involved
nevertheless remains critical at LF as the input to selnantic interpretation.
We thus assume that negative complementizers are obligatory
throughout a derivation. We then expect characteristic effects of the
obligatory compleme:ntizer on adjunct extraction. These expectations are
borne out, as indicated in (9).
(9) a. * Why does Joho deny [that Mary left the room __._ ]
b. * Why does J obn doubt [that Mary fired Bill ]
c. * How much does John doubt [that Bil1likes Mary _.__ ]
Note that the same contexts were considered in previous chapters as
resllonse stance complements, as identified by Cattell (1978). The analysis
of these as respDnse stance, along the same Hnes as the anaiysis of factive
complements in=bapters 2 and 3 above, requires that the response stance
complement involves discourse binding of the contents of the complem~nt
clause. Laka's proposal gives an alternative grounding for the claim that
the complementizers of complements of negative verbs have semantic
content; this assures that complements of negative verbs can be treated for
extraction purposes as they were in previous chapters of this dissertation
even if these complements are not response stance, Qr even if the treatment
of response stance conlplements given here should he rejected. The
account of the extracticn facts proposed in chapter 4 above, based on
obligatoriness of the complementizer, will be r~vicwed in section 5.2
below.
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5.1.2 Indicative and Subjunctive Complements in Italian:
Scorretti (1991)
Subjunctive tensed complements in Italian can have their
complementizer dropped, but not indicative complements, as the following
data from Scorretti (1991) illustrates.
(SUBjunctive)(10) a. Credeva che I __ Mario avesse scritto
He thought that I __ Mario had written
b. Sapeva chef *__ Mario aveva gH\ scritto (INDicative)
He knew that/ ale __ Mario had already written
Furthermore, the subjunctivt: complement is tense dependent on the matrix
tense, whereas the indicative complement is tense independent. Following
Scorretti (1991), assume that this is due to the tense variable of a
subjunctive complement being bound via an operator chain to the tense
operator of the matrix. The facts in (10) suggest a role for the
complementizer in this analysis which, departing from Scorretti. we can
implement as follows. Suppose that in an indicative tensed complement,
the overt complementizer che lexically supports an independent tense
operator moved to C at LF. The complementizer then performs a semantic
function, which makes it obligatory. The complementizer of a subjunctive
complement doesn't support an independent tense operator, and therefore
can delete. The postulated structures are shown in (11).
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(11) a. pro [1 Tnsi ] credeva [CP [C [I Tnsi ] (che)] [Ip Mario
avesse scritto ]] (SUB)
b. pro [1 Tnsi ] sapeva [CP [C h Tnsj ] che] lIP Mario aveva
gil scritto ]] (IND)
Given these structures, with the complementizer optional in (1Ia) and
obligatory in (11 b), we expect that adjunct extraction should be possible
out of subjunt:.:tive complements, but not out of nonsubjunctive
complements. This ex.pectation is borne out. Adjunct extraction out of
subjunctive complements is illustrated in (12).
(12) a. Perchei pensi [che Gianni sia partito __ i ]
why think-2nd that G. be(sub) left
b. Comoi pensi [che abbia riparato la macchina __ i Gianni]
how think-2nd that have(sub) repaired the car G.
But adjunct wh elements cannot extract out of nonsubjunctive complements,
even if these are nonfactive, as shown ira (13).
(13) • Perche aveva sentito/scritto [che Gianni era partito __ i ]
why did-3rd hear/write that G. has left
Implicating the complementizer in the support of an independent tense
operator, we obtain the familiar situation: the presence of 1'. complementizer
with a semantic function is correlated with the failure of adjunct extraction
out of the complement clause. The reasons for this given above in the
present work will be reviewed in section 5.2.
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5.2 ComplemenUzers r Antecedent Government, and MinimaJity
The generalization that emerges from the cases of adverbial w h
extraction considered above is that such extraction goes through out of a
tensed complement whose complementizer plays no semantic role, and
blocked out of a tensed complement whose complementizer has a semantic
function. By the Principle of Full Interpretation, it follows that adverbial
wh extraction is blocked out of a tensed complement just in case the
compJementizer is pr~sent at LF. In the approaches considered here, the
extraction properties were tied directly to the presence of the
complementizer. Furthermore, IP is stipulated to be a barrier unless L~
marked, and the L-marking of IP is accomplished by movement of the [V-
I] complex to C at LF.
It was observed that the complementizer effects in question are a sort of
Minimality effect. A formulation of the definitioc of antecedent
government was then developed which would directly block antecedent
government over a complcmentizer, or any other nongoverning head,
present at LF, thus capturing the Minimality effect. This approach
proceeded on the assumption that INFL, or its component heads, are
extended projections of V in a way that C isn't. On the basis of this
assumption, the government domain of V extended automatically to all of
IP, where the government domain of a head X, occurring in the
configuration in (14), was defined as in (15).
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( 14)
XP
A
ex. x'
A
x YP
A
P y '
A
Y
(15) GD(X) = {a, YP, ~, y', Y}
If I is an extended projection of V, then the government domains of V and I
are fused into an extended government domain (EGO).
government was defined as follows.
Antecedent
(16)
a an teceden t governs Piff
a. a binds P (a c-commands 13, and a and 13 ar'e coindexed), and
b. There is an EOD containing both a and p.
The possibility of antecedent government across IP then depends on the
configuration resulting from movement of [V-I] to C at LF. If the
complementizer that is absent at LF, then [V-I] substitutes into C; in this
case, the verbal features of V-I are transmitted to C, and so spec-CP
becomes part of the the EOD(V.. I), so a constituent in spec-CP can
antecedent govern into IP. If the complementizer that is present at LF, then
[V-I] adjoins to C, and in this case the verbal features of V-I are not
transmitted to C, and the C system is not included in EGD(V-I), so a
constituent in spec-CP does not antecedent govern into IP.
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The extension of the government domain of V depends directly on the
transmission of verbal features, which is assumed to be conditioned by the
features of the head. The GD(V) extends automatically to the I~system
since I (or its component heads) is an extended projection of V, and thus
carries the categorial [+V] features of V. The head C does not carry [+V],
but if [V~I] substitutes into C, then this feature can be transmitted directly
to C. However, if a lexical complementizer is present in C, then it carries
the feature [~V], which clashes with [+V]; the pres~nce of the
complementizer thereby blocks transmission of [+V] to C. Thus the effects
of the complementizer for the extension of the EGD(V~I) to C seem to fall
directly out of the notion of a government domain, together with
assumptions about the [+V] specification of various heads. Further
consideration of the effects of (16) in ECM and super raising constructions
led to refinements concerning the configurations in which EGOs can be
united. The condition that emerged from the discussion in Chapter 4 was
that the EGOs of two clauses are united when they overlap and do not
contain independent tense operators. When the EGOs of two tensed clauses
overlap, they are not fused since the two tensed clauses contain tense
operators that are independent of one another.
In the remainder of this section, the account of antecedent government
and wh extraction given in Chapter 4 and summarized above will be
compared with several frameworks for extraction theory developed in the
literature. The framework of Chapter 4 will henceforth be referred to as
the Government Domain (GD) framework.
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5.2.1 Lasnik and Saito (1984 , forthcoming)
In the framework of Lasnik and Saito, antecedent government is defined
as follows.
(17)
a an teceden t governs ~ iff
a. a binds ~ (a. c-commands P, and a and ~ are coindexed), and
b. There is no y (y=CP or NP) such that a c-commands y and
'Y dominates p, unless ~ is in spec-yo
This definition is expressed in terms of more primitive notions of the
theory, but in such a way that the notion of antecedent government cannot
be said to be derived from any more primitive notion of the theory. In
particular, anteced~nt government is not defined in terms of government,
nor explicitly related to government within the context of the theory. In the
account given in Chapter 4, on the other hand, the structural condition
involved in antecedent government is that ot the extended government
domain (EGO), which is directly defined in terms of the core cases of
government, and the sharing or transmission of verbal features.
U sing the notion of a legitimate LF object derived from Chomsky (Class
lectures, Fall 1990), the y-assignment mechanisms of L&S were simplified
to the extent that y was reduced to a privative feature assigned only to the
traces of moved arguments, and y-assignment was taken to apply freely at
s-s trueture or at LF.
The L&S framework and the GD framework differ crucially in their
treatments of that-type complementizers. L&S allow the complementizer
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that to delete or to be inserted at any level of derivation in any complement
clause. As a result, the presence of that at LF cannot be any part of the
account of why adverbial wh elements cannot extract out of factive or
response stance complements. Within the L&S framework, some other
provision would have to be made to block these extractions. Possibilities
include postulating a factive operator in spec-CP of a factive complement,
as in Melvold (1986), or assuming that factive verbs don't L-mark their
complement CPo
5.2.2 Chomsky's Barriers
The Barriers framework is similar to the GD theory in that antecedent
government is effectively reduced to government in both, although quite
differently in the two frameworks. In Barriers, the defectiveness of the 1-
s~lstem, according to which IP is not a barrier, makes the presence or
absence of a complementizer have no effect on extraction. As a result, the
possibility of adverbial w h extraction out of tensed complements does not
depend in the Barriers framework on the presence of the complementizer.
In the GO framework, antecedent government does not automatically extend
across IP, and whether it does so or not depends crucially on the presence
or absence of the complementizer at LF. The IP node is simply the upper
boundary of that part of the EGO(V-I) that is given purely on the basis of
the categorial features of the heads involved, without movement or
transmission of verbal features to a head that lacks them underlyingly.
Whether the EGD(V-I) can be extended to the C-system depends on whether
or not a semantically contentfu] complementizer occupies Co. The
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possibilities of adverbial wh extraction are therefore tied to the presence or
absence of a semantically contentfu! complementizer in C.
As with L&S, the import of these differences is that the extraction facts
out of factive and response stance complements would be captured within
the Barriers framework by positing a factive operator t not readily
extendable to response stance complements, or by making assumptions
about the capacity of factive verbs to L-mark their complement CPs.
Cinque (1990) presents the latter option explicitly; see Chapter 3 above and
section 5.2.3 below for discussion of this approach. Within the GO
framework, the adverbial wh extraction facts out of all tensed complements
follows on the basis of the theory of the semantic role (or lack thereof) of
the complementizer.
5.2.3 Cinque (1990)
Cinque (1990) develops a post-Barriers extraction framework
incorporating a number of elements from Rizzi (1990), and a number of
original elements as well. The locality condition for adverbial w h traces
and argument traces are explicitly separated within this framework. The
locality condition for adverbial wh extraction is the following [po 42].
(18) Definition of barrier for government
Every maximal projection that fails to be directly selected by
a category nondis tinct from [+V] is a barrier for governmen t.
The complementizer system is assumed to share in the feature [+V], as set
forth in the following passage.
200
Finally, concerning the [+V] requiremen t, it can be noted that I
and C, if not intrinsically [+V] categories, are at least conlpatible
with [+V] elements (witness their ability to host verbs in some
languages). Thus, they can be taken to be (at least) nondistinct
from [+V] categories. [po 41]
Given that the complementizer is nondistinct from [+V], the barrierhood of
IP is voided by the fact that C selects IP.
The conceptual problems with this are that it is not clear that
complementizers should be regarded as categorially nondis tinct from [+V],
and still less clear that they should be regarded as selecting IP. To begin
with the first point, INFL, or some core subset of its components, seems to
accompany any clausal instance of VP, whereas the projection of the C-
system depends on the nature of the clause. Even infinitival clauses have a
projection of INFL, although agreement features (or Agr heads) may be
missing or null, and the Tense operator may be unspecified for [±past].
However, on most theories of infinitival structure, not all infinitives have a
CP node. Furthermore, whereas INFL (T or Agr) seems to be critically
related to V across languages, the associa·ion of C with V is limited to a
fraction of languages in which C seems to host verbal elements; this is a
phenomenon worthy of investigation, and may indicate that C is involved
with I and V in these languages in a way that it isn't in other languages,
but given their comparative lack of universality in contrast to INFL-V
interactions, such phenomena do not seem to justify the general
categorization of complementizers as [+V] in the same way that INFL- V
interactions justify the general categorization of INFL as [+V]. In the
above chapters of the present work, it was suggested that some
complementizers playa semantic role. This leaves an open question as to
why a CP node is present, as in propositional complements, when there is
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nc semantically contentful complementizer in Co. But if it is right that
(some) complementizers have a semantic function, then this function can be
examined to see whether it would provide a basis for the categorization of
complementizers as [+V], or whether, on the contrary, it suggests that
complementizers should be wholly distinct from the verbal system. Insofar
as complementizers have been identified here as having semantic content,
inducing a presupposition that the contents of the complement clause
actually occurred in a factive complement, or are at issue in the discourse
in a response stance complement, their content would seem to identify
complementizers along more traditional lines as markers of assertoric force
rather tban as verbal elements.
Concerning the second point, namely Cinque's assumption that C
selects IP, it is not clear within standard theory why a that-type
complementizer is required at all. It does not appear that the
complementizer is a predicate that semantically selects IP as an argument.
If this is correct, then C does not select IP under standard conceptions of
selection. 1 Nevertheless, as Cinque notes [po 41], lie cannot take any
complement other than IP." The question is whether this is due to any sort
of selectional property of C, or some other sort of property. Within
standard theory, since the function of the complementizer is not clear, it is
unclear as well why the complementizer should regularly occur in the
structural relation it has to IP, that is, in Cinque's words, it is unclear why
1To quote Gnnishaw (1979): "Subcategorization expresses restrictions between predicates and
the syntactic category of their complements. Semantic selection expresses restrictions between
predicates and the semantic type of thel':, complements." Thus ifcomplementizer is not a
predicate that takes IP as an argument, then C does not semantically select IP or subcategorize
IP. In the tenns of Pesetsky (1979), capturing the same disrlnctionjust quoted from Grimshaw,
the complementizer does not c(ategory)wselect IP or s(emantically)-select IP.
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tic cannot lake any complement other than IP. tI We can imagine that the
binary branch between C and IP might be stipulated within XI -theory. But
this gets away from the conception of XI -theory as a mere schema, that in
(19), from Chomsky (1986b), where, in a tradition dating back to Stowell
(1981), further properties of phrase structure are determined by predicate
and argument relations, thematic properties of heads, case requirements,
and so on.
(19) a. XP --t YP XI
b. Xl --t X ZP
But while standard theory leaves the exact relationship between C and IP
unclear, and thus leave it unclear whether this relation is one of selection,
the theory of the semantic content of some complementizers given here
suggests a specification of the relationship between C and IP. Recall from
Chapter 2 above that propositional predicates select tensed complements of
the form CP<e>, with a free event variable, whereas factive verbs select a
tensed complement of the form CP<>, with no free event variable. On this
theory, the complementizer mediates between a clausal complement taking
verb, with its selectional requirements on the event structure of the
complement, and the actual event structure of the complement clause. In
paticular, in a factive complement, the complemen tizer that discharges the
event position at IP, producing a CP<> complement appropriate. for the
higher, factive, predicate. On this account, the semantics of factive
complementation require the complementizer that to occur in Co of the
complement clause. So in factive complementation, the complementizer has
a semantic function by virtue of which its presence is required, and in the
context of this function, the complementizer stands in a semantic relation to
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IP. However, this relation is not one of selection. The factive
complementizer does not select IP, but it is required in order to discharge
the event position of the complement clause at the IP node.
Thus, in some cases at least, the semantiC' relationship of the
complementizer that to IP can be specified as nonselectional. Since the
semantic relation of that-type complementizers to IP is elsewhere (in
propositional complements) obscure, if nonexistent, there seem to be no
good grounds for asserting that C selects IP in general.
In assuming that C selects IP, and that C is nondistinct from [+ V],
Cinque assures, from his definition of barriers for government given in
(18) above, that antecedent government will occur freely over that-type
complementizers. This precludes appeal to the obligatoriness of the
complementizer in the explanation of the extraction facts from factive
complements. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 3 above, Cinque argues that
factive complements are not directly selected by the verb, specifically, that
they are 9-marked but not L-marked by the factive verb. This argument
was found to be questionable, resting on a faulty assimilation of factive
complements to manner of speaking complements; see section 3.1.2 above.
5.2.4 Rizzi (1990)
In Rizzi's (1990) framework of Relativized Minimality, A movement,
At movement, and head movement are blocked respectively by an
intervening A specifier, At specifier, or head. Of greatest: concern for
issues discussed in this disset:tation, At movement is blocked by an
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intervening A' specifier. In particular, as has been noted in the literature
(see Frampton 1990c), if this is to be the account of the failure of adverbial
w h extraction over negative elements (the "inner islands" of Ross 1967), as
Rizzi claims, then each inner island context must involve an intervening A'
operator situated in an intervening Al specifier. The range of cases
involved includes the following, from Frampton (1990c).
(20)
a. * I know how passionately she does not like soccer
b. * I know how passionately she never/seldom/rarely likes soccer
c. * I know how passionately few people like soccer these days
In order to account for the inner island of sentential negation in (20a),
Rizzi assumes that Neg is an At -operator in spec-IP. In this position,
Rizzi claims, Neg blocks adverbial wh extraction by Relativized
Minimality. Furthermore, Rizzi claims that Neg in spec-IP induces do
support in English examples like the following.
(21) a. John does nct smoke
b. * Jobn not smokes
The reason is that the V-I complex formed by lowering of the inflectional
affix at S-structure (see Pollock 1989 and Chomsky 1989) produces, on
Rizzi's account, an A' operator which must raise at LF to a position
governing the trace of the lowered inflectional head. As an A' operator,
the V-I complex would be subject to Relativized Minimality effects by the
At operator Neg in spec-IP. Therefore V-I cannot raise, and so the affix
lowering derivation is blocked. Instead, the inflectional affix can be
realized on the verb do, inserted in I for this purpose, yielding (21 a). Note
that Chomsky's (1989) assumption that the V-I complex raises to I at LF
would not do for Rizzi since this would not involve raising V-lover Neg
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situated in spec-IP. Rizzi t s account requires that t.he V-I complex raise at
LF to a position higher than spec-IP so that Relativized Minimality is
violated. 2 Rizzi gives no reason for this. It might be thought to follow
from the status of V-I as an operator, which would require it to raise to an
At specifier or an adjunction site above spec-IP. But then, as Frampton
(1990c) notes, we are faced with the oddity of a complex head raising to an
At specifier or to an adjunction site.
In any event, in (20b, c), the negative operator must also be in an At
specifier to create an inner island; as Rizzi notes [fn.18, p.116], this is
problematic since the negative adverb does not induce do support.
(22) a. John never arrived late
b. John seldom arrived late
But Rizzi notes that the negative adverb can appear in pre-INFL position,
as in the following.
(23) a. John never has arrived late
b. John seldom has arrived late
This leads Rizzi to suggest that the negative adverb is in pre-INFL position
in (22), in which case (if it ;s far enough pre-INFL) it will not induce do
support. But as Frampton (1990c) notes, no reason has been given for
why the negative adverb should not be able to appear in spec-IP, regardless
of where else it can occur. And if the negative adverb can appear in spec-
IP, then there ought to exist a derivation in which do support is called
upon, yielding the following:
2Spec-IP is occupied by Neg so V-I would presumably not be able to move into spec-IP, and so
would have to raise above spec-IP.
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(24) * John never did arrive late (lie with unstressed do)
But such is not the case.
Frampton (1990c) suggest a modification of Rizzi's treatment of inner
islands, assuming the Relativized Minimality framework, in which all
negative phrases in (20) involve the presence of NegP together with a null
negative operator generated in spec-NegP. This establishes negation as an
At operator for the application of Relativized Minimality, but in a uniform
way, with the operator closely tied to the head Neg. The do support facts
can be captured assuming that sentential negation is a lexical head Neg,
accompanied by a null negative operator in spec-NegP, whereas the
negative adverb is (or is accompanied by) a negiative operator in spec-
NegP, accompanied by a null head. Then the sentential negation would
interfere with the head-to-head movement involved hi raising V-I at LF, but
the negative adverb wouldn't. 3
On the GD account, sentential negation occupies a head Neg, and other
forms of negation are accompanied by a null head Neg. It was assumed in
Chapter 4 that Neg raises to I and that the Neg-I complex raises to C at LF.
Since Neg has no verbal features, it was assumed that in the configuration
[c £I I Neg] C] produced by raising Neg-I to C, Neg blocks the
transmission of verbal feature to C. Therefore, the presence of Neg blocks
the extension of the EGD(V-I) to the C-system, so adverbial w h extraction
is blocked out of inner islands. Note that on this account, given the head
3For this to go through, the null head accompanying the negative adverb should not have any
effect on head·to-head movement of V-I.
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Neg, whether null or overt, which is assumed to be required whenever
negation is present, there is no need !o posit null negative operators.
The clailT' of greater uniformity for the GD system over Relativized
Minimality becomes stronger when factive contexts are taken into
consideration. The Reiativized Minimality framework does not provide any
treatment of factive contexts other than ones that have been rejected here.
If there is a factive operator in spec-CP of a factive complement, then the
failure of adverbial wh extraction out of factive complements would follow
from Relativized Minimality, but, as noted in Chapter 3 above, the factive
operator could nCrt be present at S-structure, and so would have to be
inserted at LF. Rizzi (1990) does not pursue this option, but falls back on
the analysis of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), that the factive complement
is embedded within an NP. The OD account, in contrast, blocks adverbial
w h extraction out of factive complements due to the effect of the factive
complementizer, which blocks the extension of the EGD(V-I) within the
factive complement to the C system of the complement clause. The
treatment of factive islands is therefore parallel to that of inner islands: in
both cases, a non governing head intervenes in the extension of the EGD(V-
I) to C, thereby blocking antecedent government across Co and into IP.
Rizzi (1990) also presents a unique account of camp trace effects.
Noting that agreement features surface on the complementizer in many
languages, Rizzi assumes that Agr can be generated in compo When Agr is
generated in camp in the presence of a wh trace in spec.. CP, then Agr
acquires the index of that trace through spec-head agreement, and thereby
agrees with the extracted constituent. The possibility of subject extraction
208
depends on Agr being generated in Co and meeting two requirements: (i)
Agr in Co must properly head govern the initial trace of the subject in spec-
IP; and (ii) Agr must agree with the subject through spec-head agreement
with a trace of the subject in spec·CP. The presence of a complementizer
in Co blocks the generation of Agr there and thus blocks subject extraction.
As noted by Frampton (1990c), the requirement that Agr in Co agre~
with the extracted subject makes the licensing condition on the subject trace
n(\t purely one of proper head government, but something much more akin
to antecedent gov~rnrnent by the trace in spec-CP. To the extent that this is
true, explicit antecedent government accounts such as those of Lasnik &
Saito and that presented here are perhaps more straightforward accounts of
comp trace effects. Concerning the appearance of agreement features on
complementizer:, this would presumably follow from the raising of I, or
the V·I complex, to C at LF, as assumed here. This was invoked in the
discussion of West Flemish in Chapter 4, where the account of
complementizer agreement was adopted from Law (1991).
5.3 Topics for Further Inquiry
The main claim of this dissertation is that factive and response stance
complenlcntizers have a semantic function which makes them obligatory at
LF, cy Chomsky's Principle of Full Interpretation, and that this determines
the adverbial wh extraction facts out of factive and response stance
complements. The complementizer of propositional complement clauses
has no semantic function in English and therefore must delete at LF,
allowing adverbial wh extraction out of propositional complements. One
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question left open by this approach is why that-type complementizers are
obligatory in propositional complements in many languages~ including, for
example, French, Spanish~ and Italian. The facts of adverbial w h
extraction out of deeply multiply embedded propositional complements in
these languages, discussed in Chapter 3~ shows that propositional
complements are present at LF in these languages. Adhering to Full
Interpretation~ it follows that the propositional complementizer should play
a semantic role at LF in such languages. The discussion of indicative
complements in Italian in section 5.1.2 above, adapting ideas from
Scorretti (1991)~ suggested a semantic function for the nondeletable
propositional complementizers in Italian, those introducing tensed
indicative clauses~ namely that they provide lexical support for the
independent tense operator of the indicative complement. Whether such a
semantic tole can be found for nondeletable propositional complementizers
across all the various languages in which they are found is a topic for
further inquiry. The same holds for the few nondeletable propositional
complementizers in English~ such as in complements of assert, conjecture~
and propose. By Full Interpretation~ the complementizer in complements of
these verbs should have a semantic function that is not shared. by
complementizers in complements of other propositional verbs such as think
believe, and say. The requisite delineation of differences in propositional
complementation across different propositional complement taking verbs in
English would seem to require a more detailed look at properties of these
verbs than was undertaken here, and is another topic for further inquiry.
A more mysterious and fundamental open problem left by the present
work is what licenses the projection of the C-system, and of the
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complementizer when it occurs, in ordinary propositional complements in
languages like English where the complementizer apparently performs no
semantic function and is deletable at LF. As discussed in section 5.2.3
above, we would not want to stipulate the projection of the C-system in
phrase structure rules since, in current theorizing, the phrase structure
rules are a bare X' schema, with the categorial content of the actual
constituents involved determined by selectional properties of heads. If the
projection of the C-system is to fall out of selectional properties of heads,
it would presumably be that the propositional verb selects a CP
complemen t, more particularly, that the propositional verb selects Co as the
head of its complement. This could be stipulated as a fact of c-selection.
But this is quite unsatisfactory. Even where c-selection has been argued to
be independent of s-selection (Grimshaw 1979, Pesetsky 1982.. among
others) this independence takes the form of categorial variability across a
given semantic complement type, and semantic variability across a given
categorial complement typ,e; it does not take the form of syntactic categories
being introduced without any semantic content. If we stipulate the c-
selection of CP by a propositional V and the c-selection of IP by a
propositional complementizer, this will constitute a departure from building
up categorial structure from underlying lexical properties that are not
purely categorial in nature. Finally, since predicate argument structure is
not involved in the relation between Co and IP, their configuration would
not be determined by s-selection.
For factive complements, the relationship between Co and IP is not one
of semantic argument structure, so the sequence of heads V-C-I would not
be determined by s-selection. However, the semantic complementizer does
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playa semantic role, which provides a basis for determining the sequence
V-C-I in factive cODlplementation by c-selection. The problem with
propositional complementation in English is that there is no comparable
semantic role of the complementizer to provide a basis for c-selection of the
heads involved. The question then arises: why is the C-system projected in
propositional complements in English? This is left an open question by the
present work.
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